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Abstract 
This thesis engages with the biblical archive and its animals, asking what it means to read 
the Bible after Jacques Derrida’s “question of the animal”, that is, critical questions 
directed at the characterisations, representations and utilisations of animals past and 
present which deem animals distinctly different to humans in order to demarcate their 
inferiority. At the same time, it is a critical response to Derrida’s Bible. Derrida – arguably 
one of the most important and influential thinkers of the twentieth century – provides a 
significant philosophical contribution to the question of the animal. In animal studies, the 
Bible is treated as a foundational legacy for concepts of the “human” and is frequently held 
up to blame for a misplaced human hubris. Derrida too draws on the Bible in implicit and 
explicit ways to underpin his critique of human/animal distinctions. Building on Derrida’s 
work on animality, I provide close and critical interpretations of four crucial texts of the 
biblical archive. I argue that these biblical texts are caught up in irreducible tensions: on 
the one hand, these texts depict and describe how humans and animals alike abide as finite, 
fellow creatures under God as a justice to come which calls for a radical similitude and 
solidarity; on the other hand, animals are portrayed as objects that are mastered by humans 
to demonstrate God’s power over the living. God’s power thus resides in a double bind – it 
both displaces power from humans to show them as animals, and it simultaneously 
provides a model for human power over animal others. 
In the first chapter I explore the significance of Derrida’s motifs of nakedness and 
shame over nakedness for his critique of human/animal distinctions, arising from his 
reading of Genesis. Critically continuing Derrida’s play on myths of origin, I tackle the 
question of the first carnivorous man, Noah, in Genesis 9 in order to show how this text 
can both be read as a license to enact the sovereignty of man over animals, and, how this 
text radically resists such a reading in God’s covenant with all life, human and non-human.  
Following my exploration of myths of origin, the second chapter grapples with 
Derrida’s notion of a deconstructed subject through his emphasis on response and 
responsibility. Derrida puts forward the biblical response “here I am”, as the mark of 
vulnerability in every relation with the other. I explore what this responsible response 
might mean in the context of the Book of Daniel that portrays encounters between human, 
nonhuman animals and God. Developing Derrida’s injunction to follow the nonhuman 
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other, I argue that the double context of Daniel conveys two distinct visions of the concept 
of the political as animal: one, in which a fantasy for a harmonious domestication and 
cohabitation amongst rulers and their human and animal subjects is fostered under the only 
true ruler, a benign God; and, a collapse of such a fantasy, where rulers – human and 
divine – are portrayed as carnivorous, ferocious creatures who turn their subjects from pets 
to prey.  
The third chapter follows this collapse to Derrida’s critique of the commandment 
“Thou shalt not kill” as a commandment relating only to humans and thus a detrimental 
Judeo-Christian legacy. Derrida draws on the story of Cain and Abel to discuss the way the 
killing of an animal leads to the killing of a brother. To explore questions of killability I, 
however, turn to the negotiations of such issues in Acts 10. In the animal vision of Acts 10, 
questions of clean/unclean animals are suspended and hospitality is apparently opened up 
between Jewish and non-Jewish Christians. I demonstrate that the universalism associated 
with this text refers to an exclusive human fellowship which evades the actual implications 
of the animal vision. Yet, I posit that there are again two ways of reading the animal vision. 
In the first reading the analogical resemblance set up between animals and Gentiles implies 
that Gentiles too become killable as “clean” and thus the animal vision allows for 
indiscriminate killability amongst the living in general. In the second reading the cleanness 
of all animals is in fact a radical redemption of animal life for fellowship, in the same way 
that Peter accepts the fellowship and hospitality of Gentiles. Ultimately, the category of the 
living and the dead draws humans and non-humans together into what I call “mortability”; 
that is, the capacity for death shared amongst the living in the suspension of judgement 
until Jesus returns.  
In the fourth chapter, I follow up on the suspension of judgement by analysing 
Derrida’s thinking of sovereignty and animality in relation to Revelation 17. Crucially, 
Derrida’s logic of sovereignty includes Christ as lamb, in his logos or reason of the 
strongest, despite its ostensible weakness as a diminutive animal. I explore this further by 
turning to the scene of Revelation 17 in which the Lamb is at war with the Beast and the 
woman riding it. Developing Derrida’s allusions to sexual difference as it relates to the 
question of the animal, I explore how Revelation 17 denigrates both animals and women 
by characterising them as the figure of evil: Rome. The logic of the animal representations 
sets up the divine as the good on the side of the weak in the figure of the suffering Lamb. 
But as the Lamb becomes a beast-like indivisible sovereignty that asserts its reason of the 
strongest, the figures of “evil” become the vulnerable weak victims – the animal others. 
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Another image of Rome emerges, then, as a deconstructed sovereignty in the subjects that 
stand as powerless figures in the political order, namely the animals of the Roman arenas 
and the prostitutes of the Roman Empire.  
The four texts I examine abide in the ambiguous tensions of an archive that can in 
the end neither be presented as animal-friendly nor as straightforwardly anthropocentric. 
The biblical archive is a complex compendium fraught with tensions that can, with its 
animals, only be held in abeyance. There can be no final “ownership” proclaimed of this 
archive and its animals, nor can any interpretive act dis-suspend them from such an 
ambivalent state. These very different texts do, however, provide the material and 
momentum to show central and crucial instances of how the biblical archive characterises 
its humans, animals and gods. My analysis reveals that the very same spaces in which 
these characterisations might be fixed as detrimental to animal life, are where the 
possibilities of seeing animals radically otherwise lie.  
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Introduction  
Animal Questions, Biblical Blame, and Jacques Derrida 
While scholarship has been undertaken on the Bible and its relationship to animals, it has 
tended to fall between negative or positive accounts. I argue that there is a need for 
nuanced interpretations of biblical texts which abide in the ambiguous tensions of these 
texts that can in the end neither be presented as animal-friendly nor as straightforwardly 
anthropocentric. Building on Jacques Derrida’s work on animality, I present interpretations 
of four crucial texts in the biblical archive: the aftermath of the flood where humans are 
given animals to eat in Genesis 9, the story of Daniel following his God amongst the lions 
in the Book of Daniel, the question of Jewish-non-Jewish fellowship over clean/unclean 
animals in Acts of the Apostles 10, and the battle between the Lamb and the Whore who 
rides a Beast in Revelation 17. These very different texts provide the material and 
momentum to show some instances of how “the Bible” characterises its humans, animals 
and gods. I propose that, in fact, often in the very same spaces in which these 
characterisations might be fixed as detrimental to animal life, the possibilities of seeing 
animals radically otherwise also lie. 
I argue that both Derrida’s use of the Bible for thinking about animals, and the 
biblical texts I examine on the subject of animality, abide in an irreducible tension: on the 
one hand, humans and animals alike abide as finite, fellow creatures under God as a justice 
to come that calls for a radical similitude and solidarity; on the other, animals are portrayed 
as the subjects that are mastered by humans to demonstrate divine-like power over the 
living. God’s power is thus a double bind – it both displaces power from humans to show 
them as animals, and simultaneously provides a model for power over others as God has 
power over the living, mimicked by humans over those they call animals. Derrida’s 
critique of the “human” draws upon the biblical archive to develop what I call his 
“awakening” to the animal other as the condition for ethics as response and responsibility. 
For him, the Bible is ostensibly part of an intellectual inheritance that needs critical 
rethinking in regard to animals, but at the same time, he draws on biblical resources to 
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counter the philosophical heritage he critiques. Yet it is important to not rest there, as if 
Derrida has the last word. Picking up where he left off, intending to say, “if we have time, 
a word about the Bible”,1 there are yet many more words required in following Derrida’s 
thinking today in our own time, and many more words and creatures of the Bible still to be 
thought, followed and responded to.  
Three questions will have to be addressed in this introduction. First, a double one: 
why the question of the animal? What is this “question of the animal”? Secondly, why the 
Bible? And finally, why Jacques Derrida as an interlocutor? I will attempt to respond to 
these questions, contextualizing my contribution to what is termed animal studies, 
followed by an outline of my thesis argument. Three points form the premise of this thesis: 
(1) in animal studies the Bible is seen as an important, “originary” legacy in, and of, 
Western culture over notions of the “human”, and is frequently held up to blame for 
anthropocentric attitudes; (2) Jacques Derrida provides a significant philosophical 
contribution to the “question of the animal”; (3) Derrida too draws on the Bible in implicit 
and explicit ways to underpin his critique of human/animal distinctions. I argue that 
Derrida’s use of the Bible in relation to animality requires attention and analysis, and, that 
the biblical archive needs to be revisited in light of the blame accorded to it as well as in 
light of Derrida’s thought on animality.  
 
Humanity’s Identity Crisis: Sovereign Subject No More? 
Concern and compassion for animals is nothing new. From Pythagoras to Theophrastus, 
Seneca to Porphyry, Percy and Mary Shelly to Arthur Schopenhauer, Jeremy Bentham, 
John Locke and John Stuart Mill to Jacques Derrida, the debate around attitudes to, and 
appropriation of, animals has existed. But from an increased interest in animals burgeoning 
in the 1970s, the last three decades have seen this interest gain momentum towards 
rethinking more radically and systematically animal life as a subject in the Humanities. 
The “question of violence and compassion toward animals has, in a certain sense, become 
one of the leading questions of our age.”2 The question of the animal is born out from what 
might be classed as two crises, overlapping to some extent in both being related to the 
concept of the “human”, its powers, properties and place in the world. The first is the crisis 
                                                          
1
 BS I, 343. 
2
 Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal From Heidegger To Derrida (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), 113. 
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of the subject and the desired “exiting” of something like an “epoch of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity”,3 promulgated perhaps most prominently by thinkers such as Martin 
Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan and 
again Derrida. This crisis has taken shape under the shadow of the Enlightenment era as a 
critique of conceptualizations of the human subject, particularly around concepts of 
autonomy, consciousness, freedom and reason. Derrida characterises the way in which this 
Enlightenment subject has come under critique as “absolute origin, pure will, identity to 
self, or presence to self of consciousness”.4 
Notions of the subject in relation to definitions of humans could be thought as far 
back as Aristotle’s writings, but the idea of the subject as it is understood today comes 
most clearly to the fore with René Descartes’s famous je pense donc je suis, or the, Cogito 
ergo sum, and what is characterised as the beginning of modernity.
5
 It has become 
commonplace, as Nick Mansfield points out, to characterise the modern era as an era of the 
subject.
6
 The intellectual trends sparked by critiques of the subject proffer interrogations of 
the debt of Enlightenment thinkers such as Descartes, Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, and the ways in which their thinking undergirds modern conceptions of selfhood 
as well as socio-political structures and institutions.
7
 An important work in this regard is 
Theodor W. Adorno’s and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, published in 
1944, that put forward a powerful critique of an Enlightenment tradition and rationalist 
thinking that appeared to go hand in hand with the bloodshed of the twentieth century.
8
 
They asked why humanity has not entered into a new kind of living but rather sunk “into a 
                                                          
3
 Jean Luc Nancy, “‘Eating Well’ or the Calculation of the Subject”, in Points… Interviews, 1974 – 1994, 
trans. Peter Connor and Avital Ronell, ed. Elisabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 257. 
4
 Derrida is in fact being somewhat facetious here in that he is questioning Heidegger’s characterisation of an 
“epoch of subjectivity”, by giving the example of Spinoza as someone who does not present a metaphysics of 
absolute subjectivity. EW, 265. 
5
 René Descartes, Discourse on the Method, trans. J. Veitch (Amherst NY: Prometheus Books, 1989 [1637]) 
and Principles of Philosophy, trans. Valentine R. Miller and Reese P. Miller (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1991 [1644]). As Nick Mansfield points out, in Descartes “we find together two principles that 
Enlightenment thought has both emphasized and adored: firstly, the image of the self as the ground of all 
knowledge and experience of the world (before I am anything, I am I) and secondly, the self as defined by 
the rational faculties it can use to order the world (I make sense).” Nick Mansfield, Subjectivity: Theories of 
the Self from Freud to Haraway (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 15. 
6
 Mansfield, Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway, 13. 
7
 Mansfield discusses the importance of Heidegger’s critiques of the subject as something determined by 
certain attributes such as consciousness or reason; what Heidegger proposes we ought to consider, rather, is a 
more fundamental ground for the subject, namely existence itself, Dasein. Foucault’s name has stood for a 
thinking of subjectivity that is not a naturally occurring “thing” that anyone has, but rather a construct of 
dominant socio-economic, political and cultural structures and institutions.
 
For further discussion see 
Mansfield, Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway. 
8
 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Verso, 1997 [1944]) 
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new kind of barbarism.”9 In 1947, Heidegger asks in his “Letter on Humanism”, how 
meaning can be restored to the term “humanism” and critiques ways in which humanism 
has been understood in relation to man, his essence and existence.
10
 The story for Adorno 
and Horkeimer was one in which humanity had not met its own expectations and had 
trusted too much in the triumphs of modern consciousness.
11
 The Enlightenment “must 
examine itself, if men are not to be wholly betrayed.”12 Liberating people from superstition 
and myths seems, for them, to have resulted in a sovereignty of man (or the autonomy, 
power, will and force of the subject) that manifested itself in domination and mastery of 
nature, power, technology as well as other people on the grounds of calculation and 
utility.
13
 As a result of such examinations and critiques, Calarco suggests that the subject 
has become disassociated from “the autonomous, domineering, atomistic subject of 
modernity”, but rather recognises his or her coming into being by and from events, powers, 
structures, cultures and institutions.
14
  “The subject, when understood as one who bears and 
is responsible to an event and alterity that exceeds it”, is, then, not a “fully self-present and 
self-identical subject”.15 This latter idea would be the subject “whose existence and death 
have been proclaimed in the discussions over humanism and the metaphysics of 
subjectivity.”16  
Discussions of the subject and critiques of the Enlightenment are of course diverse, 
complex and multifaceted, and by no means form a straightforward consensus. Similarly, 
the “Enlightenment tradition” is itself an amorphous and composite web of thinkers far 
more diverse and multifarious than implied here. But, broadly speaking, particular 
conceptions associated with Enlightenment thought concerning the subject and its relation 
to autonomy, reason, freedom, the individual and consciousness, have come under close 
                                                          
9
 Ibid., xi. 
10
 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, Basic Writings, ed. David F. Krell 
(New York/London: Routledge, 2011), 149. Heidegger propoes that the first humanism, “Roman humanism, 
and every kind that has emerged from that time to the present, has presupposed the most universal ‘essence’ 
of man to be obvious. Man is considered to be an animal rationale.” Ibid., 154. This is not only a literal 
translation of the Greek, but a metaphysical one as well, he argues. Metaphysics, Heidegger says, thinks of 
the human being on “the basis of animalitas and not in the direction of his humanitas.” Ibid. The human body 
and existence is something essentially different to animals, according to him, and so humanism and the 
human must be rethought on this basis. Derrida critiques Heidegger for this supposition on several occasions. 
See GHH, 169-173, TATTIA, especially 142-160, and most fervently and closely perhaps throughout BS II.  
11
Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xi. 
12
 Ibid., xv. 
13
 Ibid., 4. 
14
 Calarco, Zoographies, 12. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
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and critical scrutiny in the last century, a scrutiny that appears to have generally taken the 
form of a “crisis” as to what the human subject is or might be. 
The second crisis is the ecological concern for the natural world, the seemingly 
detrimental impact of human life and civilization in the world, and the critical attempts to 
alter attitudes to the world’s natural resources, the environment, and the habitat in which 
humans and animals live.
17
 Ecological thought could be characterised as a “humiliating 
descent” for humans.18 Tracing such a “descent” much further back than the twentieth 
century critique of the Enlightenment subject, Timothy Morton argues that from 
“Copernicus through Marx, Darwin and Freud, we learn we are decentered beings, 
inhabiting a Universe of processes that happen whether we are aware of them or not, 
whether we name those processes ‘astrophysics’, ‘economic relations’, ‘the unconscious’ 
or ‘evolution’”.19A major element of the current ecological crisis is species extinction; 
animals and their disappearance thus serve as a wake-up call and horror mirror-image to 
humans. Mary Midgley calls the relations between humans and the world a “war” against 
nature, and proposes that it is only recently that,  
modern people might actually in some monstrous sense win their bizarre war, that 
they might ‘defeat nature’, thus cutting off the branch that they have been sitting 
on, and thus upsetting, not only the poets, but the profit-margin as well. To grasp 
this change calls for an unparalleled upheaval in our moral consciousness.
20
  
A double anxiety is embedded in animal species extinction: first, a sense of responsibility 
and guilt at animals disappearing at what appears an alarming and unprecedented rate; 
secondly, a recognition of humans as vulnerable (human) animals who may suffer the same 
fate if a balance is not regained of sustainability in the ecosphere. The ecological crisis and 
concern for the environment has functioned as a profound challenge to what is now 
condemned as human sovereignty. Critical questions as to human superiority and a self-
serving human culture are rife in debates over the state of the world today, and much of 
this debate figures as a powerful indictment of humanity, calling for radical change. Such 
change is not merely about practical alterations to some human lifestyles, industry and 
                                                          
17
 For further discussions of ecology see for instance Timothy Morton’s work, The Ecological Thought 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) and Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental 
Aesthetics (Cambridge MA: Hardvard University Press, 2007). For an interesting and critical discussion of 
ecology, animality and humanism, see Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order, trans. Carol Volk 
(Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1992]). 
18
 Timothy Morton, “Thinking Ecology: The Mesh, the Strange Stranger and the Beautiful Soul”, Collapse VI 
(2008): 265.  
19
 Ibid., 265. 
20
 Mary Midgley, The Myths We Live By (Oxford/New York: Routledge, 2004), 171. 
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culture – existing at the cost of the natural world and its resources – but about attitudes to 
the very concept of humanity and its place in the world.  
 As a general backdrop to these two crises, another important factor for the rise of 
animal studies comes from the natural sciences. Zoological, ethological and ecological 
research has provided the empirical grounds and impetus for reassessing dominant 
assumptions about the differences between human and animal life. Merely one example is 
tool use, commonly thought to be a uniquely human characteristic. Research done in 
behavioural ecology shows for example the new Caledonian Crows who can be observed 
to not only frequently use tools but also to manufacture tools, create new designs to suit 
their needs and select tools according to task.
21
 The destabilization of concepts and 
characteristics thought to be exclusive to, and definitional of, humans, has set in motion 
something of an “identity crisis”. As Cary Wolfe points out, such knowledge has “called 
into question our ability to use the old saws of anthropocentrism (language, tool use, the 
inheritance of cultural behaviors, and so on) to separate ourselves once and for all from 
animals”.22 He argues that the humanities are “now struggling to catch up with a radical 
revaluation of the status of nonhuman animals”.23 Wolfe also draws attention to new 
theoretical paradigms over the past few decades – cybernetics and systems theory, chaos 
theory – paradigms that “have had little use and little need for the figure of the human as 
either foundation or explanatory principle.”24 Troubling absolute distinctions between 
humans and animals has opened up most pertinently, perhaps, questions of ethics in 
reflecting on the status of animals in relation to humans, and a concomitant attempt to 
rethink the exclusivity of human rights and strictly human ethical considerations.
25
   
Pragmatic questions are raised over the appropriation and exploitation of nature and 
its resources for human gain, animal life as a commodity and commercial industry, along 
with an existential probing of human progress and its questionable status today, for the 
                                                          
21
 There are numerous books now that testify to characteristics thought to belong to humans observed in 
various animal species, such as the research done by Jane Goodall, Arthur Schaller and Dian Fossey, 
developed from the founders of modern ethology, Niko Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz. More about the 
Caledonian Crows can be found on the website of the Oxford University research group on Behavioural 
Ecology: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~kgroup/tools/introduction.shtml.  
22
 Cary Wolfe, ed. Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2003), xi. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 See for instance Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (California: University of California Press, 2004 
[1983]), Robert Garner, Animal Rights: The Changing Debate (New York: New York University Press, 
1997) and Paul Waldau, Animal Rights: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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future, and our place (or survival) in it as a species. The question of the animal, Calarco 
exhorts, “should be seen as one of the central issues in contemporary critical discourse”, 
rather than tucked away somewhere distant and unimportant as a niche in applied ethics.
26
 
Moral philosopher Christine M. Korsgaard writes of animals:  
many of these individuals are complex centres of subjectivity, conscious beings, 
who experience pleasure and pain, fear and hunger, joy and grief, attachments to 
particular others, curiosity, fun and play, satisfaction and frustration, and the 
enjoyment of life. And these are all things that, when we experience them, we take 
to ground moral claims on the consideration of others.
27
 
Why, then, are animals ipso facto excluded from such consideration? Marc R. Fellenz calls 
this exclusion an “inattention” on the part of moral philosophers,28 and suggests it is “the 
challenge philosophy must face in the coming century”.29 The question of the animal, then, 
is (1) an appeal to face and challenge the industrialization, commercialization, exploitation 
and objectification of animals and the suffering this entails in the contemporary world; (2) 
a concern and care for the impact of anthropocentrism for wider ecological, environmental, 
political and ethical issues; and (3) a critical engagement with conceptions of the subject in 
light of current philosophical and scientific discourse, along with a commitment to 
revaluate concepts of the “human” and “animal” in scientific, political, literary, religious 
and philosophical traditions, past and present. 
The surge of interest in the topic of animals in the Humanities has accelerated in 
the last few decades, with research that has steadily received more and more critical 
attention, reaching a pitch in the last ten years. Earlier scholars such as Peter Singer, 
Richard Ryder, Andrew Linzey, Tom Regan and Mary Midgley fought for academic 
attention in the 1970s and 80s, focusing on animal rights and animal liberation, building on 
the pioneers of utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, for an appeal to 
decrease the suffering and pain of animals. In the 1990s the debate continued to explore the 
differences between humans and animals and what this might mean both philosophically 
and politically.
30
 This is coupled with feminist issues of exclusion and marginalization, 
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 Calarco, Zoographies, 1.  
27
 Christine M. Korsgaard, “Facing the Animal You See in the Mirror”, The Harvard Review of Philosophy 
XVI  (2009), 3. 
28
 Marc R. Fellenz, The Moral Menagerie: Philosophy and Animal Rights (Urbana and Chicago: University 
of Illinois Press, 2007), 5. 
29
 Fellenz, The Moral Menagerie, 6. 
30
 See for instance James J. Sheehan and Morton Sosna, eds., The Boundaries of Humanity: Humans, 
Animals, Machines (Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford: University of California Press, 1991), Robert Garner, ed. 
Animal Rights, The Changing Debate (New York: New York University Press, 1997), David Degrazia, 
Taking Animals Seriously, Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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with for instance Carol J. Adams’ work.31 The turn of the century and onwards has only 
seen an increase of this interest with a range of thought-provoking scholarship on animals, 
from Stephen R. L Clark’s The Political Animal: Biology, Ethics and Politics,32 Peter 
Atterton and Matthew Calarco’s Animal Philosophy, Ethics and Identity,33 Wolfe’s (ed) 
Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal,
34
 to Fellenz’s The Moral Menagerie: 
Philosophy and Animal Rights, Paola Cavalieri’s (ed) The Death of the Animal: A 
Dialogue,
35
 and Calarco’s Zoographies: The Question of the Animal From Heidegger To 
Derrida,
36
 to mention only a few of the most significant examples.
37
 This scholarship 
engages historically, ethically and philosophically with animal issues,
38
 from questions of 
the human/animal distinction and whether it can be retained,
39
 to extensive discussions of 
                                                          
31
 See for instance The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (New York: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010 [1990]); Neither Man Nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals (New 
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Josephine Donovan (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1995) as well as their Feminist Care 
Tradition in Animal Ethics: A Reader (New York: University of Columbia Press, 2007). Much work has been 
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350-75, and more recently Lori Gruen and Kari Weil, eds. Special Issue “Animal Others”, Hypatia 27. 3 
(2012). 
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 Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco, eds., Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity (London: Continuum, 
2004). 
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Press, 2003). 
35
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36
 Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal From Heidegger To Derrida (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008). 
37
 This is only continuing with the second decade of the twenty-first century, beginning with a number of 
prominent animal-focused publications; to name a few, Stanley Cavell et al, eds., Philosophy and Animal Life 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), Tom Beauchamp and RG Frey, Oxford handbook of Animal 
Ethics (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A 
Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Kathy Rudy, Loving Animals: 
Toward a New Animal Advocacy (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2011) and  F. Bailey 
Norwood and Jason Lusk, Compassion, By the pound: The Economics of Farm Animal Welfare (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press,  2011). These were quickly followed by Margo Demello, Animals and Society: An 
Introduction to Human-Animal Studies (New York: Colombia University Press, 2012), Jeffrey Jerome 
Cohen, ed. Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics and Objects (Washington DC: Oliphant Books, 2012) and 
Tom Tyler, Ciferae: A Bestiary in Five Fingers (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).  
38
 See particularly Calarco’s Zoographies for the Continental Philosophy tradition, and Clark’s The Political 
Animal: Biology, Ethics and Politics, for a thorough discussion of philosophical traditions on animals, 
particularly Aristotle and Plato, but that also touches excellently on slavery, children, women, kings and apes 
in relation to rethinking the concept of the animal. 
39
 Calarco’s thesis, for instance, is that human/animal distinctions should no longer be maintained, and that 
we must move away altogether from anthropological modes of thought. Calarco concludes with a critique of 
Derrida for maintaining the two terms “human” and “animal” despite his criticism of the absurd distinction 
they are founded on, calling this a rarely dogmatic moment in Derrida’s writing. Calarco, Zoographies, 3, 10, 
143-148. In my opinion it is rather that Derrida insists on a number of limits and distinctions, as he argues in 
VAA. But further, that it is not as simple a matter of just erasing the word “animal” (or “human”) and thus 
acting as if the problematic issues surrounding this word are also gone. Derrida’s focus on specific animals, 
with specific names and in specific contexts is his call for a thinking that would be different to the words “the 
animal”, that resist such reduction. 
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consciousness, rights, tradition, rationalism and Darwinism,
40
 psychoanalysis, 
microorganisms and DNA,
41
 as well as concepts of technology and pets, such as Donna 
Haraway’s well-known discussion of “cyborgs and companion species”.42 Clearly, the 
debate over animal welfare, rights and status, is one that is attracting much attention in 
current scholarship, engaging with contemporary popular attitudes to animals, such as the 
fashion and food industry, as much as with philosophical theories and cultural legacies. 
 
The Biblical Archive: Sacrificial Scapegoat in our Cultural Memory43 
What does the Bible have to do with any of this? The Bible is a crucial archive to explore 
in the context of animal studies because much contemporary philosophy on the animal 
refers to the Bible (either explicitly or implicitly) as an anthropocentric cultural weight to 
blame for humanity’s superiority complex. In much the same way as feminist scholars 
have turned to the Bible to critique patriarchal structures, arguing for its persistent 
influence in cultural and social structures, this scriptural archive has also seemingly trod 
animals underfoot. This view is largely based on assumptions about “the Bible”, and so 
this archive needs to be revisited and reviewed more closely and critically, which is the 
main aim of this thesis. To apportion blame to a complex canon of texts from vastly 
varying time, place, style, content and context is at any rate a dubious practice. I engage 
with the Bible precisely because of its importance in cultural memory as a powerfully 
persistent archive with a complex and rich diversity of characters – animal, human, divine. 
The Bible demands more sustained attention in order to grapple with its texts today, in 
light of the concerns and criticisms of animal studies.   
Scanning the field of contemporary philosophy on the question of the animal, it is 
interesting to note that in measuring blame for the concept of the human as a superior 
                                                          
40
 See in particular Fellenz’s The Moral Menagerie. 
41
 Judith Roof, “From Protista to DNA (and Back Again): Freud’s Psychoanalysis of the Single-Celled 
Organism”, in Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, ed. Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis/London: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2003). 
42
 Donna Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, And Significant Otherness (Chicago: 
Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), 4. See also Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the 
World of Modern Science (New York: Routledge, 1990) and When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007). Haraway focuses on dogs and what she calls the “implosion of nature and culture in 
the relentlessly historically specific, joint lives of dogs and people, who are bonded in significant otherness.” 
Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, And Significant Otherness, 16. 
43
 Much of the following section on biblical blame is reproduced in my article “Beastly Questions and 
Biblical Blame”, in The Bible and Posthumanism, ed. Jennifer L. Koosed (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
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being, the Bible is frequently brought up in the beginning, in introductions to rigorous 
discussions over the status of animal life. Seemingly, this is done to name and shame “the 
Bible” as blame-able without being put under much, if any, critical investigation. Engaging 
with the status of animals in the world, the Bible is held accountable for our rigid, 
exclusive and inflated notion of the human. Anchoring popular and philosophical 
conceptions of the “animal” in the deeply entrenched anthropocentric structures of Western 
intellectual thought, the tendency is to mount the Bible as an originary stable point of 
blame, to be put on trial, hurriedly condemned without prosecution, and thereby rushed to 
the marginal spaces of muted censure. Of course, no philosopher says exactly this: I will 
take the Bible to court and put it on trial for the killing and eating of millions of animals, 
for intensive farming, hunting, fur-production, pet-keeping, and other similar practices so 
commonplace in the Western world. Nonetheless, there is an implicit assumption that the 
Bible is guilty of animal abuse, or at the very least partly responsible for the current 
ideological underpinnings that justify animal abuse. While it is not afforded the privilege 
of closer examination – perhaps deemed somehow unquestionable or not of sufficient 
philosophical interest – the Bible nonetheless persistently stands accused of sacrificing the 
animal in favour of the human, thereby acting as scaffolding for the metaphysical 
assumptions that have traditionally held the human in place: central and aloft. The human 
is privileged by the divine, prime receiver of the logos; a powerful gift that has long 
equated humans to sovereign masters over the non-human in creation. Turning to some of 
the most significant recent publications in animal studies, mentioned earlier, demonstrates 
this marked tendency, that is, Wolfe’s Zoontologies, Atterton and Calarco’s Animal 
Philosophy, Ethics and Identity, Calarco’s Zoographies, Clark’s The Political Animal: 
Biology, Ethics and Politics, Cavalieri’s Death of the Animal and Fellenz’s, The Moral 
Menagerie. 
For instance, Wolfe writes in Zoontologies, that “the animal as the repressed Other 
of the subject, identity, logos” reaches “back in Western culture at least to the Old 
Testament”,44 and yet none of the diverse contributors to this exciting collection of articles 
follow up on this particular Old Testament heritage. It is briefly brought to the fore only to 
be dropped again as a muted point.  In Peter Singer’s preface to Animal Philosophy: Ethics 
and Identity, his second reference to the long history of animals having “no ethical 
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significance,” or at least, “very minor significance”45 is the apostle Paul (after Aristotle), 
further mentioning Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. It is from this vantage point that 
Singer opens up into “most Western philosophers”.46 In the introduction to the same book, 
Atterton and Calarco contend that the transition from Aristotle’s man as “rational animal” 
to simply “rational being” (in which “man” is exclusively and exhaustedly subsumed) was 
made “all the easier by the biblical story of man being made in the image of god and 
having dominion over the animals.”47 A biblical story, then, is thought to have smoothed 
the passage from thinking of man as a certain kind of animal in creation, to man as 
something else altogether in light of his ability to reason.  
In Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida, Calarco 
discusses Levinas and the ethical relation to the “Other”, who for Levinas is necessarily a 
human other. Calarco turns Levinas’ position on its head, drawing his own “neoreligious”48 
conclusion where the encounter with the animal is “transcendent”, a “miracle”, but, is 
quick to avoid this turn to religious language by affirming his resolve for a “complete shift 
in the terms of the debate”,49 as if he were echoing Levinas’s own words: “enough of this 
theology!” 50 He goes on to warn that we must adopt a hypercritical stance towards the 
“ontotheological tradition” we have inherited, “for it is this tradition that blocks the 
possibility of thinking about animals in a non- or other-than-anthropocentric manner.”51 A 
theologically oriented tradition is not merely to blame then, but is also a stumbling block 
for contemporary attempts to think about the animal. In the introduction to The Political 
Animal: Biology, Ethics and Politics, Clark references a number of specific biblical 
passages (Leviticus: 19, 22, 23, 25, 26; Deuteronomy: 22, 25; Ezekiel 34; Proverbs) to 
demonstrate “these commands, these tacit bargains” implicit in owning animals and yet not 
treating them as mere things.
52
 His is a more “positive” account of the biblical legacy, but 
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remains in this case nonetheless elusive, never expanded upon in the main body of the 
argument.
53
  
In Cavalieri’s Death of the Animal: A Dialogue, one of her “speakers” (in the first 
essay of the book, a dialogue-shaped discussion) suggests we need to instate “distance 
from the revered legacy of our history, what I am referring to in particular is the idea that 
some points, or perspectives, of the past should be rejected as archaic”.54 The same speaker 
warns that although narrative form is something humans have always “craved” and 
“cherished” as modes of understanding self and world, we must ensure that “such 
narratives are not translated into normatively hierarchical frameworks”, as “they determine 
roles and questions of status.”55 This becomes more explicitly directed to the biblical 
tradition when she writes that according to “the most widespread” of these culturally and 
conceptually determining narratives, “human beings were made by God in his own image, 
while nonhuman beings are mere creations. The latter are only a preparatory work, while 
the former are the apex of creation, directly molded by God.”56 This reference is put 
forward with confidence, without recourse to specific biblical text, context or sustained 
analysis. The assumption is that we already know what she is talking about, the point 
speaks for itself. Cavalieri uses this point as a synecdoche for the history that has justified 
the systematic subjugation and suffering of animals: “such a story supports the normative 
implication that humans are superior beings, entitled to use nonhumans as they see fit.”57 
What Cavalieri seemingly calls for is violence towards the “sacred”; a fundamental purge 
or erasure of the biblical trace. Without further ado, she suggests, this particular conceptual 
corpse needs burying. A relic of the past, it still clutters our thinking of the animal, and 
thus demands immediate iconoclastic action. Invoking the ethical dimension inscribed in 
the question of the animal, issues of “right and wrong” as she puts it, this is a point of some 
urgency, lest we allow the biblical to run wild and cause all sorts of further havoc.
58
  
Fellenz picks up on the same point, and sums up the blame in the following 
statement: “The traditional ethical models found in Western philosophy and theology have 
been premised on human uniqueness: the belief that as rational (perhaps ensouled) beings, 
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They Shall Teach Thee”, in Animals as Religious Subjects: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Celia Deane-
Drummond, David Clough and Rebecca Artinian-Kaiser (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
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humans have a putative value and destiny that surpass that of any other animal.”59 He 
writes about “the religious concept of animals as part of the human dominion”60 and points 
out the necessary “proximity” between human and animal within religious sacrifice which 
is also the prerequisite for scientific experiments on animals for human gain; it is a case of 
life and living in a way that corresponds.
61
 Whether this is a point that accords greater 
significance to animals in biblical accounts of sacrifice or not, the relation Fellenz sets up 
implicitly foregrounds biblical sacrifice of animal bodies as the origin to scientific 
experimentation on animals. This is an interesting point, but one that surely needs 
validating through specific reference to biblical sacrifice narratives, rather than ploughing 
forth under the assumption that we all know what exactly takes place in such sacrificial 
structures, as if these scenes were straightforwardly transparent. Fellenz also refers to 
biblical and classical Greek stories to convey the way in which the transformation of 
humans into animals is a frequent trope used to signify punishment.
62
 One of the 
foundations for assuming the ontological inferiority of animals is according to Fellenz 
“theological in nature”, embodied in the religious myth that “we humans are ensouled 
beings, created in the image of a God who made the world, including the animals, for our 
use.”63 He does present some of the ways in which Christian theologians have worked 
against this trend, but stays clear of specific textual references to the Bible, and ultimately 
the theological arguments are swept under the carpet: “we need not rely on them, nor 
become entangled in other theological complexities”,64 a sweeping motion reminiscent of 
Cavalieri’s proposed disentanglement from the biblical.65  
Of course, these are all philosophical texts on the moral and ontological status of 
animals. Why should they engage with biblical texts? Further, this is not to say they are 
necessarily wrong. The point is rather, that to respond to the question of the animal as it 
relates to our cultural inheritance, it is problematic to plot an uncritical notion of the Bible 
as origin point, or as stable homogenous meaning, especially without revisiting these 
textual sites. Further, to hold up the cultural inheritance of the Bible and its theologies 
without thinking more precisely about what is meant by the “theological”, “God”, “human” 
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and “animal” in these contexts is to propagate a myopic acceptance of this legacy as well 
as its whole-sale rejection on terms that are all too opaque.  
Even if these contemporary philosophical references are merely the result of 
religion’s “prolonged stammerings”66 in the world today, the Bible nonetheless plays the 
significant part of both fundamental beginning and ensnaring tangle. It represents a 
dangerous labyrinthine structure that serious philosophers would be better off avoiding. As 
if that messy business is a job for biblical scholars alone. If it were not for the fact that the 
above-mentioned philosophers are producing valuable and timely publications on the 
animal, and all point to the Bible as culpable, this troublesome biblical body of literature 
could perhaps feasibly be left for biblical scholars to dissect in the dark, or for theologians 
to peruse in peace. As this is clearly not the case, however, and, additionally, as the biblical 
corpus and its creatures arguably have much to offer in the animal studies debate, it is of 
paramount importance that we turn to the Bible as textual supplement to our thinking 
around and about the question of the animal. Instead of attempting to violently erase the 
biblical trace we would be better off turning towards that textual body, responding to it, go 
through its pockets anew, and review the strange and fantastical, domestic and divine 
characters that inhabit its spaces. As Laura Hobgood-Oster points out, to view such a 
tradition – she is specifically addressing the Christian tradition – as wholly negative is 
“mistaken or at least incomplete.”67 It is perhaps a matter of adopting what Yvonne 
Sherwood in Derrida’s Bible called “slow motion biblical interpretation”.68 An interpretive 
practice with the biblical archive that is “caught up in a complex relationship of exultation-
mourning, gratitude-disappointment, fidelity-betrayal”, “a mode of interpretation that, 
instead of dividing the world into those who accept or reject a given religious inheritance 
(in a large act of choice that seemingly exonerates us from the intricacies of inheritance 
thereafter), implicates us all in little acts of micro-choosing and micro-decision.”69  
There are of course exceptions to the trend described above, perhaps best diagnosed 
as a backlash, which has formed more “positive” readings of the Bible. The earliest and 
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continuing example of a Christian theological response within animal studies has been 
Andrew Linzey’s work – such as Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for 
Theology and Ethics, which investigates both Christian scripture and tradition to question 
whether this tradition is “irredeemably speciesist”.70 In another publication, now with the 
collaboration of Rabbi Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok aim to give an 
account of “the positive resources available within the Jewish and Christian traditions for a 
celebration of our relations with animals.”71 While not uncritical, Linzey’s project has been 
oriented around a positive revaluation and redemption of the Bible and the Judeo-
Christian. Another example is Lisa Kemmerer’s Animals and World Religions from 2011 
which has two chapters on Judaism and Christianity that also provide a predominantly 
positive gloss. While valuable in their own rights, what overtly positive responses risk is to 
replace the Judeo-Christian and its biblical literature as sacrificial scapegoat with a 
resurrected lamb: meek, domesticated and benign. I argue that it is equally impossible to 
see the vast and complex biblical archive in such a guise as it is to hold it up as a 
scapegoat.  
Two notable examples of recent scholarship that engage with animal studies, 
religion and the Bible that do not fall into the trap of either denigration of approbation are 
Stephen D. Moore’s forthcoming volume Divinanimality: Animal Theory, Creaturely 
Theology
72
 and Jennifer L. Koosed’s edited volume The Bible and Posthumanism from 
2014.
73
 Both volumes provide rich engagements with both the theoretical stakes of animal 
studies and the ambiguities of religion and its scriptures. Such work, however, is still on 
the marginal, even eccentric, side of Biblical studies. Other studies such as Kenneth Way’s 
Donkeys in the Biblical World: Ceremony and Symbol
74
, Tova L. Forti’s Animal Imagery 
in the Book of Proverbs
75
, Deborah O’Daniel Cantrell’s The Horseman of Israel: Horses 
and Chariotry in Monarchic Israel (Ninth–Eighth Centuries B.C.E.)76 are also appearing 
within the field of animals in the Bible, but as Ken Stone points out, these are strictly 
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historical-critical resources, that, although useful, do not provide a critical engagement 
with, or connection to, the questions raised by animal studies today.
77
 
More work has been emerging within theology and religious studies than biblical 
studies so far. In his introduction to animal studies, Paul Waldau calls for “inquiries about 
religion and animals” that do not resort to generalization, noting Lynn White’s infamous 
1967 thesis that “especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric 
religion the world has ever seen.”78 Elijah Judah Schochet’s Animal Life in Jewish 
Tradition
79
 and Robert M. Grant’s Early Christians and Animals80 have been two 
resources for Judaism and Christianity and their relationships to animals, and Ingvild Sælid 
Gilhus’ valuable Animals, Gods and Humans: Changing Attitudes to Animals in Greek, 
Roman and Early Christian Thought is a welcome contribution to contexualising the 
Judeo-Christian in a Greco-Roman world.
81
 Waldau and Kimberly Patton’s A Communion 
of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science and Ethics, David Clough’s systematic theology 
on animals,
82
 Creaturely Theology,
83
 along with the recently published Animals as 
Religious Subjects: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, are further signs of a response from 
scholarship on religion.
84
 Laura Hobgood-Oster provides a wide-ranging reading of 
animals in the Christian tradition that have largely gone unnoticed and forgotten, in her 
Holy Dogs and Asses: Animals in the Christian Tradition.
85
 Sarra Tlili has recently 
published a book entitled Animals in the Qur’an, providing a response from the Islamic 
perspective. Expanding and building on such work, it is important, I argue, to resist stark 
or simplistic oppositions between redeeming the Bible or dismissing it wholesale.  
It is imperative to build on this burgeoning scholarship, multiplying perspectives 
and critical attention to foster broader as well as more detailed discussions. Perhaps, in the 
desire to promote animal welfare, a tendency to dismiss contradiction and complexity for 
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wholesale blame or praise concerning the biblical archive has marred the field of animal 
studies so far. The task now is to make space for the nuances, contradictions, complexities, 
tensions and idiosyncrasies that abide in the biblical archive as to its characters, animal, 
human, divine. 
It is in the name of a particular textual cultural-religious inheritance and canon as 
memory and authority that the Bible is referred to as we have seen above, and to which we 
must turn anew with the question of the animal in mind. Or perhaps, it would be better to 
talk (as I already have) of the “biblical archive” in referring to the Bible, thus drawing in 
notions of multiplicity, preservation, power and legacy more explicitly. Thinking critically 
about such a “biblical” inheritance in relation to its textuality is important to unmask the 
seemingly organic origin point the “Bible” or the “Judeo-Christian” stands for in 
references to its blame, as if it were homogenous, congruent, and a monolithic corpus. I 
argue that it is neither a pure origin for anthropocentrism nor a straightforward source for 
anthropocentric thinking. It is indeed the case that individual texts in the biblical archive 
can be interpreted as fostering current understandings of human dominance, centrality and 
superiority. At the same time, however, the same texts frequently also radically 
problematize such an anthropocentric understanding in the relationality that conditions life 
with and as animals. 
It goes without saying that the Western world is influenced by the Bible in 
countless and incalculable ways. Whether it is actually read or known as such by the 
contemporary majority is another question. In his influential Religion and Cultural 
Memory, Jan Assmann theorises the ways in which individual memory is never wholly 
distinct from social memory, and further, the ways in which societal norms and practices 
emerge from such collective memory. In “the act of remembering we do not just descend 
into the depths of our own most intimate inner life, but we introduce an order and a 
structure into that internal life that are socially conditioned and that link us to the social 
world.”86 Individual memory, its formation, structure and order, is mediated through and in 
a particular context, culture and society, and is thus caught up in what he calls collective 
memory. “The task of this memory, above all, is to transmit a collective identity. Society 
inscribes itself in this memory with all its norms and values and creates in the individual 
the authority that Freud called the superego and that has traditionally been called 
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‘conscience.’”87 This kind of memory is, he writes, “particularly susceptible to politicized 
forms of remembering.”88 We might for instance see the above references to the Bible as a 
symptom of a particular kind of collective memory of the Bible as anthropocentric. 
Particular pages of its archive are remembered and reinforced socially and communally 
through repetition of its supposed meaning. One such example would be the much referred 
to Imago Dei in Genesis – that is, humans being made in God’s image – and the concurrent 
“memory” that this implies human superiority. Such reinforced memory and its 
consequences explain perhaps the anxiety felt in regard to the Bible as a cultural canon 
whose memory is still deeply present in today’s world, in more or less oblique ways. The 
fuzziness that accompanies any attempt to calculate just how such memory functions or 
exactly what it denotes merely exacerbates the anxiety, making such “memories” all the 
more elusive and uncontrollable, thus harder to erase or even to admit their presence as a 
dominant norm.  
It is important to note that what Assmann is suggesting is that norms and values are 
to some extent naturalized by appearing to represent the individual beliefs of a person, as 
separate from particular cultural archives, thus thought to be natural as either singular or 
universal (“common sense”) rather than culturally constructed and part of a larger more 
particular fabric of influences and influxes. Cultural archives, such as literary canons and 
religious myths, are of great importance, whether consciously acknowledged or not. “Both 
the collective and the individual turn to the archive of cultural traditions, the arsenal of 
symbolic forms, the ‘imaginary’ of myths and images, of the ‘great stories,’ sagas and 
legends, scenes and constellations that live or can be reactivated in the treasure stores of a 
people.”89 Archives, then, are crucial for understanding both individual and collective 
forms of memory and how they continue to influence norms, values and practices in the 
present and for the future. Assmann holds that there “is no understanding without memory, 
no existence without tradition.”90 Noting Heidegger’s thought and Derrida’s writing on 
archives, Assmann argues that this discussion emerges “as a form of memory that 
constitutes the present and makes the future possible through the medium of symbols… 
permeated by the political structures of power and domination.”91 For the question of the 
animal this is of great importance. It is precisely a question of power and domination in 
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terms of political structures and authoritative archives that condition thinking and acting in 
the world today with regard to power (or the lack of it), but also, crucially, as Assmann 
implies, for the future. In other words, if perceptions of animals today as edible, killable 
things, are shown to be linked to particular myths or cultural legacies, these perceptions 
might appear rather less “natural” or “common sense”. If, on the other hand, such 
understandings are reinforced by recourse to discursive strategies of myths and narratives 
as to the “natural” or “original” order of particular hierarchies, then the right to lord it over 
animals might appear fully justified, and the idea that animals could be treated or thought 
of otherwise would remain unthinkable. 
 Derrida founds his discussion of the archive in its etymology; arkhe, he says, 
“names at once the commencement and the commandment.”92 This word coordinates two 
principles in one, namely, “the principle according to nature or history, there where things 
commence – physical, historical, or ontological principle – but also the principle according 
to the law, there where men and gods command, there where authority, social order are 
exercised, in this place from which order is given – nomological principle.”93 Reflecting 
on the biblical archive, it is pertinent that its status in contemporary philosophy on the 
animal is as precisely these two features, as an origin point – commencement – and as a 
persevering, prescriptive law – commandment. For Derrida the archive always holds what 
is uniquely imprinted but at the same time re-iterable, reproducible. Like a signature, it 
signifies the utterly singular and is a repeatable, general structure of signs. The archive can 
never wholly secure or enclose its content as singular and unique. It is always haunted by 
its possible destruction, haunted from the origin in “its immanent divisibility, the 
possibility of its fission”.94 In other words, it can never be only a “thing” of the past that 
safely and purely records and holds particular inscriptions, but abides in an on-going 
signification process that is divisible, multiple, vulnerable, but also always to some extent 
uncontrollable and excessive. The Biblical archive can quite clearly never form one 
inheritance or inhabit one legacy; it can never wholly “be” itself, as if this “itself” could 
remain self-identical, stable and singular. In other words, it “is” by definition not 
anthropocentric in any pure or stable manner. It is not that the philosophical thinkers of the 
animal I have discussed propose this, but rather, that the biblical heritage and its identities 
are vaguely and obscurely “remembered” as such.  As Derrida points out, every archive is 
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both “institutive and conservative. Revolutionary and traditional.”95 The biblical archive is 
a particularly conserved and conservative canon, with a particular history of formation and 
interpretation. But it is also always already constituted by a destabilizing movement, and 
can always be thought otherwise or elsewhere,
96
 thus “opening wide spaces for 
reimagining”97 what has been marked as anthropocentrically colonized territories, or 
indeed, to challenge the positive gloss imprinted on its pages, stamped as “animal-friendly 
area”. 
 In light of the blame apportioned to the Bible, and to its status as an important 
cultural archive, it is imperative that this hybrid body of texts is examined with a critical 
attention to the complexities and tensions that mark its varied topography. Exactly how this 
canon has influenced past and present views of animals is perhaps impossible to map out. 
But to trawl over some of its terrain today – in light of the questions posed in animal 
studies – and attempt to identify in what ways the biblical archive could be seen to 
reinforce ideas of human superiority, and, in what ways it might resist such ideas, is a task 
that this thesis will attempt. 
 
Following Derrida 
Why Jacques Derrida as an interlocutor? Derrida (1930-2004) was arguably one of the 
greatest thinkers of the twentieth and start of the twenty-first century, and certainly one of 
the most influential if not infamous. The names “Derrida” and “deconstruction” have, as 
Sherwood’s assessment demonstrates, been frequently divided between religious 
mystification and secular demystification, both “encroaching totalitarianism and 
encroaching relativism”.98 Alternately critiqued for “impotent bookishness” and “totalizing 
power”,99 he “serves as a cipher for perilous regression (into childhood ‘play,’ or the occult 
world of Jewish mysticism), and also for dangerous acceleration beyond the borders of the 
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humanities and the human and humane.”100 From his early work in the 1960s and 1970s 
with the seminal Writing and Difference
101
 and Of Grammatology,
102
 through 
Dissemination,
103
 Glas,
104
 The Truth in Painting,
105
 Of Spirit,
106
 Spectres of Marx,
107
 
Rogues,
108
 to mention only a few, to the last two posthumously published volumes The 
Beast and the Sovereign,
109
 he has done nothing if not sparked debate and intellectual 
stimulus amongst critics and followers. Prolific and diverse in his interests, Derrida wrote 
on phenomenology, Marx, Plato, Freud, drugs, 9/11, the poetry of Paul Celan, the death 
penalty, Franz Kafka, democracy, the South African truth and reconciliation commission, 
Abraham and animals, as well as the terms and neologisms he is so well known for, such 
as écriture, différance, the khora and deconstruction.
110
 Perhaps what characterises 
Derrida’s style of thinking and body of work the most is a sustained attention to languages 
and texts, their details, marginalia and tensions, marked by a deep respect for the legacies 
and traditions he engaged with, as well as a ceaseless capacity for imaginative, radical and 
surprising interpretations.  
Peter Sedgwick calls Derrida “amongst the most controversial of post-war 
European thinkers”,111 because “he is a thinker who has sought to challenge a number of 
what he argues to be deeply rooted presuppositions that dominate the practice of 
philosophical enquiry.”112 As Derrida-scholar Nicholas Royle puts it: “He questions 
everything. He refuses to simplify what is not simple. He works at unsettling all 
dogma.”113 It is perhaps no wonder then, that he has “consistently provoked anxiety, anger 
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and frustration, as well as pleasure, exhilaration and awe.”114 In his book In Memory of 
Jacques Derrida, Royle argues that Derrida “was the most original and inspiring writer and 
philosopher of our time. He made – and his writing still makes and will continue to make – 
earthquakes in thinking.”115 But earthquakes in thinking what? Or who? 
I propose two primary reasons for choosing Derrida as an interlocutor. The first is 
that Derrida extensively and rigorously analyses issues at the heart of the two crises I 
referred to earlier, namely the question of the subject and the question of the human as a 
sovereign figure in the world. His later work forms a significant contribution to the 
question of the animal. The second reason is the way in which the Bible functions in his 
work. As I will show, the Bible is seemingly complicit with the traditions he critiques, but 
simultaneously, more implicitly, forms a crucial resource for his thinking of response and 
responsibility towards the nonhuman other.  
In the philosophical tradition associated with the crisis of the subject, Derrida is a 
significant figure, both indebted to, and critical of, thinkers such as Adorno, Levinas, 
Heidegger and Foucault. Derrida argues that despite all the challenges to the understanding 
of the “subject”, the discourse on the subject “continues to link subjectivity with man”.116 
Already in 1968, Derrida addresses the question of “man” and suggests that the history of 
the concept of man has not been sufficiently interrogated, as if “man” were a sign without 
historical, cultural, linguistic limits.
117
 A large part of Derrida’s later work engages with 
concepts of the “human” and “man” in the Western philosophical tradition, the question of 
the animal, and what a different subjectivity might look like – one that takes account of 
animal life too, and not merely as inferior to humans. I would go so far as to say that to a 
great extent Derrida inscribes his philosophical signature on this question of the animal, as 
his contribution and legacy to philosophy and critical thought. This can be most powerfully 
and succinctly found in the 1997 Cérisy lectures that have become posthumously published 
as The Animal that Therefore I am. Related to this work on the human subject and animals, 
he also dedicated much work and many seminars towards the end of his life to concepts of 
sovereignty – the sovereignty of man – and figures of beasts in philosophical, political, 
cultural, and religious canonical works. These are gathered in the posthumously published 
two volumes The Beast and the Sovereign, transcribed from his final 2001-2003 seminars. 
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Here he explores the often paradoxical representations of political man as superior to 
animality and political man as animality.
118
 He wishes to pose “the great questions of 
animal life (that of man, said by Aristotle to be a ‘political animal,’ and that of the ‘beasts’) 
and of the treatment, the subjection, of the ‘beast’ by ‘man.’”119 Michael Naas points to 
this central concern of sovereignty in the last two decades of Derrida’s work, as “the root 
of many of the philosophical concepts Derrida wishes to reread and many of the 
contemporary ethical and political issues he wished to rethink.”120 To mention the most 
prominent issues, these would be religion, hospitality, democracy and justice.
121
 These 
themes are all both obliquely and more unequivocally present in Derrida’s thinking of 
animality. 
In “Violence Against Animals”, Derrida proclaims that the “‘question of animality’ 
is not one question among others, of course.”122 He explains how he has long considered it 
“decisive”:  
while it is difficult and enigmatic in itself, it also represents the limit upon which all 
the great questions are formed and determined, as well as the concepts that attempt 
to delimit what is ‘proper to man,’ the essence and future of humanity, ethics, 
politics, law, ‘human rights,’ ‘crimes against humanity,’ ‘genocide,’ etc.123  
Derrida explicitly draws attention to the persistent interest he has taken in the question of 
the animal and the many references to it in his work.
124
 Situating himself like a Robinson 
Crusoe on an island unto himself, Derrida claims he has always been exempt from what 
philosophy has called with such imprecision “the animal”:  
I am saying ‘they,’ ‘what they call an animal,’ in order to mark clearly the fact that 
I have always secretly exempted myself from that word, and to indicate that my 
whole history, the whole genealogy of my questions, in truth everything I am, 
follow, think, write, trace, erase even, seems to me to be born from that 
exceptionalism.
125
  
What Derrida contributes to animal studies is a thought-provoking and wide-ranging 
critique of the traditions in Western philosophy that have dominated the debate on the 
“human” and “animal”, providing suggestions for how we might begin to follow such 
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traditions – and various forms of anthropocentrisms – differently. Derrida’s repeated 
references to a “Western philosophical tradition” from Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, to 
Heidegger, Lacan and Levinas, intentionally situates him as following this tradition, 
participating in its legacies, but determinedly inscribing his own philosophical signature on 
this tradition in a powerful indictment of its philosophical treatment of animals. This set of 
names is frequently referred to simply as a metonym for the Western philosophical 
tradition, named by Derrida, “from Aristotle to Lacan, and including Descartes, Kant, 
Heidegger, and Levinas”126 as “paradigmatic, dominant, and normative” in regard to the 
philosophical understanding of the “human”. He further justifies their prominence in his 
work by arguing that they 
constitute a general topology and even, in a somewhat new sense for this term, a 
worldwide anthropology, a way for today’s man to position himself in the face of 
what he calls ‘the animal’ within what he calls ‘the world’ – so many motifs (man, 
animal, and especially world) that I would like, as it were, to reproblematize.
127
  
It is not, of course, that this tradition is homogenous, but rather that it has been 
“hegemonic” when it comes to human/animal distinctions, and further that it is in fact a 
discourse “of hegemony, of mastery itself.”128 In The Animal That Therefore I am he 
undertakes this reproblematization, focusing on the above-mentioned canonical figures. 
For the Beast and the Sovereign seminars he expands his canon, with a wide range of 
writers in volume one: La Fontaine, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Giorgio Agamben, Gustave Flaubert, Gilles Deleuze, Edmund Husserl, Paul 
Celan, D.H Lawrence, as well as going over Aristotle, Paul Valéry, Levinas, Lacan and 
Heidegger again. Volume two focuses on interpreting Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe 
and Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. 
The figures and texts Derrida examines are not put forward as an exhaustive archive of 
Western culture and philosophy for rethinking the conceptualisation of the human/Man, 
but do form an impressively expansive exploration and multifaceted critique of some of the 
key texts and thinkers for the Western world. 
Derrida’s thesis is bold and with enormous implications for grappling with some of 
the most dominant thinkers in the history of Western philosophy:  
I’ll venture to say that never, on the part of any great philosopher from Plato to 
Heidegger, or anyone at all who takes on, as a philosophical question in and of 
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itself, the question called that of the animal and of the limit between the animal and 
the human, have I noticed a protestation based on principle, and especially not a 
protestation that amounts to anything, against the general singular that is the 
animal.
129
  
He traces an agreement between philosophical sense and common sense “that allows one 
to speak blithely of the Animal in the general singular” and suggests that this “is perhaps 
one of the greatest and most symptomatic asinanities of those who call themselves 
humans.”130 Derrida stands seemingly solitary in the continental philosophical tradition in 
paying attention to animal issues, despite, as Calarco reminds us, this tradition priding 
itself on its engagement with concrete ethico-political subjects of thought.
131
 Singer echoes 
this in his affirmation that a philosophical impetus is necessary to bring about practical 
change in relation to animals but that continental philosophy has failed to provide one. 
What philosophical incentive to challenge the way nonhuman animals are treated, he asks, 
has come from philosophers in the continental tradition, thinkers such as “Heidegger, 
Foucault, Levinas, and Deleuze, or those who take the work of these thinkers as setting a 
framework for their own thought?”132 His answer is “as far as I can judge, none”, revealing 
perplexity as to “why such an extensive body of thought should have failed to grapple with 
the issue of how we treat animals.”133 He asks what this failure signifies in the alleged 
attempts to question and critique prevailing assumptions and dominant institutions.
134
 At 
the same time, as I implied earlier, of course these thinkers have formed an important part 
of rethinking animality in terms of bringing questions of the subject, freedom, ethics and 
the other to the fore. It would arguably be impossible to imagine animal studies today 
without these thinkers and this continental tradition. Derrida, however, is one such thinker 
who explicitly drew attention to such practical and philosophical issues, and whom Singer 
fails to mention.  
 Despite his own insistence on the topic of animality, to which he dedicated his 
whole life, little sign of this can be found in the scholarship that poured out in the 
aftermath of his death, on his work and legacy. In their book Encountering Derrida: 
Legacies and Futures of Deconstruction, editors Allison Weiner and Simon Morgan 
Wortham, write that Derrida’s death in October 2004 leave us behind with “a wealth of 
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writings that touched upon nearly every aspect of the philosophical enterprise, publishing 
an enormous body of texts that crossed – and reinvented – a host of disciplinary fields” but 
none of the contributions to this volume mention the question of the animal.
135
 In Memory 
of Jacques Derrida touches briefly on Derrida’s The Animal that Therefore I am and the 
question of animality and suffering, but would not leave the impression that this was a 
particularly important topic for Derrida.
136
 Ian Balfour’s edited collection Late Derrida 
does not bring this issue to the fore,
137
 nor does Madeleine Fagan, Ludovic Glorieux, 
Indira Hašimbegović, and Marie Suetsugu’s rather more gauche Derrida: Negotiating the 
Legacy.
138
 Calarco bemoans this “utter dearth of writing on this theme by his followers and 
critics”139, and asserts that from “the very earliest to the latest texts, Derrida is keenly 
aware of and intent on problematizing the anthropocentric underpinnings and orientation of 
philosophy and associated discourses.”140  
Naas’ Taking on the Tradition: Jacques Derrida and the Legacies of 
Deconstruction from 2003, looks at how Derrida’s work has helped us rethink themes of 
tradition, legacy, inheritance in Western philosophical tradition, writing of “the incredible 
power of the tradition, its way of recuperating the most heterogeneous and marginal 
elements, and its great fragility, its vulnerability to the very gestures of reception that make 
it – along with our history and our origins – possible in the first place.”141 While Naas 
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touches on concerns that are close to the animal as the forgotten, foreclosed topic Derrida 
emphasises in the Western philosophical tradition he examines, he does not mention 
animality specifically. Naas continues to argue that one “begins by listening to the canon 
because the canon always gives us more than we imagine, more than we could have 
expected, because the canon always gives us, in its folds, something noncanonical, 
something that can never be simply included in the curriculum.”142 This more arguably 
could easily refer to the foreclosed animal subjects that Derrida follows and responds to, 
and what he forcefully argues has been what philosophy forgets, namely, “the animal can 
look at me.”143 In other words, it is not merely an object of study, of comparative interest 
or symbolic significance. The animal “has its point of view regarding me. The point of 
view of the absolute other”.144 As Derrida says, “nothing will have given me more food for 
thinking” than the alterity of the animal.145 Much still remains to be thought as to the 
philosophical and practical stakes of Derrida’s question of the animal. In this contribution 
to the study of Derrida and animality, I attempt to take account of the ways Derrida’s 
response to the question of the animal overlaps with his thinking of hospitality, justice, and 
religion because these concepts are crucial when it comes to the relation between human 
and non-human animals and the divine. But I am also interested in teasing out the less 
overt aspects of Derrida’s thought in regard to the oblique ways in which biblical examples 
and interpretations function in his work on the animal as a whole. 
What Derrida ultimately calls for in his work on animality is three-fold: (1) greater 
vigilance in philosophical thought, over the supposedly distinct differences between 
humans and animals; (2) compassion and what I term the “awakening” to the animal other 
as a condition for ethics – an awakening that is linked to his dream for an unconditional 
hospitality; and (3) responsibility in the face of a horizon of justice that will always be to 
some extent excessive, incalculable and impossible, but that nonetheless demands our 
interminable response with respect to the other as any other.  
While the term “deconstruction” is indiscreetly bandied about in all manner of 
contexts, usually in alliance with a vague sense of the postmodern project divorced from 
Derrida’s work or person, or, on the other hand used synonymously with his signature as a 
thinker, I am somewhat uneasy about its usage, especially in light of the frequent misuse 
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and misunderstandings that weigh it down.
146
 As a ghost that cannot be wholly purged, 
however, I would like to suggest that in this context, the term specifically understood 
might be helpful for shedding light on Derrida’s point of departure in thinking through the 
so-called distinction(s) between what we call humans and what we call animals. This can 
be described by the figure of the threshold.
147
  
The threshold not only supposes this indivisible limit that every deconstruction 
begins by deconstructing (to deconstruct is to hold that no indivisibility, no 
atomicity, is secure), the classical figure of the threshold (to be deconstructed) not 
only supposes this indivisibility that is not to be found anywhere; it also supposes 
the solidity of a ground or a foundation, they too being deconstructible.
148
  
The word threshold (seuil), Derrida explains, comes from the Latin solum, which means 
soil “or more precisely the foundation on which an architectural sill or the sole of one’s 
feet rest”.149 What this means, “and this is the gesture of deconstructive thinking” is “that 
we don’t even consider the existence (whether natural or artificial) of any threshold to be 
secure, if by ‘threshold’ is meant either an indivisible frontier line or the solidity of a 
foundational ground.”150  
But to stop here would be to succumb to the abstraction that so many explications 
of deconstruction fall into. It is not merely about acknowledging the instability of any 
threshold, or limit between one concept/thing and another, or merely about breaking down 
such boundaries by pointing to their fragility, thus equating “deconstruction” (as it so often 
is) with its near-homonym “destruction”, declaring with glee a signification-vacuum. This 
would be to open up what Derrida calls the “abyss”, and remain content to cease thinking 
in the face of such a void. Rather, for Derrida, what is called for is both “a greater 
vigilance as to our irrepressible desire for the threshold, a threshold that is a threshold, a 
single and solid threshold”,151 an openness to the fact that there may in fact be no 
threshold,
152
 and a recognition that “the abyss is not the bottom nor the bottomless depth 
(Ungrund) of some hidden base.”153 “The abyss, if there is an abyss, is that there is more 
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than one ground [sol], more than one solid, and more than one single threshold [plus d’un 
seul seuil].”154 What the “deconstructive” task would consist of, then, is to examine 
critically what threshold is upheld as natural, single and seemingly indivisible, and what 
other thresholds might be unmasked or unmaskable in the critique of such a supposed 
central threshold. Where does a threshold lie? But further, what does it hold inside and 
what (or who) outside? How is it constructed as a threshold? Who are the masters and 
inhabitants of the house, and who are strangers, foreigners, even enemies lurking outside? 
Concepts of house, home, threshold, and its insiders/outsiders become hugely important to 
Derrida’s discourse on animality. It is, for him, part and parcel of a thinking of a 
hospitality that is unconditional, and an ethics that is spatial and temporal: in a place, a 
specific context, at a threshold that is both shared and divisive, and with a singular other 
who is both potentially threatening and loving, never determined (or determinable) in 
advance as one or the other.  
Humans, Derrida suggests, have given themselves this word animal, “as if they had 
received it as an inheritance” to construct a threshold: they have “given themselves the 
word in order to corral a large number of living beings within a single concept” the 
animal.
155
 Animals thus remain outside, on the other side of this threshold, as killable, 
edible, huntable, trappable, containable; as non-others and non-neighbours, accepted in 
proximity as exceptions in the case of pets or as machines for human use. Of course, this is 
putting the point starkly, and Derrida does participate in a certain polemical trend that 
marks animal studies.
156
 Such polemics, however, are perhaps justified in light of the 
urgency of challenging the threshold that “allows” intensified animal farming industries, 
genetic cross-breeding and manipulation, hormone-treatment, experimentation, cloning and 
artificial insemination, at unprecedented levels involving unimaginable suffering, all for 
the “putative well-being of man”.157 Derrida calls the question of the animal an event, and 
condemns the dissimulation that allows for a diversion from, or deferral of, confrontation 
with this event. “However one interprets it, whatever practical, technical, scientific, 
juridical, ethical, or political consequences one draws from it, no one can today deny this 
event – that is, the unprecedented proportions of this subjection of the animal.”158 This is a 
repression of sorts, a symptom that demands immediate attention and long-term treatment, 
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that no one can seriously deny any longer: “men do all they can in order to dissimulate this 
cruelty or to hide it from themselves; in order to organize on a global scale the forgetting 
or misunderstanding of this violence, which some would compare to the worst cases of 
genocide”.159  
I have called Derrida’s response to the question of the animal an “awakening” to 
the animal other as a condition for ethics. Why? Peggy Kamuf argues that “wakefulness, or 
alertness” are traits Derrida “consistently assigns a positive value”.160 She points out that 
this key part of his vocabulary is a testament to the legacy of modern philosophy at least 
since the Enlightenment and perhaps especially with Kant and his call for vigilance.
161
 
What she calls Kant’s “wake-up call to critical, non-dogmatic philosophy” has continued 
to resonate ever since, and she argues, “nowhere in a more thought-provoking fashion than 
in Derrida’s writings of the last half century.”162 Wakefulness is “the very condition or 
possibility of critical reception and inheritance.”163 But wakefulness to what or who? To 
the other, in an ethical relation that is a response and responsibility to the other, which 
Derrida proposes must also be the animal other. Before pursuing this further it is necessary 
to add a preliminary note on the reference to “ethics” here. When Derrida refers to ethics in 
relation to animality he is seemingly referring to two things. The first is the specific moral 
practices and laws that govern the interactions between humans and animals; the second is 
to the self-other relationship as an always already ethical relation. Simply put, “ethical” in 
this second sense is bound up, not with specific moral prescriptions, but with a state of 
responsibility to and for the other, to whom something of me is due. When I mention the 
awakening to the condition for ethics, then, I mean to the conditions under which this 
encounter takes place in determining this something in regard to who the other is or can be.  
It is important to note that Derrida’s notion of an awakening to ethics is partly 
based on a critique of Heidegger and the authority of wakefulness that Derrida criticizes 
Heidegger for deeming a human power or property.
164
 It is, he writes, on the basis of 
questions of sleep and waking that Heidegger announces his typology of beings – stone, 
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plant, animal, man.
165
 Derrida emphatically does not follow Heidegger in this regard on 
positing a human straightforward, exclusive and authoritative consciousness as 
“wakefulness”. The other important reference for Derrida’s awakening is its connection to 
his critique of Levinas and his ethics of the face of the other who is a determinedly human 
other.
166
 Derrida questions this ethics and suggests it remains a dormant ethics. “It is a 
matter of putting the animal outside of the ethical circuit.”167 And this, he writes, “from a 
thinker that is so ‘obsessed’ (I am purposely using Levinas’s word), so preoccupied by an 
obsession with the other and with his infinite alterity.”168 Derrida retorts:  
If I am responsible for the other, and before the other, and in the place of the other, 
on behalf of the other, isn’t the animal more other still, more radically other, if I 
might put it that way, than the other in whom I recognize my brother, than the other 
in whom I identify my fellow or my neighbour? If I have a duty – something owed 
before any debt, before any right – toward the other, wouldn’t it then also be 
toward the animal which is still more other than the other human, my brother or my 
neighbour? In fact, no. It seems precisely that for Levinas the animot is not an 
other.
169
   
Derrida is attempting, in Calarco’s words, to think “a thought of the same/other relation 
where the same is not simply a human self and where the other is not simply a human 
other.”170 In the notion of “awakening” Derrida is thus indicting the philosophical tradition 
he criticizes with a myopic, docile, negligent attitude when it comes to the question of 
ethics in the face of animals. “So long as there is recognisability and fellow, ethics is 
dormant. It is sleeping a dogmatic slumber. So long as it remains human, among men, 
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ethics remains dogmatic, narcissistic, not yet thinking. Not even thinking the human that it 
talks so much about.”171 The unrecognizable is the awakening.172  Sedgwick explains how,  
Philosophy, for Derrida, takes place in the world first and foremost as an ethical 
mode of thought: it concerns the relationship between thinkers (philosophers) and 
the limits of what they can think. Their duty is to pay attention to these limits. 
Paying attention to these limits, refusing to think in terms of an already secure 
future for philosophical thought, is the duty of philosophy itself and of those who 
practice it.
173
 
Having critiqued ideas of response and responsibility as properties thought to be 
exclusively human, Derrida is both calling for a more radical response and responsibility 
on the part of human animals in his call for an awakening to the animal other as a condition 
for ethics, but he is also at the same time questioning the autonomy and authority assumed 
to be inherent to such powers of “wakeful” response and responsibility. As he puts it, we 
must cast “doubt on all responsibility, all ethics, every decision”.174 Such doubt, he says, 
“on responsibility, on decision, on one’s own being-ethical, seems to me to be – and is 
perhaps what should forever remain – the unrescindable essence of ethics, decision, and 
responsibility.”175 His awakening to ethics, then, is a relation that is always in question and 
always undecidable. Wakefulness can never be assured as a fully present consciousness, an 
authoritative open-eyed seeing, or a wholly controlled knowing, immune from dreams, 
blindness, the unconscious, finitude and limitations, as well as forgetfulness of what or 
who also sees me. In fact, to be responsible or responsibly “wakeful” might be to recognise 
oneself still to be dreaming, to be still asleep. The self-consciousness of the wakeful 
human, Derrida emphasises, is a relationship to the other whom I follow, who sees me, 
who can see me naked, and to whom I respond. This provisional wakefulness is what, I 
argue, characterises Derrida’s idea of the other as an animal other who goes before me, to 
whom I say “after you”, and the other as a witness who sees me and who signifies a justice 
in abeyance, who founds my accountability as the very possibility for ethics. As I will go 
on to discuss, this otherness for Derrida is imagined in the nonhuman other of animal and 
divine. 
In order to be ethics at all, for Derrida, the relationship to the other must be 
grounded in two principles. One is what he calls the  
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immense question of pathos and the pathological, precisely, that is, of suffering, 
pity, and compassion; and the place that has to be accorded to the interpretation of 
this compassion, to the sharing of this suffering among the living, to the law, ethics, 
and politics that must be brought to bear upon this experience of compassion.
176
 
 This compassion ought, as he says, to “awaken us to our responsibilities and our 
obligations vis-à-vis the living in general”.177 In other words, this is not an awakening to 
Heidegger’s “authority of wakefulness”,178 but rather to the responsibility demanded 
towards the vulnerability of life, the always deconstructible limits of humans and animals 
alike, and a shared finitude in the face of mortality.
179
 Wakefulness is attention as care and 
curiosity towards animal others, rather than a consciousness deemed exclusively human. 
The second principle is developed in Derrida’s important interpretation of D.H Lawrence’s 
poem “Snake” with the “scene of hospitality”180 and sovereignty it presents. Here 
sovereignty is on the side of the snake, however, and not the human who is petty with a 
learned propensity to violence, and who thus attempts to kill the snake who shows up at the 
watering hole. Analysing this poetic narrative, Derrida writes that “Lawrence awakens to 
ethics, to the thought ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ in a scene of hospitality”181 in a scene with a 
potentially murderous, threatening animal. Here lies Derrida’s critique of Levinas and 
Heidegger, in the recognition of the other who goes before me – the snake who is already 
there at the watering hole and whom I follow – who demands an “after you” from me, the 
proper ethical response to the other as any other. This is an animal who shares my world, 
who evokes humility at the heteronomy of this other, and the possibility of hospitality.  
The question is, Derrida suggests: “Does an ethics or a moral prescription obligate 
us only to those who are like us”… “or else does it obligate us with respect to anyone at 
all, any living being at all, and therefore with respect to the animal?”182 Derrida’s 
awakening to ethics is precisely the recognition of the animal as a neighbour, or fellow, not 
by claiming its “sameness” to humans, but in its otherness and thus as a prime example of 
the challenge of the other of ethics, who demands my compassion, even in the face of 
danger or incalculability as to who the other is and what it might do. It is a matter of 
recognising the other as first, coming before me, and thus admitting a certain 
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powerlessness and divisibility in the “I” who always stands in relation, seen by the other, 
seeing the other.
183
  
Wakefulness and awakening to ethics is also related to Derrida’s dreams:  
I was dreaming of inventing an unheard-of grammar and music in order to create a 
scene that was neither human, nor divine, nor animal, with a view to denouncing all 
discourses on the so-called animal, all the anthropo-theomorphic or anthropo-
theocentric logics and axiomatics, philosophy, religion, politics, law, ethics, with a 
view to recognizing in them animal strategies, precisely, in the human sense of the 
term, stratagems, ruses, and war machines, defensive or offensive manoeuvers, 
search operations, predatory, seductive, indeed exterminatory operations as part of 
a pitiless struggle between what are presumed to be species. As though I were 
dreaming, I myself, in all innocence, of an animal that didn’t intend harm to the 
animal.
184
  
The first part of this dream is a reference to his deconstruction of the absolute distinction 
between humans and animals, showing the so-called “animal” strategies that suffuse 
human conceptions of politics and philosophy, and the violence inherent to such a “war” 
against “the animal”. His dream is both to expose this lack of a rigorous distinction and to 
indict this violence by hoping to move outside such anthropocentric and -morphic circles.  
The second aspect of the dream, that refers to an animal that does not intend to harm 
another animal, is a testament to the “dream of an absolute hospitality and an infinite 
appropriation”185 that characterises Lawrence’s scene between the “I” and the snake. It is 
the dream of a possibility of non-war between what is generally called human and 
generally called animal, grounding this possibility in the ethical stance that demands a 
certain naivety or innocence in facing the other who might harm me, and the hope inherent 
to this innocence that one will in fact remain unharmed. This ties in with Derrida’s idea of 
an impossible hospitality. Such an awakening to ethics, then, is paradoxically to some 
extent a dream and must remain a dream, in the sense that it is in the end the unknowable, 
incalculable and even the impossible.
186
 Derrida nonetheless suggests that this is the only 
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ground for ethics that would be worthy of the name “ethics”, one we must be alert to, just 
as the only kind of hospitality is the infinite, impossible hospitality that welcomes the other 
at my door, on the threshold, as any other, and as the call from this other, the first-comer to 
whom we must respond with an “after you”. We are thus talking not about ethical 
principles themselves in regard to Derrida’s awakening to the animal other as a condition 
for ethics, but to what Calarco describes as Derrida’s proto-ethics.187 It is not that this is 
without practice, but rather that such a practice emerges out of the principles described in 
or by particular, concrete contexts. This is essentially “a matter of acting and making 
decisions in concrete circumstances, using as much knowledge as possible, and in view of 
a ‘maximum respect’ for animals.”188  
 
The Biblical Derrida and the Animal Bible   
While, as already mentioned, Derrida suggests that all his work has been concerned with 
animality and the question of life, this thesis will engage most closely with his explicit later 
texts on animals, namely the essay “‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject”, The 
Animal that Therefore I am and the two volumes under the title The Beast and the 
Sovereign. This is not to deny that his other work contains interesting and fruitful material 
for thinking about animality, or because it has been already done, merely because – in 
addition to limitations in time and scope – these explicit texts on the animal still require far 
more scholarly attention than they have been given so far. Before attempting to engage 
with Derrida’s entire corpus of more oblique and implicit references to animality, it is 
necessary to begin with a focus on his explicit work on the question of the animal. This is 
especially the case as I propose that one important aspect of Derrida’s work on animality in 
particular has been neglected, namely his biblical references and their significance for his 
thinking of animality. This comes to the fore especially in “‘Eating Well,’ or the 
Calculation of the Subject”, The Animal that Therefore I am and in The Beast and the 
Sovereign seminars. So far little has been said of the relationship between Derrida’s 
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biblical references and his thinking of animality.
189
 What this thesis will contribute to the 
field of animal studies, biblical studies, animality and religion, and scholarship on Derrida 
and his legacy, is an analysis of the significance of Derrida’s biblical references, building 
on this by adding interpretations of biblical texts that supplement, challenge and develop 
Derrida’s biblical reference points further in relation to the question of the animal.   
Following Derrida’s injunction to “begin wherever we are”, “in a text where we 
already believe ourselves to be”190 it appears that from reading both Derrida and the 
philosophical accounts of the question of the animal I have cited, one of the “texts” we are 
already inhabiting is the book we call the Bible. Alongside his philosophical-cultural-
political canon, Derrida pays heed to the biblical archive. This too is an archive we come 
after, a legacy we follow, and one that is perhaps equally normative and dominant to the 
philosophical texts Derrida examines. Derrida’s attention to the Bible in this context is far 
from negligible, but neither is it seemingly fully developed, at least not with the same 
vigilance as his engagement with the philosophical tradition in question. His rather cursory 
remark about the “Judeo-Christian” current in the Cartesian cogito191 and the parenthetical 
homogenization of Cartesianism “beneath its mechanistic indifference, to the Judeo-
Christiano-Islamic tradition of a war against the animal, of a sacrificial war that is as old as 
Genesis” is never explicated or properly confronted.192 Nor are his rather vague allusions 
to the “Christian or classical”, “Greek or Christian” tradition(s) done justice in the 
purported interchangeability and nebulous quality of these terms.
193
 Like the philosophical 
assumptions about theology and the Bible I discussed above, the “Judeo-Christian” 
tradition and biblical legacy thus sits rather shamefacedly in the corner within Derrida’s 
work regarding its unquestioned blame. The words that trail off the last pages of The Beast 
and Sovereign vol. I. – signalling a promise to turn to Genesis194 – become a haunting 
remainder, and are never resuscitated in vol. II.
195
 Of course, Derrida does offer a reading 
of Genesis, in the earlier The Animal That Therefore I Am, and this book is full of biblical 
references with thought-provoking interpretations. But they are never explicitly theorized 
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or commented on as part of a “biblical” or “Judeo-Christian” legacy, nor are they explicitly 
extended to form part of a larger argument either for Derrida’s work on the animal, or for 
reflecting on the Bible and the Judeo-Christian as cultural canon(s) and tradition(s). They 
are examples of what he fleetingly (in this context) refers to as the “Judeo-Christian” 
tradition; but as examples, they are never free from what Naas describes as Derrida’s logic 
of the example, never arbitrary, neutral, merely given or innocent.
196
 The ambiguity of the 
example, as Naas notes, is its status as a singular sample and its tendency toward a 
teleological model.
197
 This logic is not critically reflected on or faced up to in Derrida’s 
work on the animal, nor has it received sufficient attention in the scholarship on Derrida. 
This is what I will attempt to rectify and suggest how we might develop this further with 
more extensive exploration of, and critical regard for, the biblical archive.  
Calarco suggests that the question of the animal “is situated at the limits of philosophy 
and the metaphysical tradition, and that the resources to think through this question are not 
likely to be found wholly within that tradition.”198 Although it is doubtful he had the 
biblical archive in mind, and as shown previously, this archive is thought of as endemic to, 
and a source of, the metaphysical and philosophical tradition Derrida critiques, it is, I 
argue, with the biblical archive that some of these resources seem to be found for Derrida. 
Resorting to these resources, Derrida develops, in Calarco’s words, “a notion of finite life 
as responsivity, where life is understood not exclusively but broadly and inclusively, 
ranging from human to animal and beyond.”199 Calarco’s “beyond” could well be said to 
signal the God figure Derrida discusses in The Animal that Therefore I am. Other central 
themes to Derrida’s discourse are also related to biblical examples, as I will show in the 
four chapters of this thesis, namely, nakedness and shame, accountability or responsibility 
before God, killability, and the logos.  
Derrida’s reliance on the biblical archive to develop his argument does not occur by 
celebrating the Bible as a canonical source of animal-rights. As I have shown, on the 
surface of it, the Bible is held up as quite the opposite, both in the contemporary 
philosophical literature on animality and in Derrida’s own work. Nonetheless, the motifs 
that undergird Derrida’s call for rethinking attitudes and assumptions towards animal life 
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are arguably grounded in the biblical archive that Derrida sporadically draws from. These 
themes are: (1) Genesis and nakedness; (2) Ethics, hospitality and “Thou Shalt Not Kill”; 
(3) Following the nonhuman other as “cat or God”; and (4) The Logos, sovereignty and the 
Lamb. All four themes figure under the over-arching conception of an inextricable 
relationality between human, animal, divine, that is in opposition to the solitary sovereign 
indivisible human “I” Derrida critiques so forcefully. Such a relationality and responsivity 
is crucial for Derrida’s call for a thinking of the other, and for thinking conceptions of the 
subject and sovereignty that go beyond the human. 
What I argue is that these themes constitute a tension in Derrida’s work that in fact 
mirror the tensions that can be found in the biblical archive more broadly. For Derrida, his 
biblical themes partly form a positive resource for thinking the responsivity and 
relationality of humans and animals, and in part, they provide a bulwark for human 
sovereignty. Ultimately, what I argue in regard to the biblical texts I examine, is that they 
are caught up in an irresolvable tension: on the one hand, humans and animals alike abide 
as finite, fellow creatures under God as a justice to come that calls for a radical similitude 
and solidarity; on the other, animals are also portrayed as the subjects that humans master 
and appropriate to play God, or demonstrate God’s power over the living. God’s power is 
thus a double bind – it both displaces power from humans to show them as animals, and 
simultaneously provides a model for power over others. 
The four chapters of this thesis build on the four themes delineated above, by 
exploring Derrida’s treatment of them along with four biblical texts in response. The four 
biblical texts that will supplement Derrida’s philosophy and expand his biblical archive 
are: the aftermath of the flood in Genesis 9; Daniel who follows his God and encounters 
lions in the Book of Daniel, the animal vision that leads to a suspension of clean/unclean 
distinctions in Acts of the Apostles 10, and the Lamb who confronts and triumphs over the 
Beast and Whore in Revelation 17. My engagement with, and interpretation of, all four 
biblical texts form a critical response to Derrida’s question of the animal, building on his 
own references to the biblical archive, but also importantly responding back to Derrida, 
challenging and supplementing his own biblical repertoire. The four biblical texts are 
chosen not only with regard to their interest for exploring further Derrida’s themes, but 
also for their place, function and significance in the biblical archive itself, in order to think 
further about what it means to draw on this canon of texts that form such a crucial tradition 
and inheritance for Western culture. Additionally, each biblical text is read through the 
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lens of Derrida’s question of the animal, thus recognising and opening up their textual 
spaces to include the consideration of animality that Derrida so insistently and persuasively 
calls for. In this way the biblical texts help us to understand Derrida’s interest in the 
question of the animal better, while at the same time they supplement this focus with their 
own themes, trajectories and tensions.  
It is necessary to say a few words on why these four biblical texts in particular have 
been chosen. I am not presenting these texts as overarchingly representative for “the Bible” 
or as exhaustive for the dual theme “Bible and animality”. They are not the only or 
necessarily the most “natural” texts to choose with this question in mind. 200  Three reasons 
can be given for why I have chosen these texts in particular. The first is that they present 
particularly pertinent themes that exemplify and supplement Derrida’s points: Genesis 9 on 
nakedness, the Book of Daniel with its “cats” and God figure, Acts 10 with its questions of 
the “other” for hospitality and killability, and Revelation 17 with is sovereign Beast and 
Lamb. Secondly, they can be read as symptomatic points in the biblical archive that mark a 
certain “biblical” or “Judeo-Christian” terrain, moving between origin, myth and aetiology 
(Genesis) to the revelatory, apocalyptic and messianic (Revelation); from purportedly 
“Jewish” legends and divinity (Daniel) to an emergent “Christianity” (Acts) as well as the 
interaction between the “Jewish” and the “Christian” over relationships to animals and 
humans (Acts). Lastly, these texts both in some sense confirm ideas of an anthropocentric 
Bible and simultaneously disturb and destabilize such accusations of anthropocentrism; 
they thus prompt critical attention to such an influential canon for the question of the 
animal today and provide resources for thinking outside and beyond anthropocentric 
attitudes. 
Each chapter will engage closely with one of these biblical texts, and each of these 
will explicate and exemplify further aspects of Derrida’s question of the animal. Each 
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biblical text will supplement Derrida’s own interpretive responses, spawning further 
questions and tensions of their own, sometimes widening the scope of the question and 
sometimes narrowing its focus; they add other understandings of human/animal 
distinctions, human/animal/divine relationships and representations, as well as challenges 
for thinking these categories and relations differently, otherwise, elsewhere.  
 In the first chapter I develop Derrida’s theme of nakedness and shame. Nakedness 
is a key concern for Derrida’s question of the animal. It is what spurs on what Stephen 
Moore calls a “catalytic” moment for animal studies”201 in Derrida’s encounter with his 
cat, the cat’s difference to himself in not being considered naked as such, and the  thought 
process this sets in motion over questions of shame, self-consciousness, guilt and the 
relationship between humans and animals. Nakedness is a trope that signals shame and 
guilt at positing a fundamental difference between humans and animals and the far-ranging 
consequences of this, but also of a shared vulnerability in the mortality humans and 
animals suffer alike. On the surface of it, Genesis 9 is “culpable” of the origins of 
carnivorousness in animals being given to humans to eat. Continuing Derrida’s discussion 
of nakedness, shame and accountability, I show that on one hand, Genesis 9 is a prime site 
for locating the sovereignty of “Man” given by God to humans, in order to see the power 
of humans over the animal world. On the other hand, however, Genesis 9 stages the 
tensions in such a power dynamic, in light of the emphatic covenant with all life and the 
“reckoning” or “accounting” for all life prescribed as a justice to come by God. Because 
animals are now in principle killable, this justice is a space of decidability: animals become 
a site in which humans must decide how to respond, with “good or evil”. This is akin to 
Derrida’s call for a responsibility to the other (and the animal other) beyond prescribed 
rights; responsibility and justice are caught up in a logic of excess and undecidability, in 
which more is always demanded within singular, irreducible contexts of encounters 
between self and other. 
The second chapter explores Derrida’s remark on being under the gaze of “cat or 
God”; in other words, his thinking of the other as the nonhuman. Derrida puts forward the 
idea of a deconstructed subject as the vulnerable exposed response that follows the 
nonhuman other, be it animal or divine. I explore the way in which Derrida appears to 
proffer a particular response in the biblical “here I am”, that he propounds more fully in 
The Gift of Death. While Derrida outlines what following his cat entails in a response of 
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“here I am”, he does not fully extrapolate on the “God” figure in this context, leaving it 
open as to whether the cat is God, is like God, or whether animal and divine are distinctly 
different entities but both figures for nonhuman otherness. To explore this further, then, I 
turn to the Book of Daniel with its “cats” and God. I suggest that Daniel presents two 
radically different visions of animality, one in which all creatures – kings and animals alike 
– are akin to domesticated animals under the one divine ruler, God, in a harmonious 
cohabitation that calls for a non-carnivorous relation to the other. The other vision is a 
collapse of the first, where the state of domesticated animality has revealed a profound 
vulnerability to the animality of human and divine rulers, now conceived as brutal and 
carnivorous. The “here I am” of the deconstructed subject, then, is a double-edged 
response: it opens up for the encounter with others in solidarity and similarity, but it 
simultaneously reveals the vulnerability inherent in regard to the untameable otherness of 
one’s other.  
In the third chapter I outline Derrida’s critique of “Thou shalt not kill” as an 
acceptance of the killability of animals and the limitation of the other in ethics to be a 
specifically human other. This is infinitely troubling for conceptions of ethics, justice and 
hospitality, in Derrida’s view. Here the biblical commandment is an obstacle for critical 
thinking that Derrida sees as endemic to philosophy in the West. Why has this 
commandment been understood always as only relevant to humans? What is it about 
killing humans that makes it murder and not legitimate slaughter or sacrifice? And how 
might these categories be reversed, manipulated or confused? Derrida turns to the story of 
Cain and Abel to suggest that the sacrifice/killing of an animal is what leads to the 
sacrifice/killing of a brother, suggesting that God repents of his preference for animal flesh 
when he recognises the consequences of such legitimate killing. Interpreting Acts 10, its 
animal vision, and the questions it raises over the killability of animals and hospitality 
between Jews and Gentiles, I provide two possible interpretations in seemingly stark 
contrast to one another. The first interpretation emphasises the command in Peter’s vision 
to “kill and eat” in the new cleanness of all animals and by extension Gentiles. The shift 
from laws of clean/unclean, then, and the opening up to Gentiles, is a move that carries 
with it a violence and acceptance of the killability of all animals. In the analogical 
resemblance set up between animals and Gentiles, Gentiles too are similarly killable as 
“clean”. The second interpretation I show to be possible posits the cleanness of all animals 
as a radical redemption of animal life for fellowship and consideration, in the same way 
that Peter accepts the fellowship and hospitality of Gentiles. The animal/Gentile other thus 
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becomes a neighbour, building analogically from animals having gained a new status as no 
longer profane; animals too, then, are the fellows upon which other any or all fellowship is 
founded. Crucially, Acts 10 provides a model for Derrida’s dream of an unconditional 
hospitality. At the same time, however, it shows how easily a circumscribed “other” in 
ethics becomes linked to a more indiscriminate killability – Derrida’s nightmare. 
Finally, in the last chapter, I analyse the figure of the lamb as the animal other and 
the figure of the beast as the human sovereign in relation to Derrida’s discussion of 
animality and sovereignty in The Beast and Sovereign vol. I. Derrida proposes a 
representation of the political in the sovereignty of man as carnivorous wolfishness that 
subjects the lamb to being killed and eaten in this show of mastery and the logic or logos of 
the strongest. Alluding to another lamb, the Christ-lamb, Derrida briefly engages with what 
might be sketched as the Christian legacy on conceptualisations of the “human” as that 
which has logos and life as they are tied to reason, autonomy and sovereignty. This would 
be another instance where the Christian legacy is put forward as negative. The logic of the 
animal representations in Revelation 17 rely on two points. The first is that Jesus and God 
as the “good” are construed as weak and powerless, in the figure of an animal, the Lamb. 
Evil, on the other hand, is construed as a beast and as a woman, a prostitute. It would seem 
that Revelation 17 thus presents both a sympathetic solidarity with weak animal others and 
propagates a negative image of animality and women as evil. Ultimately I argue that in the 
triumph for sovereign power that Revelation 17 stages, the Lamb becomes a sovereign 
reason of the strongest. While the Beast and Whore are presented as evil forces of the 
political, they become the vulnerable weak victims – the animal others – in the face of the 
violence of the sovereign Lamb. Another image of Rome emerges, then, as a deconstructed 
sovereignty in the subjects that stand as weak and powerless figures in the political order – 
now presented as the “good” – namely the animals of the Roman arenas and the prostitutes 
of the Roman Empire. 
Summarising my interpretations, I point out that these are texts in the Bible that 
may well be deemed anthropocentric in some ways, but, as Koosed points out, this archive 
“also contains multiple moments of disruption, boundary crossing, and category 
confusion”.202 Many of its stories “explore the boundaries of the human in ways that 
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destabilize the very category of the human.”203 As Stone emphasises, reading the Bible in 
response to the question of the animal, originating as it does before modern conceptions of 
the human and animal, can complicate and multiply distinctions and differences between 
human, animal, divine.
204
 But engaging with texts in the Bible is not merely, or even 
foremost, about blurring boundaries. Rather, such an engagement is about exploring 
particular manifestations of “animal”, “human”, “divine”, in their relationships, imagined 
boundaries and identities, in their inter-dependence, affection and animosity, empathy and 
alienation, destruction and dreams. Calarco states that Derrida’s work has “only scratched 
the surface of this project of deconstructing the history of the limitrophe
205
 discourse of the 
human-animal distinction.”206 His hope, then, is that scholarship will continue building on 
Derrida’s thought across different institutions, contexts, texts and discourses.207 One such 
geography that needs to be explored further is precisely Derrida’s Bible and the Bible we 
might read after Derrida, following Derrida and his questions. These are texts we might 
hope to “think with, to think about how we think and categorize, divide and decide.”208 I 
return then to the “slow motion” reading I noted earlier, hoping to offer close and attentive 
readings of the biblical texts that would take account of their tensions and disruptions, 
strangeness and symbolism, as well as their more “literal” and seemingly straightforward 
meanings.   
Perhaps in tension with the pace of such a reading, such a project cannot but hope 
to respond to the urgency and contemporaneity of Derrida’s question of the animal in 
regard to this ancient archive called “Bible”. Picking up on what Sherwood says of 
Derrida’s Bible, this straddling of the ancient and the urgent – the past and the present – 
involves perhaps responding to a further invitation set in motion by Derrida. Namely, 
turning to an edition of the Bible that is not locked into the past as a wholly contextual 
study seeking out origins, intentions and “ancient meanings”. Rather, as I will attempt to 
do, such an interpretive practice would entail picking up Derrida’s Bible as “an edition of 
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uncertain date: in one sense ultra-contemporary, constantly thinking the biblical cum 
tempus, with time – that is with change, flux, interpretation, revision – and with the 
time(s).”209 After all, “every reading is not only anachronistic, but consists in bringing out 
anachrony, non-self-contemporaneity, dislocation in the taking-place of the text”.210 
Turning to the four biblical texts that inhabit very different spaces of the biblical archive, I 
will address their characters with curiosity as to how they might “speak” today, how they 
might look now, perhaps always already haunted by how they may or may not look back, 
answer back, respond in one way or another. Padding through these various textual 
landscapes it is hoped the reader will consent to follow in these tracks and allow a response 
to Derrida’s Bible and the Bible after Derrida.  
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Chapter 1 
Derrida’s Nakedness and Genesis 9: 
Reckoning with the First Carnivorous Man  
 
Derrida’s Nakedness 
Nakedness is a key concern for Derrida in his discussion of animality. From the very 
beginning of The Animal that Therefore I am, this concern is situated in a reading of 
Genesis: “Starting from Genesis”,1 confessing to “words that are, to begin with, naked”.2 
Derrida’s very first words echo the first words of Genesis: “In the beginning”.3 Derrida 
chooses nakedness as a point of departure for discussing distinctions between humans and 
animals because it allows him to outline the crux of his argument as a condemnation of a 
“crime” “against animals”4 and a call for a response and responsibility towards what we 
“call” the animal.5 Nakedness is one point that is thought to divide humans and animals. 
“Man would be the only one to have invented a garment to cover his sex.”6 Humans are 
thought to be different to animals because humans can know themselves to be naked. 
Animals, however, are unaware of their nakedness and so are not naked as such.
7
 The issue 
of nakedness is tied to the assumption that humans are self-conscious creatures whereas 
animals do not possess such self-consciousness. In other words, this differentiation on the 
point of nakedness is less about nakedness per se, and more about the capacity to self-
reflect, to be self-aware, self-conscious. Derrida shows how this human self-consciousness 
becomes connected to the idea of the human as an autobiographical “I”, capable precisely 
of saying “I”, of reflecting on him or herself and the philosophical dictum “I think 
                                                          
1
 TATTIA, 1. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid 
4
 Ibid., 48. 
5
 Ibid., 30.  
6
 Ibid., 5. 
7
 Ibid., 4-5. 
Chapter 1: Derrida’s Nakedness and Genesis 9 
 
 
46 
 
therefore I am” that arises from this understanding.8 Without language, animals are thought 
to lack this “I”, the “think” that accompanies the “I” as a defining characteristic, and thus 
the ability to say “I am”.9 As a result, animals are thought to be incapable of the response 
and responsibility tied to ideas of language, reason, self-consciousness and accountability. 
Derrida inflects the “I am” into an “I can”, because the human, in philosophical discourse, 
is described according to the powers, properties, and capacities he or she is thought to 
possess and that animals purportedly lack.
10
 Derrida’s “I can” is an allusion to the French 
pouvoir, meaning both “to can”, “to be able” and “power”; Derrida thus proposes that the 
human “I am” is really an “I can” that is thought sovereign, powerful, capable, possessive 
of properties that set it apart from animals as a superior sovereign figure.
11
  
In this chapter I will outline the significance of Derrida’s discussion of nakedness 
in relation to his references to Genesis, and develop this further with my reading of 
Genesis 9 that both draws on Derrida and builds on his points for the relationality of 
response and responsibility between animal, human and divine. 
 
Response and Responsibility as Relationality 
Derrida’s critique of a discourse that divides between the properties humans possess and 
that animals purportedly lack is inextricably – but only implicitly – caught up in his 
references to, and readings of, Gen. 1-4. While I remarked that nakedness is a trope used to 
signify self-consciousness or the lack of it, it is also no arbitrary trope. It draws from the 
nakedness of Adam and Eve hiding from God in Genesis 3 and extrapolates from there to 
point to shame, name and naming, accountability, animality, and God. Derrida understands 
the self-consciousness of the human who knows him or her-self to be naked as shame: Man 
“would be a man only to the extent that he was able to be naked, that is to say, to be 
ashamed, to know himself to be ashamed because he is no longer naked. And knowing 
himself would mean knowing himself to be ashamed”.12 Realising one-self to be naked and 
the accompanying sensation of shame implicitly alludes to Adam and Eve coming to know 
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themselves as naked, being exposed and hiding in Gen. 3:10-11. Further, Derrida writes, 
“the property unique to animals, what in the last instance distinguishes them from man, is 
their being naked without knowing it”.13 “Not being naked therefore, not having 
knowledge of their nudity, in short, without consciousness of good and evil.”14 The 
consciousness of “good and evil” is of course a reference to Adam and Eve’s fruit-eating, 
consequent knowledge of good and evil and banishment from the garden in Gen. 3:5. 
Derrida uses these Genesis references to critique what he sees as the solipsistic sovereignty 
of the human “I” in philosophical discourse. He sees its exclusion of animals as a symptom 
of the solipsism that makes humans respond and responsible to only a human other, an 
other who represents the similar or self-same. Derrida implies that the autobiographical 
capacity of “I” and “I am” is self-regarding, even when it purports to relate to its other, 
because it is still a human other, reflecting one-self in similitude. What is deemed proper to 
humans – such as reason, language, response, responsibility – has thus become the 
justification for a sovereign rule of humanity at the expense of animals. What the 
justification has refused, however, is a sense of relationality with animals; it has resisted a 
response to animals, and a responsibility in the face of the animal.  
By orienting the human “I” around notions of shame in his allusions to Genesis, 
Derrida inflects autobiographical solitude into a confessional and relational stance. Is there, 
he asks, “an account of the self free from any sense of confession?”15 Alluding to 
Augustine’s Confessions and the invention of autobiography, the concept of confession 
links the human “I” to notions of fault and guilt, thus pointing us back to Adam and Eve 
after eating the forbidden fruit.
16
 Derrida implies that the confession that accompanies any 
autobiographical “I” is the “crime” of depriving animals of everything humans are thought 
to possess.
17
 Derrida shows the artifice of such a construction of difference. This is 
particularly the case because the nakedness of the body also connotes the vulnerability of 
exposure to the other which stresses the impossibility of separating the “I think” from a 
body. Humans and animals share such an embodied state as mortal creatures, however 
different their bodies may be. Nakedness is the sign of exposed vulnerability. Derrida’s 
theme of nakedness is thus intended to draw attention to the vulnerability of the body as a 
mortal thing capable of suffering. This “capacity” for suffering counters the “I can” that, 
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Derrida argues, dominates the discourse around the “human” with its properties and 
powers, in being a negative capacity, a weakness rather than capacity-as-power or pouvoir. 
This is where Derrida’s call for compassion in the face of animal life leads, to a 
compassion that ought to “awaken us to our responsibilities and our obligations vis-à-vis 
the living in general”.18  
 While autobiography marks the solipsism of the sovereign “I” in a self-rotating 
self-reflection, Derrida uses confession to argue that every “I” is always a response to. He 
calls for relationality rather than solipsism, a response and responsibility that is not 
calculated in advance to exclude any other as too other. Describing himself naked in his 
bathroom in the sight of his cat, Derrida is showing the way in which it is not merely a 
matter of his perspective as a philosophical thinker, a solipsistic, disembodied “I think 
therefore I am”, but rather an acknowledgement of his being seen.19 Derrida stages his 
philosophical discussion of the animal in a relational scene where he is being seen by an 
animal, and not by the idea of an animal, but by a particular cat, an “unsubstitutional 
singularity”, “this irreplaceable living being”.20 By calling all animals by this common 
denominator, philosophical discourse on “the animal” has refused the multiplicity, 
irreducibility and complexity of the living creatures that are subsumed by this designation, 
that Derrida condemns as a dynamic of power, akin to Adam’s naming of the animals in 
Gen. 2:20, but as if he had given them only this one name: the animal. Derrida’s animal 
other is an irreducible singular other who “can see me naked”.21 What philosophy has 
forgotten, he suggests, this being perhaps “calculated forgetting itself – it can look at 
me”.22 The animal “has its point of view regarding me. The point of view of the absolute 
other”.23 This is important because it turns the tables to the animal as a sovereign gaze and 
the human “I” as a vulnerable body. When Derrida writes that as with “every bottomless 
gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze called ‘animal’ offers to my sight the abyssal 
limit of the human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man”24 he is revealing the 
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unknowability of the other, whose identity will always to some extent remain hidden – 
unknown and unknowable – just as this gaze reveals what we ourselves do not know. He 
configures this as a secret: “seeing oneself seen naked under a gaze behind which there 
remains a bottomlessness, at the same time innocent and cruel perhaps, perhaps sensitive 
and impassive, good and bad, uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal and 
secret.”25 Thinking of the animal as “bare” or naturally naked is to strip animals of the 
potential for secrecy and thus of otherness. They become reducible objects to the human 
gaze, transparently inhabiting the properties humans see in them, namely, all that is 
deemed not-human.  
Derrida orients the autobiographical capacity of the “I”, then, rather to testimony 
and witness (confessing and being-seen), in relation to the other who sees me and the other 
who demands my response. But response and testimony to who or what? If response and 
responsibility are properties of humans, Derrida implies, then the creature capable of 
saying “I” and confessing ought also to take responsibility for the “crime” of demoting 
animal life to the homogeneity, subjection and violence of this category “the animal”. 26 
“The sovereign is alone insofar as he is unique, indivisible and exceptional”,27 but the 
human, Derrida argues, is not such a sovereign “I” alone, but always lives in response to 
the other, in the gaze of the other, which Derrida posits as his cat, the animal other.  This is 
where Derrida’s reading of Genesis comes in again, with the Adam of Genesis 1 who is 
created after the animals (the animals are created in 1:24-25 and humankind in 1:26). 
Along with nakedness, an important trope in this discussion is that of following. With the 
reference to following, Derrida redirects the human “I am” (in French: Je suis from être), 
“this powerful little word suis”28 to another meaning of Je suis, namely “I follow” in the 
French verb suivre, to follow.
29
 Like the Adam of Genesis 1, Derrida implies that humans 
follow animals, coming after. Whereas this “coming after” can mean to hunt or pursue, it 
can also imply the call for an “after you” to the animal as the other, the firstcomer. As with 
the first creation story of Genesis in which Adam comes after (Genesis 1) and the second 
where Adam comes first (Genesis 2), Derrida implies there is a decidability in the I of the 
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“I am” which is also at the same time always already an “I follow” as to what forms being 
and following will take, as if left with the knowledge of Adam and Eve of “good and evil” 
and the decidability this sets in motion.
30
 In the context of his reading of Genesis, then, 
relationality is construed, like Adam, “between the beast and God”.31 Whereas the animal 
is the figure of otherness for Derrida that breaks the seal of solipsism that has kept humans 
in relation predominantly to self-same humans, Derrida’s figure of God is harder to place. 
If Derrida takes on an “Adamic” persona as naked, standing before but also coming after 
his cat whom he – like Adam – has named, what becomes of God in this equation? 
Michael Naas points out that Derrida resists the theologico-political, rejecting any 
pure sovereignty – that is, an indivisible solitary and exceptional power – such as God.32 
But God is arguably both sovereign and non-sovereign in Derrida’s interpretations of 
Genesis. Drawing upon the second creation myth in Genesis 2 where Adam names the 
animals, Derrida argues that “the public crying of names remains at one and the same time 
free and overseen, under surveillance, under the gaze of Jehovah, who does not, for all 
that, intervene”.33 “He lets him indulge in the naming all by himself. But he is waiting 
around the corner, watching over this man alone with a mixture of curiosity and 
authority.”34 Derrida connects the power of man in naming the animals to the 
conceptualisation of the human as a sovereign “I” set apart from divine or animal 
creatures, lonely in his sovereignty. But everything happens “as though God still wanted to 
oversee, keep vigil”,35 marking his own sovereign and – as Derrida puts it – “infinite right 
of inspection of an all-powerful God and the finitude of a God who doesn’t know what is 
going to happen to him with language. And with names”.36  
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Derrida’s God here is not an indivisible sovereign God, but a God who has given 
over power to humans, and will wait to see what happens. While Derrida stages the human 
entrance to knowledge in the implicit reference to Genesis with knowledge as 
“consciousness of good and evil”,37 and referring, as I have shown, to Gen. 1-4 more 
broadly, he does not comment further on how the biblical legacy might either be complicit 
with the philosophical tradition he critiques (as he appears to imply elsewhere) or how 
these references in fact ground his own relational “I” responding to the other as “cat or 
God”.38 Building on his Genesis reading, Derrida inflects Adam’s naming to his own 
named cat as a particular cat,
39
 for thinking of the animal other not “as the exemplar of a 
species called ‘cat’” but in “its unsubstitutional singularity”.40  Like the secret, unknown 
and unknowable gaze of the animal other, God similarly provokes a “vertigo before the 
abyss”41 in the prospect of an address from the other. But while Derrida reflects on being 
seen naked by his particular and named animal other, the figure of God is left as something 
of a haunting remainder. 
I suggest that by supplementing Derrida’s reading of the Genesis creation myths at 
the beginning of Genesis, with another origin myth that follows, in Genesis 9, this “in 
order to see”42 of Derrida’s God is crucially embedded in a covenant between God and all 
living beings, that shows the “power of man at work”43 given from God in the subjection of 
animals. But it also portrays Derrida’s demand for accountability to, and responsibility for, 
the lives of others, the shame evoked by the crime in excluding the animal from the ethical 
circuit, and the unveiling of the naked human as animal. Genesis 9 both stages the power 
of sovereign “Man” in the figure of Noah whose nakedness must be covered and whose 
position and propriety must be erected and upheld, but simultaneously complicates this 
sovereignty in the haunting promise of God to account for all life. Permission to kill 
animals in Genesis 9 sits uneasily beside the injunction not to kill a fellow brother and the 
demand for response and responsbility. It is in this uneasy proximity to animal life and the 
deconstructable distinctions that separate a human neighbour/brother from an animal 
                                                          
37
 Ibid., 5. 
38
 Ibid., 18. 
39
 On the proper name, Franz Rosenzweig writes that as soon as a being has its own name it can no longer be 
dissolved in its genus as a generality, it is its own genus. Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. 
Barbara E. Galli (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005) 201. Derrida alludes to this idea here when 
he emphasises the significance of his named cat, perhaps as another oblique comment on Levinas’s dog, who 
also had a name, Bobby, but who does not feature in Levinas’ thinking as an ethical subject. 
40
 TATTIA, 9. 
41
 Ibid., 18. 
42
 Ibid., 42. 
43
 Ibid., 16. 
Chapter 1: Derrida’s Nakedness and Genesis 9 
 
 
52 
 
neighbour/brother that Genesis 9 sets in motion a call for a responsibility that is always 
already broken, at fault, but at the same time excessive, haunting and powerful. Building 
on Derrida’s discussion of nakedness, animality and relationality, Genesis 9 provides the 
ground for an understanding of the figure of God as a horizon of justice to come.  
 
Genesis 9 on the First Carnivorous Man 
Ostensibly, Genesis 9 is one of the texts in the biblical archive that could be held up as 
“blameable” for its attitudes to animals. It is the chapter that follows the story of the flood 
in which God exterminates all creatures, except those he has warned: Noah, his household, 
seven pairs of clean animals, a pair of unclean animals, and seven pairs of birds, ‘to keep 
their kind alive on the face of all the earth’ (7: 1-3). R.W.L Moberly deems the Noah 
stories to be the most famous biblical texts,
44
 and Bill T. Arnold calls Gen. 6:9-9:29 “one 
of the best-known stories in world literature”.45 After the two creation myths of Genesis 1 
and 2, Genesis 9 presents a third “creation”. After Adam as the first man, Noah becomes a 
“new Adam, the first of a new human race”.46 Genesis 9 thus sets up the relationship 
between animal, human and divine after the flood, and presents the conditions of this new 
world.  With its (in)famous line about humans being made in the image of God, it 
seemingly destines humans to be God-like and leaves animals out of this equation. Further, 
Genesis 9 stages the origin story of the first carnivorous man, with Noah, the new “head” 
or “Man” of humanity after the flood, who is given permission to eat animals.47 Although 
the earlier creation myths in Genesis are better known, also in their treatment of human-
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animal relationships, Genesis 9 also plays out a decisive moment in the biblical archive 
over the relations between animal, human and divine.
48
 Genesis thus appears to be one of 
the most popular parts of the Bible to turn to, either implicitly or explicitly, for discussions 
of the Bible in regard to animals.
49
 As I have already discussed, it is certainly Derrida’s 
most cited biblical text in this context.  
One of the infamous lines to be brought up as blameable can be found in Gen. 9:6, 
namely that humans are made in God’s image (9:6).50 In the same passage, the killing of a 
human is designated as wrongful, and the killing and eating of animals is made permissible 
by God. As Andrew Linzey pointedly puts it: “While Genesis 1.29 commands 
vegetarianism,
51
 Genesis 9 allows carnivourousness”.52 Seen in this light, Genesis 9 is 
indeed a blame-worthy text for a perspective that seeks to think otherwise about 
human/animal distinctions than merely consumer and consumed. Accordingly, Linzey 
divides the Bible into “two worlds”, one in which “violence and disorder are inevitable, 
even divinely sanctioned”, and the other with the hope and dream of “Isaiah in which the 
lion does not eat the lamb but lies down next to it”.53  
How can these two worlds be understood, if there are indeed two?
54
 Considering 
the vast and various texts that make up different biblical canons it seems unlikely that there 
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should be (only) two such stark worlds. There is more complexity and nuance to Genesis 9 
than has often been acknowledged. 
I will argue that the scenes of Genesis 9 are more complex than a mere 
permissibility of carnivorous power. I propose that the proximity between God’s 
permission for humans to eat animals and his covenant with all life evokes a tension in the 
text over edibility, killability and accountability. God’s promise to account for all life 
marks the power given into human hands to consume animals, but simultaneously the 
response and responsibility that will be demanded of them. The reading I propose, then, is 
that the God of the flood eschews sovereign power, becoming the figure of justice to come, 
in which humans and animals are accounted for alike, but in a world where humans abide 
in a decidability regarding their response as to who is or can be(come) seen as a “brother”, 
and who or what in turn sees them (naked). 
Genesis 9 tends to be divided into two separate parts, 1-17 and 18-29. I will treat 
these two parts in turn, but read their themes and characters in conjunction as a narrative, 
in view of the relationship between animals, humans and God in the first part and the 
emphasis on Noah’s nakedness and his relationship to his sons and grandson in the second 
part. In this second part, Noah is caught naked by his son Ham; Noah angrily curses Ham’s 
son Canaan, condemning him to servitude to his brothers. This part of the chapter plays out 
the changeability of status regarding “brotherhood” and the “human”, where a brother and 
a son, or grandson, can become relegated and subjected to a lower status as a non-brother, 
a non-human. I argue that this happens in the anxiety caused by Noah the patriarch being 
exposed for what he is: naked, drunk and unconscious, as if there were no difference 
between himself and a beast. To compensate for such an exposure of the truth of his naked 
“animal” state, Noah exercises his power in a performative command that makes Canaan 
animal-like, of lesser status than his human brothers. He is perhaps not edible but he is no 
longer a “brother”, but the lowest of the low. As in the case of Cain and Abel, the killing of 
animals seemingly leads to the killability or demotion of a “brother” to what is not 
properly human.
55
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While I take account of some of the wider connections in Genesis outside chapter 
9, such as those Derrida refers to in chapters 1-4, it is of course important to note that 
Genesis is a complex “text” or rather a complex set of texts. The “canonizing process” 56 
thought to be involved with regard to Genesis has a complicated and long history and as 
such it is impossible to speak of a coherent composition. Yet, while Genesis may well be 
“an accretion of sundry traditions, shot through with disjunctions and contradictions, and 
accumulated in an uneven editorial process over several centuries”57 it is pieced together in 
this particular way and it persists as a text. This is how I will treat it. It is crucial to grapple 
with this text-tradition as well as the tensions at work in this text as a multifaceted 
inheritance. By cross-referencing other parts of Genesis, or in treating chapter 9 as a 
narrative unit, I am not attempting to locate sense or coherence as a result of original 
composition or authorial intention. Rather, I am reading Genesis 9 and its place in Genesis 
as a part and product of a biblical canon the legacy of which remains powerful and 
persistent in cultural memory but frequently obscured as to its nuances.  
 
God’s Gift of Covenant 
In this part I examine the power-dynamic from divine to human, tracing the way in which 
God becomes a less sovereign figure of power and presence after the flood and humans 
become more sovereign in their relationship towards the living, as if God renounces his 
power as a fearful Lord and gives it over to humans. But I propose that the proximity 
between God’s permission for humans to eat animals and his covenant with all life, evoke 
a tension in the text over edibility, killability and accountability. God’s promise to account 
for all life, emphatically the lives of animals too, marks the power given into human hands 
to consume and kill animals, but simultaneously the response and responsibility that will 
be demanded of them.  
Genesis 9 begins with a blessing on Noah and his sons, telling them to be fruitful, 
thus replenishing the earth with their offspring (9:1). God tells them that the dread of them 
will be on ‘every animal [or living thing: hY"x;] of the earth, and on every bird of the air, on 
everything that creeps on the ground, and on all the fish of the sea’: all are delivered into 
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their hands (9:2). The following verse gives permission for ‘everything’ to be edible (9:3), 
implying that humans have been vegetarian before but now can eat freely a carnivorous 
diet. There is a clause, however, according to which flesh with its life-blood cannot be 
consumed (9:4).
58
 Further, killing a human (or rather man: ~d'a') is forbidden (9:6). So far, 
it appears that God favours the human subjects of this re-creation such that there is a clear 
hierarchy between the life of humans that must be protected and the life of animals that is 
now edible, which is to say killable. Like Derrida’s God who “created man in his likeness 
so that man will subject, tame, dominate, train, or domesticate the animals born before him 
and assert his authority over them”,59 the God of Genesis 9 too seemingly “destines the 
animals to an experience of the power of man, in order to see the power of man in action, 
in order to see the power of man at work, in order to see man take power over all the other 
living beings”.60 Claus Westermann understands the emphasis on being fruitful as a form 
of divinely given human power: a “god-given dynamism”, “God’s power at work” in 
humans.
61
 The gift of animals – 9:3 ‘as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything’– 
is like an offering to humans, giving over the ‘fear and dread’ they might feel towards a 
God who has once blotted out his creation, to the animals in their relationship with 
humans. Fear (ar'Am) could also imply elements of reverence, as if it is indeed a matter of 
proper reverence towards one’s master or Lord, humans to the divine, and now animals to 
humans. In this sense, humans do indeed become God-like, in God’s image (9:6), with 
‘every animal of the earth’, ‘every bird of the air’, ‘everything that creeps on the ground’ 
and ‘all the fish of the sea’ into human hands (9:2). The difference between killing a 
human and killing a non-human animal for food is thus inserted as part of the conditions 
for this re-created world. Westermann concludes, “human existence is now confronted 
with the necessity of killing”.62  
One way to read the beginning of Genesis 9 would be as a repentance on God’s part 
for the flood; or, if not outright repentance, then the acknowledgement that it should not be 
done again (9:11).
63
 As a sign of his promise he has set his ‘bow in the clouds’ (9:13). 
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Indeed, such an acknowledgement would perhaps hint at an admission of repentance. W. 
Lee Humphreys calls this God’s recognition of his “overreaction”.64 Arnold deems the 
rainbow an “unexpected turn” as it is God who admits to need reminding rather than 
humans.
65
 Walter Brueggemann argues that Gen. 1-11 shows how “the will and purpose of 
the Creator God is sovereign, but that sovereignty is deeply and categorically under assault 
from the outset”.66 These intimations of a non-sovereignty in God are played out 
particularly with regard to the transfer of the power over animals into the human hand (9:2 
dy"). In God’s promise not to exercise such sovereignty again a repentance is hinted at, and 
thus God’s sovereignty appears diminished. Moberly suggests that this is God’s 
acknowledgement of the inevitability of human violence and his correlative decision to 
himself change, if humans will not.
67
 As such, God’s sovereignty is displaced from himself 
to humans. Westermann criticizes the explanation for God’s bow as connected “with the 
image of God as a warrior carrying a bow”.68 Rather, he argues, the Hebrew word for 
“bow” comes from an Arabic verb meaning “to bow” or “to bend”.69 The word for to bless 
that Genesis 9 opens with (%r;B') can in Qal also mean to kneel. In light of God’s later 
promise never again to blot out his creation, it is as if God repents of his violence, blessing 
his remaining living creatures, as if kneeling before them in repentance and bowing or 
bending to the remaining life on earth. The offering of animals to humans, then, could be 
seen as a withdrawal from the sovereign God to the sovereignty of humans.
70
 God is 
casting off the violence marking his destruction in the flood. Humans take God’s place in 
regard to the living. This would tally with Robert Murray’s suggestion that in 9:2, “God 
reaffirms the grant of sovereignty over animals” set out in the earlier creation narrative.71 
He sees this as the relationship between humans and animals laid bare “as they are, not as 
they were idealized in Genesis 1 and 2, or in any other vision of universal peace”.72 
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However, there is a two-fold tension in this text between such a reading of human 
sovereign power and what follows in regard to God’s relationship to his creation and his 
covenant. First, the covenant (9:9 tyrIB.) he establishes consists of the promise ‘that never 
again shall all flesh be cut off by the waters of a flood, and never again shall there be a 
flood to destroy the earth’ (9:11).73 This covenant is established with Noah, his sons and 
the sons of his sons (9:9): ‘and with every living creature [vp,n<Ü-lK'] that is with you, the 
birds, the domestic animals, and every animal of the earth with you, as many as came out 
of the ark’ (9:10). Arnold remarks on the centrality of this covenant “to the post-diluvian 
order”.74 But what is involved in this covenant and order? Is it the hierarchical form 
Murray intimates as a veritable demythologization,
75
 a more “natural” non-idealized order 
in which the “partners” may well be “God, humankind and all animals” but where the latter 
are straightforwardly subordinated to humankind in fear and trembling?
76
 The covenant 
arguably adds ambiguity rather than a clear-cut order. The stipulation as to who this 
covenant includes (‘between me and you and every living creature of all flesh’) is repeated 
in 9:12, 9:15 and 9:16. Again in 9:17 the inclusivity of this promise is emphasised: ‘This is 
the sign of the covenant that I have established between me and all flesh that is on the 
earth’. The references to ‘all life’ or ‘all the living’ are in Hebrew suffixed as one term 
joined together (vp,n<Ü-lK'), emphasising the unity of this ‘all’ and the shared condition of 
life.
77
 David Cunningham emphasises how the emphasis on flesh helps “blur the 
boundaries between human beings and other animals”.78 He proposes this focus on flesh as 
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a resistance to the superiority of humans made in God’s image and viewing life forms 
within this “larger context of all flesh”.79 
What happens then with the fear of animals towards humans and the permission to 
eat animals? In scholarship, this is predominantly perceived as a further “fall” in Genesis. 
Robert Alter comments that this speech “affirms man’s solidarity with the rest of the 
animal kingdom”, which is then qualified with “[v]egetarian man” given permission to eat 
animals.
80
 Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok write that in this new creation “God has now set up 
the world as a ‘kitchen’ for human beings”.81 J.W. Rogerson too suggests that whereas the 
relationship between humans and animals in Genesis 1 could be interpreted to imply a 
“caring role in regard to animals”, Genesis 9 undoes such care by introducing “an element 
of hostility”.82 Rogerson understands this as showing the way in which the world before 
the flood was how God originally desired creation to be, and the re-creation afterwards is 
the compromised version.
83
 While the command to procreate in Gen. 1:22 is also directed 
towards animals, and thus “humankind has to share the divine vocation of co-creation with 
the earth and with other creatures”84 Brett too argues that this “radically inclusive”85 order 
is compromised in Genesis 9 where the “human dominance over animals” is heightened.86 
Laurence A. Turner states: “The relations between humans and animals are brutalized.”87 
Interestingly, Julia Kristeva too comments on this turn as if there were a “bent toward 
murder essential to human beings and the authorization for a meat diet was the recognition 
of that ineradicable ‘death drive,’ seen here under its most primordial or archaic aspect – 
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devouring”.88  But this narrative presents a more nuanced effect than merely the loss of 
another “Eden”. This is not merely a collapse into a grim realism on the part of a God 
whose high hopes have been shattered in the face of human propensities to violence, or 
what Moberly calls “the evil-thought clause”89 from Gen. 8:21: ‘for the inclination of the 
human heart is evil from youth’, as if God had drawn up something like a pre-nuptial 
insurance against the future violence humans will commit. Rather, I propose that the 
proximity between God’s permission for humans to eat animals and his covenant with all 
life, evoke a tension in the text over edibility, killability and accountability. 
Tension appears in relation to God’s words on the edibility of animals, the non-
killability of humans, and God’s stipulation that he will require a reckoning of, or for, 
every life (9:5). This all-inclusive covenant, Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok point out is clear 
but “is rarely given its due and proper weight”.90 As already mentioned, the power given 
into human hands to consume animals arises alongside a promise to account for all life, 
simultaneously thus demanding response and responsibility. This is connected to God’s 
less sovereign status, allowing humans to live sovereignly. Westermann comes close to this 
reading when he concedes that the restrictions concerning life-blood appear to imply 
caution with regard to the consequences of carnivorousness. If to kill animals is 
permissible, such killability “carries with it the danger of blood-lust”, he writes, or “of 
killing for the sake of killing, of blood-thirstiness”.91 “One’s conduct towards other people 
is not to be separated from one’s conduct towards animals.”92 While the worry about 
blood-lust is a rather typical reason given for not harming animals – more for its human 
impact than concern for the animals – Westermann has hit on the issue with his comment 
on the differentiation in conduct in inter-human relationships and human-animal 
relationships that asserts itself in this narrative but remains questionable. Flesh (rf'B') with 
its life (vp,n <) or blood (~D')  (9:4) is something humans and animals share. Literally what 
God says is that he will require (vr;D') the blood of their lives, at the hand (dy") of every 
beast or living creature (hY"x;) and the hand (dy") of every man (~d'a') (9:5), emphasising the 
commonality between beast and man. Human life is designated as ‘man’, ‘mankind’: ~d'a', 
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but also as ivyai as well as with reference to a man’s brother: xa'. A reckoning will be 
required ‘at the hand of’ every beast and man as if both are equally accountable, as well as 
‘at the hand of every man’s brother’ (9:5). The word for brother, as I already noted, does 
appear to refer straightforwardly to a human brother. The second reference to requiring a 
reckoning for human life in 9:5 could be read to qualify the words referring to ‘each one 
for the blood of another’, implying this refers only to human blood. This would fit with the 
prohibition against shedding the blood of a human that follows in 9:6. But following 
directly after the reference to the flesh, life, hands and blood shared by humans and 
animals alike, and in the reckoning of animal and human life, the line that adds ‘I will 
require a reckoning for human life’ (9:5) and the life of every man’s brother, could be 
interpreted to mean that killing will be questioned and confronted also in regard to animal 
life. John Olley too points out that it “cannot be fortuitous that there is a close linking of 
permission to eat flesh and strong statements about human killing”.93 Like Cunningham, he 
notes the striking reference to flesh - rf'B' – signifying  humans and animals alike. Flesh 
can be eaten in Gen. 9:4, but flesh is to be kept alive in Gen. 9: 8-15.
94
 Furthermore, as 
Humphreys points out, “the logic of God in this double couplet (9:6) is problematic when 
pressed: One who sheds the blood of one who sheds the blood becomes a blood shedder… 
The chain could go on forever on an endless feud”.95 The “brother” figure in 9:5 whom one 
is held accountable for is potentially more open as regards fellowship than is commonly 
understood. At the very least there is the assertion that animals too will require a reckoning 
and so appear to be similarly accountable to, and accounted for, as humans.
96
 
Westermann’s point about the “necessity of killing”,97 then, is perhaps rather the possibility 
and thus the freedom to kill in relation to animals, a freedom that is haunted by the 
accountability to God as a justice to come.  
In Alter’s translation of Genesis where he aims to uphold the “profound and 
haunting enigmas”98 he believes Genesis itself cultivates, he also laments the loss of the 
bodily emphasis in Ancient Hebrew in translation. He draws particular attention to the 
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repeated reference to the ‘hand’,99 which is so important for Genesis 9 in regard to animals: 
‘into your hand they are delivered’ (9:2). As James Murphy translates: animals “are placed 
entirely at the disposal of man”.100 The hand here can be read as a symbol of capacity for 
care as well as power, for the potential of compassion and/or violence. To be given 
something in this sense can mean placed into one’s hands as possession or property, but it 
can also mean to have something entrusted to one’s care; or, it could imply “at hand”, that 
is, available or nearby, as a neighbour. In “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand”, Derrida 
examines the way in which Heidegger conceives of the hand as a defining essence of the 
human but not of animals.
101
 This is partly rooted in a distinction Derrida critiques as 
“seriously dogmatic” in its lack of empirical evidence, that distinguishes between the 
human hand’s capacity for giving and the animal claw as taking.102 Here, in Genesis 9, it is 
God who gives (!t;n ") into the human hand; the human is the creature who receives or takes. 
Further, as already mentioned, when God requires a reckoning, it is ‘at/from the hand of 
every living being’ (9:5 hY"ßx;-lK' dY:ïmi), as if the properties symbolized by the hand are 
associated with accountability and God as a justice to come for all the living. Accordingly, 
the hand is a site for “good and evil” (Gen. 3:5), for responsibility and the space of 
decision in regard to the life or lives of others. What could be said to take place, then, is 
that the God of the flood eschews soveriegnty, to become a justice to come, in which 
humans and animals are accounted for alike, but in a world where humans abide in a 
decidability regarding their response as to who is a neighbour and who is not, and how to 
handle their fellow creatures as brothers or as bodies to be killed and eaten.  
 
A Justice to Come 
Alter characterises the system implemented in 9:5 (‘each one for the blood of another’) that 
of a “retributive justice”,103 since the taking of human life will result in the killer’s life to 
be taken (9:6). Murphy calls it the “law of retaliation” or the “axiom of moral equity”.104  
While Olley suggests the covenant spells out an “unequivocal equality” rarely taken 
account of, he ultimately concedes that Genesis 9 falls back upon the “reality of self-
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centred human violence” which requires divine sanctions.105 But there is more to this 
justice than a system of inter-human symmetrical retribution or divinely given sanctions. 
With the “reckoning” God will demand ‘from every animal’ ‘and from human beings’ 
(9:5), it is as if every living being will be held accountable to God in, or as, a justice to 
come, that is, one who will hold to account and demand an account as a higher power or 
judge. The emphasis on God’s promise to all life is a testament to the relationship between 
God and all-the-living. But the proviso appears to be that this God who has blotted out his 
creation must decrease sovereign power and allow the freedom, decidability and 
responsibility rest between humans and animals. He will, rather, as Derrida put it, wait “in 
order to see”.106 J.G. McConville places this in a binary: “Human interrelationship has the 
capacity to be benign or internecine.”107 He suggests that this duality and decidability is 
particularly shown up in another pair of brothers over questions of fraternity, competition 
and killability, namely with Jacob and Esau (Gen. 27:41), echoing Cain and Abel.
108
 
McConville calls this the “embedding of justice-righteousness in the created order”.109 But 
arguably it is more complex than a duality in which one could simply opt for “justice-
righteousness” as if it appeared on a drop-down menu for ethical decisions. It is this 
complexity and ambiguity that Genesis 9 arguably plays out. 
Returning to Derrida’s “cat or God”110, then, the animal other would be the figure 
who I am called to live with and respond to. God would be the figure, in whose sight I am, 
of a justice to come – a justice that consists of response and responsibility. The human, 
“between the beast and God”111 is both sovereignly free and seen by these figures of 
otherness, who demand response and responsibility. Just as justice “can never be reduced 
to law, to calculative reason, to lawful distribution, to the norms and rules that condition 
law”112 the relationship to the animal other cannot be wholly inscribed in laws to kill or not 
to kill in this narrative. In other words, there is no straightforward command either way, to 
kill or not kill. This comes close to Derrida’s critique of rights also as something 
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prescribed by a law, rather than being interested in concepts like compassion, that are more 
ambiguous than can be inscribed in, or demanded, by laws. Further, rights-based ethics is 
“locked into a model of justice in which a being does or does not have rights on the basis 
of its possession (or lack) of morally significant characteristics that can be empirically 
derived”.113 Ethics and the “question of justice”, for Derrida, is not reducible to the 
question of rights – or to the immanence of any juridico-political doctrine.114 It is always 
more. As Wolfe puts it in regard to Derrida, ethics only as a given law or right reduces 
“ethics to the antithesis of ethics by relying upon a one-size-fits-all formula for conduct 
that this actually relieves us of ethical responsibility – an application that, in principle, 
could be carried out by a machine”.115  In Genesis 9 the response to the animal other is left 
ambiguous, a space of decidability, and thus of responsibility: it is a place where 
compassion can happen but not according to a prescribed law or a programmed demand. It 
is in the relationship between humans and animals, then, that justice can be demanded, 
precisely because the choice to kill or not is a choice, and not determined in advance as a 
moral law. More responsibility resides in such a freedom and power.  
But God is not, for Derrida or for Genesis 9, necessarily to be interpreted as a 
teleological judgement in such a structure of justice. Just as the God of Genesis 9 is less 
sovereign, eschewing a powerful presence, God as a justice to come might play a similar 
part to Derrida’s “democracy to come” as the possibility of a dream or prayer for justice as 
equality without calculation or exclusivity.
116
 As Simon Morgan Wortham explains it, this 
democracy can never be present – just as the God of Genesis will not be present to judge. 
It is rather, a call,  
for unending vigilance, uncomplacent politics, highly singular engagement, and 
newly creative, newly resourceful decision. Indeed, amid this enduring, vital 
struggle – one which cannot be resolved by recourse to constructed laws, customs 
or norms – we find the promise of the future itself, the ‘democracy to come’ in the 
here-now.
117
   
In the aftermath of Adam and Eve’s fruit-eating and self-conscious knowledge of 
“good and evil” in Genesis 3, the re-creation that Genesis 9 portrays is one in which more 
responsibility is demanded of life and in regard to life, rather than merely a concession to 
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human violence. In fact, such an accountability announced by God from all the living, in 
the context of his covenant with all life, is arguably a demand for excessive responsibility 
in the face of one’s other as every living other. Justice is thus a horizon of expectation that 
sets in motion the demand for response and responsibility in excessive measure: an 
impossible responsibility, and the dream, perhaps, of an impossible justice to be done to 
all-the-living. Or as Derrida puts it in Spectres of Marx, “justice as incalculability of the 
gift and singularity of the an-economic ex-position to others”.118 He goes on to ask whether 
“justice as relation to the other supposes” “the irreducible excess of a disjointure or an 
anachrony” that always risks evil and injustice, “against which there is no calculable 
insurance” but which “alone would be able to do justice or to render justice to the other as 
other?”119 The “an” here is tied to anachrony, and the “ex” to being out-of –joint as well as 
the “excessive” responsibility to the other that is always also an exposure. This marks the 
way in which the other comes before – being oneself after – and thus always already in a 
state of anachrony and asymmetry. Such a relation to the other cannot be economic, 
contained in an already designated law, nor can it be entirely equal. Reading this in regard 
to the animal as an other in Genesis 9, animals present a justice that denotes exposure, 
outside the given law. Despite the permission to eat animals, their killability is thus not 
assured, but is suspended in the unknowability of the justice to come in which all will 
stand to account for their lives and the lives of others. This becomes particularly the case in 
light of the second half of Genesis 9, where the lines drawn as to who is “man” or 
“brother” and who is “animal” are troubled, and thus who is killable is also problematized.  
 
Exhibiting Noah’s Nakedness 
As mentioned above, Genesis 9 is often divided into two parts, with 9:1-17 and 9:18-29 as 
separate textual strands. For all that the first half is discussed in relation to animal studies 
the second half is not taken into account, nor is the whole chapter read together in this 
regard. In the second part of Genesis 9, Noah is caught uncovered (9:21 hl'G ") drunk (rk;v') 
and naked 9:22 (hw"r>[,) by his son Ham. Ham tells his two brothers of their father’s naked 
state, and they take a garment, walk backwards into their father’s tent, and cover him up 
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without looking at him. As soon as he realises what has happened, Noah curses Ham’s son 
Canaan, condemning him to servitude to his brothers.  
Turner helpfully points out that as a “sequel to the Flood story” Gen. 9:18-29 is 
strikingly similar to the sequel to the creation account in Genesis 3. Offences are connected 
to fruit: the fruit of knowledge of good and evil (3: 3-6) and grapes from Noah’s vineyard 
(9:20-21).
120
 In both narratives nakedness is a central motif, though the terms differ.
121
 
Both are followed by curses, and both involve covering up one’s nakedness: “by God with 
animal skins in 3:21; by Shem and Japheth with a garment in 9:23”.122 Intimations of 
sexual crimes pre-flood are also potentially at play in regard to Noah’s nakedness post-
flood.
123
 But, as Laurence points out, in Genesis 3 man and woman come to know they are 
naked; Noah eats of his fruits and does not know his “true state” (9:21, 24).124 It is, 
however, as Laurence does not mention, in coming to know his own nakedness and having-
been-seen, that the narrative pivots. Hence, the story of Noah’s nakedness plays out the 
changeability of status regarding “brotherhood” where a brother and a son, or grandson, 
can become relegated to a lower status as a non-brother. I argue that this happens in the 
anxiety caused when Noah the patriarch is exposed for what he is: naked as a beast, 
unconscious of his nakedness as if there were no difference between himself and an 
animal. To compensate for such an exposure of the truth of his naked “animal” state, Noah 
exercises his power in a performative command that makes Canaan animal-like, of lesser 
status than himself and his brothers. 
Much biblical scholarship is baffled by the Noah figure of Gen. 9:18-29, unable to 
reconcile him with the righteous Noah under God’s protection, and viewing the 
drunkenness, cursing, and apparent injustice of the narrative as inexplicable. This tendency 
is perhaps the result of the dominant historical-critical method in Biblical Studies, 
especially oriented around what Alter calls the “philologist impulse” “to disambiguate”125 
and the difficulties of disambiguating the Noah of vv.18-29. For example, both Norman 
Cohn
126
 and John Skinner solve the issue by arguing that there must be two Noahs, as the 
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drunken Noah simply does not fit the character of the “righteous and blameless patriarch 
who is the hero of the flood”.127 Westermann argues for separate authorship or redactions 
between the Priestly source “P” and Yahwistic source “J”.128 David M. Carr’s study of 
Genesis evades the drunken Noah altogether by ending his interpretation at Gen. 9:17.
129
 
“Bypassing the intriguing story of Noah’s sons”, Tremper Longmann III moves straight 
from the rainbow to the Tower of Babel.
130
 In Brett’s Genesis: Procreation and the 
Politics of Identity, he writes that whatever “confusion hovers over the culprit of the crime 
against Noah, the reader is expected to see the curse of slavery as justifiable” and leaves it 
at that.
131
 Humphreys writes about Noah as “God’s select other”132 but refrains from 
remarking on the “other” Noah in the post-diluvian world of God’s creation. Murphy notes 
that we are in no position to know the extent of Noah’s guilt in regard to wine drinking, 
conflating Noah’s curse with the mythic explanation of future races.133  This forms part of 
a plausible reading also offered, for instance, by Lloyd R. Bailey, which explains the two 
narrative sections serving different functions. The purpose of the second half of Genesis 9, 
he argues, is to explain the political and social relations between the groups that Noah’s 
sons represent, shifting from a flood story to an aetiology.
134
 “This type of literature, 
attested in ancient societies around the world, intends to explain some presently existing 
object or custom by means of an ‘event’ in the past.”135  
John Bergsma and Scott Hahn call this passage a “compressed, elusive narrative” 
with “awkward features,” that has been an exegetical puzzle since antiquity.136 William 
Evans writes that “Noah’s curse dwarfs Ham’s offense” and thus offends our moral 
sensibilities.
137
 Arnold argues quite simply that Ham’s offense is due to failing to honour 
his father – a serious offense in ancient north-western Semitic culture, as is clear from 
Exod. 20:12; Deut. 5:16.
138
 Another strategy in scholarship seems to have been to add to 
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the story, to give it sense, to insist on “more to the story”139 than is told and to speculate as 
to what this might be.
 140
 This “more” has mostly taken the shape of a “dirty” secret, sexual 
deviancy, something unspeakable. Bergsma and Hahn contend that refusing this “more” to 
the story is succumbing to a conservatism in regards to anything not made entirely explicit 
in the text, and go on to explain away the “awkwardness” of the narrative by inserting 
sexual transgression into the empty space left in the silence of the text itself. 
141
 Alter 
relates how the mystery of Ham’s transgression towards Noah has remained a conundrum, 
explaining how some, even as early as the classical Midrash, have read into this story a 
castration-narrative between father and son, like the Zeus-Chronos story in which the son 
castrates the father or, alternately, enters him sexually.
142
 A sexual reading is not entirely 
implausible as “to see the nakedness of” sometimes does refer to sexual activity.143 But, as 
Alter points out, it is also entirely possible that seeing one’s father naked was itself a taboo 
and that this alone would warrant a curse.
144
 Bergsma and Hahn list paternal incest, 
voyeurism and castration as possibilities that have been put forward for what takes place 
between Noah and Ham.
145
 Surveying the sexualized accounts of this scene in scholarship, 
Brad Embry explains how paternal incest has been the category most widely accepted in 
modern interpretations of Genesis 9.
146
 He argues, however, that voyeurism is the problem, 
because “nakedness is a literary cue that indicates the reality of the Fall”.147 Embry calls 
the scene of Noah’s nakedness a “recognition of the residue of the initial Fall; the naivety 
lost in the Fall remains in the post-diluvian context as well”.148 I propose that this 
connection might be read not merely as a matter of voyeurism, but rather as oriented 
towards the relationships between animal, human, divine that cause tension and trouble.  
  Despite seeing no reason to read maternal incest into the Genesis 9 account of 
Noah and his son Ham, as Bergsma and Hahn argue, I do agree with the their point 
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concerning the theme of humiliation that is seemingly played out in Noah’s anger, the 
possible interpretation of a shift in power dynamics when the father and head of the 
household is seen naked, and the concurrent anxieties about authority being destabilized.
149
 
But this can be read in relation to animality and divinity rather than purely inter-human 
hierarchies. In light of God’s seeming to repent of the flood, or at least his promise not to 
exercise such violent authority again, Noah appears to take on a role as sovereign “Man” in 
his anger at being seen naked. Such a scene could be read as a loss of mastery – similar to 
God’s loss of mastery over Adam and Eve – and thus being seen as animal. Noah is, to 
borrow a phrase from Derrida, “naked as a beast”150 and is ashamed at being seen in this 
state. It is a matter of being seen before knowing one is seen.
151
 “Nudity is nothing other 
than that passivity, the involuntary exhibition of the self.”152 With the new order of animals 
in human hands, Noah desires to uphold such an order of differentiation, with a clear 
hierarchy of Man as Master. Here, ‘everything’ else is subjected, given into human hands 
(9:2). Brett holds that in Genesis “overt ideologies of human dominance, male dominance 
or primogeniture are allowed to stand, but alternative perspectives are juxtaposed in such a 
way as to undermine the dominant ideology”.153 Noah’s dominance as “man” is precisely 
undercut and undermined in this scene of naked exposure. If power has been displaced 
somewhat from God to humans, in whose hands all animals are given, then Noah is 
arguably asserting a stance of power in regard to his sons in the curse he exclaims. Seeing 
his father naked is akin to depriving Noah of his power as a man, above his sons and 
animals. As Derrida notes, man alone clothes himself. Animals are living creatures that 
cannot be naked, precisely because they are naturally “naked”. Keen to be more than a 
mere beast, Noah’s nakedness is something like an upstaging of his authority. He loses 
face.
154
 To repeat Derrida’s connection between the idea of manhood and shame: 
Man would be the only one to have invented a garment to cover his sex. He would 
be a man only to the extent that he was able to be naked, that is to say, to be 
ashamed, to know himself to be ashamed because he is no longer naked. And 
knowing himself would mean knowing himself to be ashamed.
155
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But Derrida’s mentioning of shame is not merely to point to the feeling of embarrassment 
that might accompany being seen naked by another. It is also, as mentioned earlier, to point 
to accountability. If only humans are capable of shameful nakedness, and thus also to a 
certain self-consciousness and self-reflection then Derrida’s turn from the autobiographical 
to the confessional “I” is due to a certain idea of guilt. Derrida emphasises this to distance 
himself from the autobiography tied to the human as an autonomous singular “I” who 
freely self-reflects, and rather situates the “I” as a testimonial figure always already 
testifying to and guilty of. For Genesis 9, it seems that Noah’s anger at being seen naked 
could be read as a symptom of uneasiness at the permission to eat animals, as to who or 
what is animal, and the status of all the living in regard to God, in the sight of God, 
accountable to God after the flood in which so much life – animal and human – was 
obliterated, guiltily, alike. Noah is described as ‘a righteous man, blameless in his 
generation’ (6:9).156 He has lived responsibly, properly, guiltlessly. Feeling himself 
watched over by God, as the only man not blotted out, Noah lives uneasily in the new 
world, haunted, as if his position as the new first man – survivor, carnivore and a Father of 
fathers – is vulnerable, and if not guilty he is nonetheless blame-able. Eager to uphold his 
blamelessness and haunted by this desire to remain proper and shameless, Noah thrusts 
blame outwards at the other who has exposed him, lying flat out, unconscious, naked, and 
drunk in his tent. Noah’s shame at being caught in this state must be transferred to 
another’s account. Ham, stepping inside the tent in which Noah lies, trespasses the 
threshold outside which his father’s “manhood” is erected, properly and clothed before 
God. Once conscious and covered again, Noah responds with a violent curse, as if he were 
covering the disgrace of improper nudity with divine-like retribution: ‘When Noah awoke 
from his wine and knew what his youngest son had done to him, he said: “Cursed be 
Canaan; lowest of slaves shall he be to his brothers”’ (9:24-25). As McConville points out, 
the covenant with all life earlier in the chapter, with its “universalizing picture is disturbed 
by Noah’s curse on Canaan for the enigmatic sin of his father Ham (9:25-27)”.157 How 
should such a disturbance be understood? 
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Why Canaan and not Ham? Lewis notes tendencies in later post-biblical literature 
to make Ham an “archsinner”.158 “The moral interest in Ham’s action expressed itself by 
drawing a warning against the exposure of the body.”159  Ham was conceived as one who 
laughed at the vulnerability of his father.
160
 Westermann notes  the tendency in some 
scholarship to  solve this problem by treating it as an error, thus it is Canaan who sees 
Noah naked, not Ham.
161
 But Westermann fiercely counters this point and says we “must 
leave the contradiction as it is”.162 Others have read this slur on Canaan as a justification 
for the animosity between the Israelites and Canaanites.
163
 Read as it is, the curse on 
Canaan could be interpreted as a hyperbolic exercise of authority that is intended more for 
the show of paternal potency than for justice. Crucially, the unfairness of the curse could 
be explained as the sheer “I can” – the pouvoir – of Noah’s power. Turner implicitly sees 
Noah as the God figure in this scene when he notes the correspondence between Genesis 3 
and 9, with God doing the cursing in the former passage and Noah doing the cursing in the 
latter.
164
 When he questions “the efficacy of Noah’s words” and asks whether “they have 
the same force as the words of God?” he conveys the way in which Noah takes on a divine-
like stance.
165Just as God was described as “overreacting” in the flood-destruction, Evans 
suggests here it is Noah who overreacts.
166
 Of the word bête, meaning both beast and 
stupidity in French, Derrida argues that to designate a living being either as stupid, lesser, 
and/or a “beast”, is a dogmatic, performative gesture, similar, I propose, to Noah’s curse.  
The “attribution of the attribute bête, the attribution of bêtise” is “a stratagem, i.e. an act of 
war, an aggression, a violence that intends to be wounding. It is always an injurious, 
offensive, abusive insult, always injurious, i.e. in the order of right, one that runs the risk 
of being unjust”.167 Noah’s curse is an excessive gesture precisely because Noah is 
asserting the right of sovereign man as differentiated from the naked, edible beast, and thus 
as such a sovereign figure his action is staged as one who does not have to answer for his 
actions. Canaan will become a servant (db,[,) to his brothers, the lowest of slaves, or a 
servant’s servant (9:25). The freedom of humans, given from God, then, becomes 
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construed as sovereign power of autonomy and authority up and against the non-
sovereignty of animals as subjected creatures. But Canaan’s demotion to servitude as the 
‘lowest of slaves’ to his brothers (9:25) reveals the slipperiness of “brotherhood” and 
“beasts” for the sacredness of only or purely human life. With Ham seeing Noah naked and 
the differentiation made consequently between his son and Noah’s other sons, the narrative 
seems to show that a brother or son can be like Derrida’s animal gaze that sees me naked. 
If human life is not immune from demotion or devaluation then the line that separates man 
from beast or brother from non-brother is fragile. Who, then, is safely killable and who 
immune from such killability? 
It is pertinent that what is known as the “curse of Ham” is linked to race issues. In 
David Goldenberg’s The Curse of Ham, he calls Gen. 9:18-25 “the single greatest 
justification for Black slavery for more than a thousand years”.168 Goldenberg traces how 
the biblical story is understood to justify slavery. “Over and over again one finds Black 
enslavement justified with a reference to the biblical story of the curse of eternal servitude 
pronounced against Ham, considered to be the father of black Africa.”169 Wondering 
whether the origin of anti-black sentiment in the Western world can be traced back to the 
Bible, he concludes that an increased association of black with slave in the Near East can 
be located in exegetical responses to Genesis 9. While incorrect, a perceived etymology of 
the name Ham from a root meaning dark, brown or black, had an impact that clung to this 
text. Such understandings influenced readings of Noah’s curse of slavery on Canaan, 
associated with Ham, since the first century.
170
 Blackness was sometimes inserted into the 
story, such as can be found in one fourth-century source, where Canaan is explicitly seen 
as the ancestor of dark-skinned people.
171
 The dual curse of blackness and slavery can be 
found in seventh-century Islamic texts that coincide with Muslim conquests in Africa. This 
period brought an increasing influx of black African slaves to the Near East. Goldenberg 
explains how from this time on, “the Curse of Ham, that is, the exegetical tie between 
blackness and servitude, is commonly found in works composed in the Near East, whether 
in Arabic by Muslims or in Syriac by Christians”.172 He thus suggests that the increasing 
emphasis on the curse coincides with the increasing numbers of black people taken as 
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slaves.
173
 Skin colour becomes the mark of ethnic groups. A similar phenomenon can be 
observed in sixteenth-century England: “After England’s encounter with Black Africans, 
white and black became the terminology for ‘self’ and ‘other’.”174  Categorizing humans 
according to skin colour was also mapped onto the biblical text. From the seventh century, 
Jewish, Christian, and Muslim biblical interpretations can be found that pinpoint Noah’s 
sons as different human skin colours.
175
 The fragility of the “brother” or the “human”, 
then, is not only a matter of edible animals and carnivorous humans, but also of the 
responses to any other as potentially “animal”, or a non-brother. The liberation theologian 
James Cone condemns the logic that determines segregation and slavery in race relations 
between “white” and “black” as the same one that leads to the subjugation and abuse of 
animals and the natural world.
176
 The use of the curse of Canaan to justify the inferiority of 
black people demonstrates this in a particularly powerful way.  
What Noah’s nakedness and its exposure reveals is that the conceptualisations that 
divide humans from animals, such as the capacity for nakedness, are constructed. With the 
particular matter of nakedness the “nakedness” of the animal as a natural state becomes a 
way to institute the accepted vulnerability of the animal body as killable and edible. To 
uphold the “clothedness” of humans is not, then, merely a matter of custom but also of 
protection as a strong, shielded, sacred species, saved from killability. Such a non-
nakedness becomes an aggression against the naked animal which is perceived as 
essentially different. As Noah’s curse demonstrates, such constructions of difference must 
be upheld with a spectacle of sovereignty that is a performance of the power of the human 
“I am” as a sovereign “I can”. But if one whose life was protected as a human, a brother, a 
son, becomes a slave and thus of a closer status to a domesticated or tamed animal, or even 
a wild animal held in captivity, then the line that divides other humans from animals is less 
robust and clear-cut too. To do as Noah does, asserting the sovereignty of his status as a 
father, a man, a master, is to refuse the other who sees him, just as to refuse to concede 
animals a perspective and power is to veil oneself to the singular gaze of the other. Further, 
it is to refuse to concede one’s own vulnerability as an animal to the sovereign other. 
Derrida calls this the violence and asinanity [bêtise] of “suspending one’s compassion and 
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in depriving the animal of every power of manifestation, of the desire to manifest to me 
anything at all, and even to manifest to me in some way its experience of my language, of 
my words and of my nudity”.177  
 
Conclusion: Accounting for All Life? 
In this chapter I have shown how the theme of nakedness in Derrida’s discussion of 
animality plays a crucial part for his thinking. Inextricably caught up in references to 
Genesis, Derrida’s nakedness becomes a topos for him to explore notions of human/animal 
distinctions. Knowing oneself to be naked is to be an autobiographical “I”, construed as a 
human “I can”, with powers to know “good and evil”, to be self-conscious, in self-
reflective autonomy and autarchy. Animals – thought to not know themselves to be naked 
– are not seen to possess this autobiographical “I”. Yet Derrida orients this “I” and its 
autobiography around confession. Confession becomes the way for Derrida to posit an “I” 
who is counter to the autonomous, authoritative, autobiographical “human” “I”. In a 
confessional mode, this autobiographical “I” is no longer sovereign, but is accountable to 
others, testifying to another sovereign figure and guilty of a crime: namely the crime of 
excluding animality and the consequences this exclusion entails for disregarding, demoting 
and disvaluing animal life. For Derrida, it is imperative to recognise oneself as naked in 
the gaze of the animal other because to do so is to concede one’s own nakedness as an 
animal. To feel shame in such a gaze is to recognise the error in deeming the animal a non-
neighbour. Testimony and guilt are conditions that arise in the face of God as a justice to 
come, as that sovereign being who sees me, but whose sovereignty does not diminish my 
own. The “I” is thus free to be always already accountable.  
 Building on Derrida’s reflections on nakedness, animality and accountability before 
God, my reading has shown that on the one hand, Genesis 9 is a prime site for locating the 
sovereignty of “Man” given by God to humans, in order to see the power of humans over 
the animal world. On the other hand, however, Genesis 9 stages the tension in such a 
power dynamic in light of the covenant with all life before a justice to come by God. 
Because animals are now in principle killable, justice is a space of decidability: animals 
become a site in which humans must decide how to respond. Such a justice cannot be 
wholly programmed in advance or it would not be a justice to come that demands 
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responsibility in the face of such a horizon. With the scene between Noah, exposed naked 
as a beast in the gaze of his son, and the following curse and demotion of Canaan to 
slavehood, tensions in the differentiation between humans and animals are played out 
further over the exposure of nakedness and the performance of sovereign power. Noah’s 
exposure as naked, resulting in Canaan’s demotion to a non-brother, conveys the fragile, 
slippery divisions between human life and animal life, showcasing thus the difficulties in 
delineating who or what is in fact killable and edible and who or what is a brother and 
neighbour. In the face of God as a horizon of justice whose covenant is with all life, the 
differentiations and distinctions between humans and animals are thus more problematic 
and questionable than a simple acceptance of carnivorous, sovereign human power would 
appear at first glance. Rather, in the face of such a horizon of justice, a demand for 
response and responsibility might be what is required and what will be reckoned with.  
  
 
 
Chapter 2 
Derrida’s Cat or Daniel’s God?  
Following God to the Deconstructed Subjects in  
the Book of Daniel 
 
Derrida’s Cat or God 
Derrida calls for a subject that would be deconstructed, which is to say, a subject that is not 
“identical to itself”.1 It would be “a subject that would no longer include the figure of 
mastery of self, of adequation to self, center and origin of the world”.2 Derrida “would 
define the subject rather as the finite experience of non-identity to self, as the underivable 
interpellation inasmuch as it comes from the other, from the trace of the other, with all the 
paradoxes or the aporia of being-before-the-law”.3 The subject would thus be “a singularity 
that dislocated or divides itself in gathering itself together to answer to the other, whose 
call somehow precedes its own identification with itself, for to this call I can only answer, 
have already answered, even if I think I am answering ‘no’”.4 This call does not have to be 
a linguistic one. It is marked also by silence and secrecy. As Derrida challenges the human 
subject as being marked by the very concepts his “deconstructed subject” resists, he looks 
to the call from the other as nonhuman, that which has been excluded from the human 
order, and so remains other to the human subject. He writes: “I hear the cat or God ask 
itself, ask me: Is he going to call me, is he going to address me?”5  
The “subject”, Derrida writes, is above all linked to “the law, as subject subjected 
to the law, subject to the law in its very autonomy, to ethical or juridical law, to political 
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law or power, to order (symbolic or not)”.6 Instead of continuing to see the figure of the 
human as a sovereign entity either enforcing the law as the sole sovereign subject of, or as 
the sole subjects to, the law, Derrida reorients the question to what he calls divinanimality.
7
 
It is a matter of thinking beyond the law as a convention or contract of mutual benefit 
amongst human subjects. As I discussed in the first chapter, for Derrida, justice and 
responsibility necessarily exceed the order of calculable law or a given prescription and 
program towards, and in relation to, the other.
8
 To respond responsibly for Derrida is more 
than this, it is to answer the call of the other. He recognises this call in the gaze of his cat. 
“This real, singular cat occupies a crucial threshold in Derrida’s philosophical knowledge. 
She (for this cat is in fact une chatte) allows him to see something of the otherness of all 
non-human animals”.9 But it is not only a case of non-human animals but of the nonhuman 
or ahuman. Derrida asks: “Must not this place of the Other be ahuman?”10 Because they 
are thought not to respond in language, animals – and one could add, gods – are excluded 
from the human order, founded on the possibility of responding responsibly in language, 
that is, to be able to account for oneself autonomously before the law and sovereignly 
enforce the law. But Derrida posits a two-fold argument in response to this. First, that there 
can be no response that is entirely devoid of what is thought foreign to it, namely reflex or 
so-called instinctive automaticity.
11
 In other words, the division separating a human 
response from an animal mere reaction is not assured. Secondly, that responsibility may 
present itself in other modes than as a response of linguistic transparency and 
accountability. One way to understand Derrida’s point is through the response “here I am”.  
In The Animal that Therefore I am, Derrida writes that he is interested in “here I 
am” as a response because: 
 ‘Here I am’ as responsibility implies this self-presentation, this autotelic, 
autodeictic, autobiographical movement, exposing oneself before the law… 
because ‘Here I am’ as responsibility implies the possibility of ‘responding,’ of 
answering for oneself in the response to the appeal or command of the other.
12
  
For Derrida the other who “calls” is an animal other. But seemingly, it is also the call of 
God. Drawing upon Levinas’ concept of ethics as a respect for the other formulated 
through the “after you”, Derrida argues that this does not just mean “ ‘go ahead at the 
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elevator, etc., it means ‘I come after you,’ and I come to myself, to my responsibility as an 
ego, in some sense, only from the other”.13  
The other is there before me, and I receive the order from the other who precedes 
me. That is the situation when faced with the other, and he not only goes ahead of 
me, must go ahead of me, but is there before me. So I say ‘After you,’ and it’s my 
first address to the other as other.
14
  
As he puts it in Rogues, “as with the coming of any event worthy of this name, of an 
unforeseeable coming of the other, of a heteronomy, of a law come from the other, of a 
responsibility and decision of the other – of the other in me, an other greater and older than 
I am”.15 Since Derrida calls for a response to the “other” as what is nonhuman, his call is 
situated between “cat or God”, or as “divinanimality” as that which has been excluded 
from the human order. Reorienting humanity to following in the double meaning of “je 
suis” as “I am” and “I follow”, Derrida reflects on what it means to follow animals, to 
come after animals. He writes that the ethical imperative towards the other to say “after 
you”, to allow the other to be a sovereign firstcomer must be thought in terms of the other 
as any other, without calculation. This other is thus also – and perhaps especially – a 
nonhuman other. In the delineation of the nonhuman other as “cat or God”16 in The Animal 
that Therefore I am, Derrida does not pose the question explicitly as to what it might mean 
to follow God as the nonhuman other in the context of the question of the animal.  But as 
Chrulew states, in the bathroom scene, it is in God’s gaze that a turn is set in motion 
towards response and responsibility for the other.
17
  
As for the question of whether (and if so, how), Derrida will address the nonhuman 
other, it would appear that his prime response is: “here I am”. Despite it appearing to be 
Derrida who is the one to address these figures of otherness, his emphasis on response 
would signal the utterance of “here I am” not as a sovereign self-introduction but precisely 
as a response before the law of the other: yes, here I am, you have already seen me, I am 
responding to you. His cat or his God would not address him with words, in language, and 
so his response is an attention to their being-there, his following them, his already having-
being-seen by them. Hence, Derrida’s figure of the animal other here is that of his cat as an 
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irreplaceable, irreducible living being.
18
 His God figure, on the other hand, remains 
something of a haunting remainder, closely associated with the God of Genesis. Are “cat or 
God” exchangeable figures for the nonhuman, for the “other” as ahuman? And what would 
such exchangeability signify? 
The generality and singularity of the “here I am” is encapsulated in Derrida’s 
discussion of Abraham who answers God: “Here I am” in Genesis 22, in the infamous 
story of God asking Abraham to sacrifice his son, Isaac. Abraham is silent about the call he 
has received from God, and “in not saying the essential thing, namely the secret between 
God and him, Abraham doesn’t speak, he assumes the responsibility that consists in always 
being alone, entrenched in one’s own singularity at the moment of decision”.19 Derrida 
argues that the self-presentation of the “here I am” that would be followed by the lawful 
and ostensibly responsible spoken confession and account of this call is in fact what would 
lead to a loss of singularity and a risk of generality, automaticity, and thus irresponsibility.  
As soon as one speaks, “as soon as one enters the medium of language, one loses that very 
singularity, precisely because language is always to some extent general, it can never be 
entirely singular. One therefore loses the possibility of deciding or the right to decide. Thus 
every decision would, fundamentally, remain at the same time solitary, secret, and 
silent”.20 What Derrida’s “here I am” signifies, then, is the singularity of the one who is 
called by name and who must decide on a response, but the generality that encloses this 
singular subject in language. Crucially, for this context, the “I” responds to the God who is 
other. Referring to the “here I am” in the context of the animal adds another dimension to 
this ethical demand.  
What Derrida shows with the “here I am” is that any response bears in it the traces 
of automaticity, that is frequently reserved for the animal instinctive reaction, and that 
responsibility can be deconstructed. In terms of automaticity, Derrida argues that iterability 
is essential to every response, “to the ideality of every response,”21 and that this iterability 
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“can and cannot fail to introduce nonresponse, automatic reaction, mechanical reaction into 
the most alive, most ‘authentic,’ and most responsible response”.22 It is the case of the 
iterable trace as a type of “machine” that cannot be reduced to my intention, reason, or 
presence, and so cannot be wholly accounted for.
23
 This is not only the case for the written 
word, but is a function of language or any communication. My language is never only my 
own, my utterance “exists asymmetrically, always for the other, from the other, kept by the 
other. Coming from the other, remaining with the other, and returning to the other”.24  In 
other words, the “here I am” as a response is a repeatable, iterable structured response that 
in itself as a general phrase or repeatable set of signs denotes the automatic and non-
autonomous “I” who answers to the other who is already there, before him or her. Wolfe 
writes 
‘we’ are always radically other, already in- or ahuman in our very being – not just 
in the evolutionary, biological, and zoological fact of our physical embodiment, 
vulnerability, and mortality, of course, but also in our subjection to and constitution 
in the materiality and technicity of language that is always on the scene before we 
are, as a precondition of our subjectivity.
25
   
At the same time, however, “here I am” is the response that signals an excessive 
responsibility of an undecidable law to and from the other. It is a matter of testimony and 
trust in the face of the other who calls me into being, whom I cannot wholly know and 
whose call asks something of me. Derrida terms this the “aporia of responsibility”,26 in the 
tension between knowing what one is doing in acting responsibly but at the same time one 
is not actually being responsible if one is merely acting according to the knowledge 
presented to us, this would be “the technical deployment of a cognitive apparatus”.27 
Hence the very condition for responsibility is also simultaneously the impossibility of 
responsibility. Even if I say “no”, or think I have said “no” a response has been given. But 
there is simultaneously always the possibility of saying “yes” to the other. As Calarco 
states: “The Other leaves a trace of the shock of encounter within me, and how I respond to 
that trace – whether I affirm or negate, avow or disavow – constitutes ethics, properly 
speaking.”28 Derrida continues to argue that there is no “discourse or address of the other 
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without the possibility of an elementary promise”.29 This is perhaps nothing more than an 
elementary promise of a relational response that in itself always already promises the 
possibility of an affirmation or acknowledgement. The yes “will have implied and will 
always imply the trustworthiness and fidelity of a faith”,30 that is, a trust in the other that 
resides in not knowing the other or the other’s response.  
“Responsibility and faith go together,” Derrida writes in The Gift of Death, 
“however paradoxical that might seem to some, and both should, in the same movement 
exceed mastery and knowledge”.31 This ties in with his notion of a deconstructed subject 
because it is a matter of recognising a lack of mastery, a non-mastery, but simultaneously 
in acknowledging the relationality, response and responsibility with and to the other who 
goes before me, who I come after and answer to. As already mentioned, in The Gift of 
Death, Derrida stages the aporia of responsibility through the figure of Abraham in 
Genesis 22. Derrida attempts to show that secrecy and responsibility must be thought 
together “in responding, hence in answering to the other, before the other and before the 
law, and if possible publicly, answering for itself, its intentions, its aims, and for the name 
of the agent deemed responsible”.32 But this is crucially an unknowable other. God “is 
himself absent, hidden and silent, separate, secret, at the moment he has to be obeyed”.33 
To be God he must remain other: “If the other were to share his reasons with us by 
explaining them to us, if he were to speak to us all the time without any secrets, he 
wouldn’t be the other, we would share a type of homogeneity.”34 The relation set up 
between the deconstructed subject as a “here I am” and the call of the other, then, is 
inextricably relational but never wholly transparent or symmetrical. What does it mean to 
follow Derrida’s God in the face of an animal other? Or is it, in cat or God, that the cat is a 
kind of divinity in Derrida’s eyes?  
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Following God to the Deconstructed Subjects in the Book of Daniel 
Daniel is a multifaceted book in the biblical archive, normally divided into two parts, 
chapters 1-6 and 7-12. Jan-Wim Wesselius calls it “a kaleidoscopic work” because of its 
variations in genre, style and language.
35
 The book is pseudepigraphic, antedated, bilingual 
(Hebrew and Aramaic). It is a text that is rife with diverse influences
36
 and has a long and 
influential trajectory, on the genre of apocalypse and particularly on the Book of 
Revelation, to which I will turn later.
37
 Lawrence M. Wills draws attention to the didactic 
elements of Daniel and their probable relation to oral folk tales.
38
 As Jennifer L. Koosed 
and Robert P. Seesengood point out, it is a collection of stories that have been popular 
especially among children, particularly known for its lions.
39
 The first six chapters are 
commonly described as court legends while the last six are usually classified as 
apocalyptic literature.
40
 But this benign association with children’s stories and neat 
taxonomy masks the way in which the Book of Daniel presents two radically different 
visions of the political as animal, visions of the complex and shifting relationships between 
power and powerlessness. By “political” here I mean the social relations, powers and 
hierarchies that determine who rules over other creatures and who is in turn ruled or 
subjected. In Daniel, the political is animal: animality is a spectrum that runs from the 
domesticated to the wild, from pet to prey, where the boundaries between who and what 
are never entirely delineated. The two visions in Daniel are cobbled together in a manner 
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akin to the hybrid animals of Daniel’s dreams, making it a strangely composite work; the 
two parts even speak different languages.
41
   
The first half of Daniel presents a fantasy for successful assimilation, incorporation 
and political absorption for exiles in a foreign empire; here, to be animal is to be conquered 
and domesticated, brought into another territory. But this is an absorption that is 
triumphant in being allied to God, up and against the misplaced hubris of human 
domination. Being conquered and “consumed” by a foreign empire is not the end: rather, 
these exilic animals survive, living on as domesticated subjects within a foreign political 
system but ultimately following their God as the higher master. Under the divine ruler, 
conquered and conquerors alike are shown to be akin to Derrida’s deconstructed subjects. 
This is shown to be an empowering state of being. The second half of Daniel, however, is a 
radical over-turning of the optimism of the first half. If the first part of Daniel highlighted 
the success of being a domesticated animal incorporated into foreign political structures, 
the second part has opened the cage doors wide and unleashed wildness and carnivorous 
animality. In Daniel’s dreams of the second half of the book, animality now appears to 
signify the limits of the domesticated civilization of court life, as overpowering, causing 
anxiety, spelling out crisis and catastrophe. It is as if the displacement of power from 
humans to God in the first half, that showed humans and animals alike under God as 
deconstructed subjects, has unleashed an array of creatures – including God himself – 
displaying ferocity, carnivorousness and violence, denoting utter powerlessness for the 
subjects surrounded by such creatures.   
The Book of Daniel is a particularly pertinent part of the biblical archive to turn to 
due to its association with questions of Jewish identity. The stories of 1-6 place the 
eponymous hero of Daniel in the Babylonian and Persian courts in the sixth century BCE, 
but the Book of Daniel is written around the time of the Maccabean Revolt (167-163 
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BCE).
42
 Jan Assmann calls the Maccabean revolt “a unique historical phenomenon, the 
influence of which has reverberated down through the centuries to the present day”.43 Both 
the Babylonian exile and the Maccabean revolt signify pivotal points in constructions and 
conceptualizations of Jewish history, cultural memory and identity. Daniel is presented as 
one of the Judean exiles in Babylon along with other noble Jews. Daniel’s setting, in the 
Babylonian exile, signals a context of exile after the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar 
destroyed Jerusalem in 587 BCE, and then in 539 Cyrus conquered Babylon with the 
Persian Empire. The Babylonian exile that followed 587 BCE can thus be seen as a time of 
crisis, of submission to foreign powers.   
In his history of ancient Israel, Nils Peter Lemche argues that it was during the 
Babylonian exile that the Israelites emerged as a distinct people, that is, as the Jews.
44
 This 
period in which Judah and the Judeans, or the “Jews” were subjected first to the 
Babylonian and secondly to the Persian rule is important for theorizing what “Jewishness” 
means – or has come to mean – and how such a category relates to concepts of assimilation 
or separation, identity or hybridity. Lemche suggests that the term “Jews” instead of 
“Judeans” could be employed hereafter, because the people in question were members of a 
society which had begun to develop characteristics ordinarily associated with the 
designation “Jew”, in relation to the character of religion in society.45 This is primarily tied 
to identifying “who” were exiled, what identified them as a people, and who were the 
opposition; in other words, questions of group identity, cultural, ethnic and religious 
boundaries, forces of oppression and opposition. Arguably, these are all themes that are 
central to Daniel and are inextricably related to animality.  
The period in which this text is thought to be composed was a time when the Greek 
King Antiochus IV of the Seleucid empire issued a decree that prohibited the practice of 
Judaism, in what Martha Himmelfarb calls “a rare instance of religious persecution in 
Greco-Roman antiquity”, suspicious of the worship of foreign deities “masking political 
conspiracy”.46 John J. Collins conveys how the Maccabean revolt has “stood through the 
centuries as a striking paradigm for recourse to armed, violent revolution in the name of 
religion”, calling the purification of the Temple after the Maccabean victory “one of the 
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great events of Jewish history and is still commemorated in the celebration of 
Hanukkah”.47 During the second century BCE it appears that Jerusalem had a social elite 
that favoured reform, opening the Jewish religion to Hellenistic culture.
48
 Assmann states: 
“Hellenistic culture as a widely held way of life, ho koinos bios as Josephus put it, was 
perceived not as Greek in particular but as Pagan in general.”49 This cultural influx 
received a varying degree of acceptance throughout the ancient Mediterranean – some 
aspiring to it, building gymnasia, baths, civic structures, while others resisted and resented 
such changes.
50
 The initiative for Jerusalem’s Hellenization came from the Jewish reform 
faction, not from Seleucid authorities, according to 1 Maccabees 1:11-15. Assmann 
emphasises that this was largely a question of fidelity to particular customs.
51
 To be a foe 
or friend is a matter of being recognised as belonging to a particular group. In other words, 
these are questions relating to the determination of what or who a particular religion and 
culture are and see themselves as, over the question of assimilation or separation, of 
domestication or wild revolt. Such domestication or revolt could be seen as a matter on the 
one hand of the political as founded in the purely human order, excluding or subjugating 
animals and gods, and on the other the political as animal, carnivorous beasts as rulers, 
lions or people(s) as trapped, subjugated subjects, such as the lions kept by the king in 
Daniel. Van der Toorn emphasises that references to lions in the Babylonian tradition are 
not real animals: “they stand for human adversaries. The single time that “pit of lions” is 
mentioned in a cuneiform scholarly text, it serves as a metaphor for the hostility and 
competition among the court sages”.52 In light of this, he suggests Daniel’s literal 
understanding of the lions is a “misrecognition” and “misunderstanding”.53 The lions in 
Daniel are clearly associated with such human political court-conflict. But I propose that 
thinking of real, living, wild animals trapped in a pit is crucial for understanding that 
subjection to foreign powers – whether Babylonian, Persian or Seleucid rulers – is 
configured as an animal-like state, being domesticated, caged, captured, and removed from 
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one’s territory. But the solidarity with such animals becomes also a nonhuman alliance 
with the God who is also an “other” to human powers of subjection. 
Gabriela Signori explains that the idea of defending faith through violence took 
shape under Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164 BCE) as a result of his prohibiting Jews from 
living according to their customs, his violation of their Temple and violence against those 
who resisted his rule.
54
 Assmann argues that from a religio-historical perspective, “the 
Maccabean Revolt of 165 BCE, as depicted in the first two Books of the Maccabees and in 
the writings of the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus, should be counted among the truly 
epochal events in world history”.55 Two of the elements he highlights are martyrdom and 
zealotry, dying for one’s faith and killing for one’s faith. Assmann highlights that this war 
was seemingly about resistance to, and revolt against, Seleucid persecution but it was also 
a Jewish civil war, between what he calls a “modernizing reformist faction and an 
orthodox faction of those faithful to religious law”.56 These are tensions that are palpable 
in Daniel. Arguably, what Daniel plays out is precisely the stark tension between 
assimilating to a foreign empire or resisting its powers; to following God as a domesticated 
subject or fighting for God like a wild animal. The significance of animality for a text such 
as Daniel can be gleaned in relation to power relations and socio-political structures as they 
relate to the sixth century Babylonian empire as well as the second century Maccabean 
revolt.  
Daniel Smith-Christopher relates “P”, the supposed priestly redactor of the 
Pentateuch to the period of the exile and highlights the relation between self-identity, 
boundaries and animals. He argues that the “purity/identity concern of the exilic 
community” is marked in the priestly writer/redactor as a preserver of a minority people, 
maintaining social boundaries of separation.
57
 He writes of “the cultic use of separation to 
ensure and preserve purity and, most significantly, the separation of Israelites from 
foreigners because they are selected by God”.58 This is a matter of separation from 
foreigners through categorisations of social relations. The key concepts he notes as to fear 
of transfer of pollution and maintenance of the group are also linked importantly to 
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Leviticus and distinctions between clean and unclean animals.
 59
 While Daniel only briefly 
mentions defilement in relation to food (1:8), questions of separation or cohabitation are 
prominent, and inextricably bound up with the animality of people as either domestic or 
violent and wild, carnivorous or non-carnivorous, edible or non-edible, faithful or faithless 
in following God as the ultimate master.  
 What Daniel ultimately displays is that all the living, king and animal alike, are 
akin to Derrida’s deconstructed subjects, and that higher power resides with the nonhuman 
divine. Human power is thus merely a play or puppeting of divine power, and at worst, a 
descent into ferocious, carnivorous violence. The Book of Daniel is a hybrid of the hope 
for triumphant domestic animality, and sheer anxiety at the dark wildness of unbounded 
political animality.  
 
Fantasies of Absorption: Being At the Table 
Briefly put, the first six chapters of the Book of Daniel depict the relationships between 
Daniel, his companions and various kings. Daniel shows himself to be clever and rises in 
the ranks: he interprets dreams and provides advice for kings. A little like Derrida’s scene 
between cat or God, the Book of Daniel presents a scene with Daniel in the sight of lions 
and his God. This takes place in chapter 6, where Daniel enjoys a high position under King 
Darius (6:3). Jealous of Daniel, the ‘other presidents and satraps tried to find grounds for 
complaint against Daniel in connection with the kingdom’ (6:4). When they cannot find 
any grounds for complaint they realise that their best option is in regard to ‘the law of his 
God’ (6:5). Appealing to the king’s vanity, ‘O King Darius, live for ever!’ (6:6), the 
presidents, satraps, prefects, counsellors and governors ‘all agreed that the king should 
establish an ordinance and enforce an interdict, that whoever prays to anyone, divine or 
human, for thirty days, except to you, O king, shall be thrown into a den of lions’ (6:7). 
The document is duly signed, and when Daniel is later found praying as usual to his God 
(6:10-11), the conspirators tell the king and remind him of the impossibility of revoking 
the law (6:12, 15). The king does not want to charge Daniel but is foiled by his own law, 
and has Daniel thrown into the pit of lions to be eaten and killed (6:14-17).   
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P.R Davies relates how the characters of the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar and 
the exiled Jews in Daniel “are both the predecessors and the prototypes of the persecuting 
monarch Antiochus IV and the persecuted Jews of Palestine centuries later”.60 The story of 
Daniel, then, is thought to reflect both a past crisis and a “present” crisis.61  Smith-
Christopher argues persuasively for the organic nature of this folding of past and present: 
“Memories and traditions regarding the hubris of Babylonian rulers that formed the ‘raw 
materials’ for the Daniel tales would not need extensive ‘revision’ to be flexible enough to 
apply with equal cynicism to the pretensions of rulers throughout the Persian and 
Hellenistic eras.”62 He argues that despite the differences between the political and 
ideological regimes from 587 to 164 BCE, the Daniel tales reflect an understanding of 
empire building in the Ancient Near East as a recurrent display of, and battle for, power. 
63
 
André Lacocque conveys how representations of Babylonian kings are often shown as 
ruling over wild beasts and birds.
64 
Keeping captured animals for hunting in menageries, as 
“symbols of their universal domination”,65 is a prime way of ensuring the show of mastery. 
What underlies such a practice, he argues, is an enactment of the myth of “man as 
dominant over the animals”.66 The lions in Daniel are thus a symbol of subjection to 
human power, akin to Daniel’s subjection to foreign powers. Like the lions, Daniel and his 
companions are caught, captured, subjected to foreign rule as domesticated subjects exiled 
from their land.  
In regard to the lions of Daniel, Karel Van der Toorn points out that practices of 
keeping wild animals are well attested,
67
 but for this purpose zoological gardens were 
created. Pits were not used to house lions.
68
 “The image of a group of lions in a pit, 
therefore, evokes the idea of famished animals fighting one another for the slightest morsel 
of food.”69 The power to capture living wild creatures, withhold food and determine the 
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life or death of such creatures is a testament to the power of the “owner” of such animals. 
Emphases on fasting and the acceptance or rejection of food in Daniel in conjunction with 
these hungry lions evokes the power related to food and eating, and the vulnerability of 
such a captured position, subjected to the whims of another, one’s master. This theme of 
eating and captivity or hospitality is brought up in the beginning of Daniel in the 
discussions over Daniel and his companions refusing the king’s food (1:8), and is also 
alluded to in Daniel’s later fasting (9:3) and King Darius fasting  when Daniel is sentenced 
to the lions’ pit (6:18). These are of course examples of chosen acts of not eating, but they 
too emphasise that acts of eating or not eating are tied up in dynamics of power, of 
resistance, or a show of powerlessness, as when Daniel is sentenced by the king’s law and 
Darius lacks the power to undo his own laws. The lions thus become a symbol of the shift 
from strength to weakness in the hands of human political and legal mastery over life.  
When Paul Porter calls Daniel “a magic zoo of fearsome and fabulous beasts”,70 the 
emphasis is on the variety and strangeness of the beasts, but his allusion to a “zoo” is 
perhaps where the emphasis ought to lie. One of the ways in which Derrida conceptualises 
the relationship between human mastery and animality is with the term oikonomia. This 
refers to the economy or law of a household, a space  
between domestication (and thus appropriation to the laws of the family home, the 
domus, the house of the master [dominus], or the mistress – domus, Heim, home, 
domesticity), taming, training, stock-raising, so many modalities of master and 
sovereign power, power and knowledge.
71
   
What this comes down to is characterising power through “having possession, 
appropriation, and the property of beasts (through capture, hunting, raising, commerce, 
enclosure), oikonomia also being the general condition of the ipseity as sovereign mastery 
over the beast”.72 The lions in Daniel are such a symbol of human mastery over animals to 
mark the human as sovereign political power, and Daniel too thus becomes an example of 
an “animal” body in the political oikonomia and its rights and powers to take life, or 
indeed, to mark it as “animal”, capturable, killable and edible. 73 
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Lemche explains that it does not appear that Jews were taken as slaves under the 
Babylonians, but social positions were doubtlessly overturned.
74
 He suggests it was mainly 
the leadership class that was deported, but that they were put to little use in the complex 
administrative systems in the new empire.
75
 “For one thing, the Judaeans were not 
educated so as to be able to undertake important administrative jobs (for which knowledge 
of cuneiform and of Sumerian, the ‘Latin’ of the day, was essential); for another, there 
would always be doubts as to the loyalty of the group.”76 Judaean social elites, then, could 
be reduced to the state of peasants, farming land assigned to them by the Babylonian 
state.
77
 In his The Religion of the Landless: The Social Context of the Babylonian Exile, 
Smith argues that although it has become common to assume that the Jews were not slaves 
in the Babylonian empire it is still pertinent to reflect on modes of slavery that might be 
appropriate for the subjects under Babylonian power in this context.
78
 He mentions social 
“death”, demotion and removal of identity markers and name changes.79 Daniel and his 
companions are given new Babylonian names in 1:7 and a new education (1:5) as if to 
tame and own them, as domestic subjects.  
But the first half of Daniel presents a fantasy of successful assimilation and 
domestication. Daniel could be seen as a fantasy figure, exiled, but upholding his traditions 
and assimilating without betraying his God; rather than die for his faith, he lives on. While 
Daniel and his companions do indeed have their names changed into Babylonian ones, they 
learn the languages of their conquerors, are given education, and have superior knowledge 
(1:17), perform superior services to the king, e.g. 1:20: the king ‘found them ten times 
better than all the magicians and enchanters in his whole kingdom’. Daniel saves the day in 
chapter 2, by telling and interpreting the king’s dream and he is promoted to a high 
position (2:48). This is thus a “taming” that is favourable. Hence, power is retained for 
Daniel and his companions because ultimately their “animal” status alienates them from 
the human hubris of their rulers who play god, and allies them rather with another 
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nonhuman other, their God, who is shown as the true ruler of the political and over all 
animals, human and non-human.   
The first half of Daniel, then, is a fantasy for political absorption and incorporation 
into the economy of the empire, as one chosen and educated to participate in advisory 
capacities to the king – not only this, but one who excels in this task. Like an animal, a 
foreign “species” to the Babylonians, Daniel becomes the domesticated servant or house-
animal who lives within the confines of his master’s house and becomes the master’s 
favoured pet, enjoying a great deal of room to move. Falling out of favour with human law, 
Daniel is ultimately the pet of his God, a higher power, and thus lives on. Daniel and his 
companions successfully integrate as animals in a new oikos. Conquered animals, they 
become heroic figures in solidarity with, and fidelity to, their nonhuman others, animal and 
divine, thus undercutting the human hubris that desires to rule exclusively, subjugate and 
determine life and death. Like the lions, they retain their powers, in deciding what or who 
to eat, in surviving the death sentence of their human masters, and responding to the 
nonhuman other, their God. Assimilation is undertaken without losing one’s life or 
allegiances. Daniel is thus a fantasy for being at the table of human rulers but of refusing 
its food, thus rising above the modes of consumption determining social relations acted out 
by such powers.  
In the scene between lions and his God Daniel ultimately stands before the 
nonhuman that exceeds and interrupts human mastery. In following his God even to the 
brink of death, he stands before the law of this God and before the lions with whom he is 
now so dangerously near. The lions and God are the nonhuman, Derrida’s divinanimality, 
in whose gaze he stands.
80
 This is indeed a case of Hugh Pyper’s “human in the biblical 
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imaginary” “caught in the gaze of God and the animal”.81 Such a sight is “at the same time 
innocent and cruel perhaps, perhaps sensitive and impassive, good and bad, 
uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal and secret”.82 Daniel might well share 
Derrida’s dizziness83 and “vertigo before the abyss”84 at being seen in this vulnerable (to 
put it mildly) position. The judgement scene thus moves from human faux-divine mastery 
over life and death to a divine-animal power that interrupts and overrules, because, Daniel 
is not killed and eaten. Daniel survives with, beside and in the face of the lions.
85
  
The specific crime Daniel has committed when he is thrown to the lions is to not 
respond exclusively to his human master, the king as the single, sovereign and sole power, 
but to destabilize this dominion by disregarding the law and continue responding to a 
nonhuman power, his God. On the surface of it, Daniel’s “crime” is merely to be 
successful, provoking jealousy amongst his fellow courtiers. But in light of the focus on 
human power in opposition to Daniel’s God in the book in general, shows that the clear 
underlying element here is the issue of competition between human and divine powers, and 
the latter trumping human domination. In other words, Daniel refuses to act as if the 
human king is the highest power, as if a god. Jan Willem Van Henten calls this a 
“fundamental relativization of state authority”86 and thus could be read as a questioning not 
only of Babylonian or Seleucid rule but of the human rights to master and rule over 
nonhuman others.
87
 Daniel eschews such mastery from the beginning of the book, by 
calling himself a ‘servant’ (1:12, 13 db,[,), resisting the food of the king, refusing thus to 
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eat well.
88
 Eating only vegetables and drinking water (1:12) rather than the delicacies [gB'-
tP;] of the king, he is both emphasizing his non-belonging to the king’s court and a 
resistance to participate in the privilege and power of human mastery.
89
 Dana Nolan Fewell 
proposes that “eating from the king’s table is symbolic of political covenant and 
compromise”,90 an alliance Daniel is clearly unwilling to enter into. It is a matter of not 
defiling oneself (1:8 la;G"t.yI). As Smith mused over Levitical concerns about modes of 
separation in the exilic period, the attempt to remain a “clean animal” in regard to eating 
habits implicitly marks the foreign rulers as precisely defiled.  
This “defilement”, however, is not inherent in their foreignness but primarily linked 
to their misplaced hubris and self-aggrandisement as god-like, rather than as domesticated 
animals under God. Any other God, thing or being, such as animals, must be subdued and 
subjected to not appear stronger than, or threatening to, human rulers as the strongest 
animal. Davies draws attention to the fact that the tension is not between Daniel’s God and 
other gods, “but to political powers, be they kings or courtiers. Indeed, the problem of all 
the stories is not whether Judaism is theologically acceptable to Gentile rulers, but whether 
it is politically acceptable”.91 Fewell too points out that in Daniel 1-6 “the most basic 
opposition” and the source of tension is between divine sovereignty and human 
sovereignty.
92
 It is note-worthy that the ruler at the time Daniel is written called himself 
Antiochus Epiphanes: “God made manifest”, and as Himmelfarb poins out, “his peculiar 
behaviour led some of his contemporaries to refer to him instead as Antiochus Epimanes, 
“mad man”.93 Daniel is keen to assert that it is God who is a higher ruler than any human 
king when in 2:37 he slips in that it is ‘the God of heaven’ who has given ‘the kingdom, 
the power, the might and the glory’ to Nebuchadnezzar. All ‘who live must know that the 
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Most High is sovereign over the kingdom of mortals’ (4:17). As such it would indeed be 
madness to treat a human king as divine-like master.  
Lacocque interestingly compares Daniel’s lions to another animal figure, namely 
Balaam’s ass in Numbers: “Like the ass who was more clairvoyant than its master the 
‘prophet’, the lions had more sense than the king.”94 In other words, this is something of a 
nonhuman alliance between animals and God. Daniel becomes a near-martyr, fully 
expected to be eaten alive by the lions, becoming himself “a morsel of food”95 as a result 
of breaking the law and addressing a nonhuman other. But, rather like Abraham’s near-
sacrifice of Isaac, the blade – or in Daniel’s case, the mouth – is restrained at the last 
minute, and Daniel, like Isaac, escapes the trial and trauma physically unscathed. A 
deconstructed subject, vulnerable before this nonhuman otherness, Daniel faces the abyss 
of probable death and the unknowability of what is to come. This is an instance of 
Derrida’s “here I am” as Daniel’s vulnerable self-presentation, relational, between the lions 
and God, risky, before the law of the other.
96
 Andrew Benjamin calls this relationality 
“porousness” and “a continual site of negotiation”.97 The “I” of the “here I am”, and that 
Benjamin describes with regard to porousness, will always have also been plural, more 
than one, as Benjamin puts it.
98
 “This is a site of an original relatedness.”99  
When Daniel tells and interprets dreams, where none others can, this impossible 
knowledge is ascribed by him not to his own powers of knowledge but to ‘a God in heaven 
who reveals mysteries’ (2:28).100 This is emphasised by him asserting: ‘But as for me, this 
mystery has not been revealed to me because of any wisdom that I have more than any 
other living being’ (2:30). Nonetheless, he becomes known as one who is endowed with 
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‘the spirit of the holy gods’ (4:8, 18; 5:11, 14), whose knowledge is beyond human 
knowledge. His knowledge is thus nonhuman, impossible for humans, and according to 
Daniel, the result of a gift from a nonhuman other.  Daniel is thus a deconstructed subject, 
without mastery, sovereign selfhood or knowledge. He refuses to respond only to the 
human subject as a god, follows his nonhuman ruler, living in faith and facing his own 
finitude. This is not in a negative sense, however, as a weakness or reduction from “man” 
to “animal” in the den of the lions. Viewed in the light of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s reflections on becoming-animal, such a state of being is also a liberation, 
movement and freedom from entrapment by any determinate form.
101
 Becoming-animal, or 
Derrida’s deconstructed subject, is to cross thresholds distinguished by “the particular 
underground tunnel in the rhizome or the burrow”, or in Daniel’s case, the “den”.102 Daniel 
has thus shifted the oikonomia by entering into the state of a deconstructed subject in 
facing the nonhuman other, his God and the lions in a radically hopeful and successful 
way. He lives on, with and in response to his God, despite being a conquered and captured 
subject. Because he identifies with his nonhuman other, the lions and God, Daniel 
delegitimizes the human hubris to rule exclusively as divine-like figures.  
Having put himself outside this exclusive human domain with its desire for mastery 
Daniel is animal. As a deconstructed subject he is situated near, as, and with animals.
103
 In 
the judgement scene, before the human law, and sentenced to being thrown into the lions’ 
pit, Daniel is made edible and killable in the carnivorous force that characterises this 
human law as protective of its boundaries. This would be part of the powers of the human 
to condemn others to being tamed, sacrificed, starved or fed, eaten and killed. In this 
human order or oikonomia, God is also what must be tamed or excluded in order to anchor 
power in human rule, and animals are the figures of this power as that which can be 
subjected, domesticated, hunted, eaten and put to death. A further example of the 
relationship between power, eating well and determinations of life and death can be found 
in chapter 5 with King Belshazzar and his feast. Belshazzar’s self-possession is disturbed, 
his face going pale, thoughts terrified, limbs giving way and knees knocking together (5:6) 
at the disembodied ‘fingers of a human hand’ writing on the wall (5:5). Daniel is called 
upon to interpret, and he criticises Belshazzar’s spectacles of power and mastery in not 
seeing, hearing or knowing ‘the God in whose power is your every breath, and to whom 
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belong all your ways’ (5:23). Part of the critique is levelled at Belshazzar’s father, whom 
Belshazzar is following, in killing those he wants to kill and keeping alive those he wants 
kept alive, degrading and honouring according to his whim (5:19). The point is to question 
the power and mastery over the living enacted by the human ruler.  
In light of the mark of privilege and power to eat, Derrida brings up the question of 
sacrifice. Who or what is sacrificed for such a hospitality, for eating?  Thinking of sacrifice 
and what it means he notes: “need, desire, authorization, the justification of putting to 
death, putting to death as denegation of murder. The putting to death of the animal, says 
this denegation, is not a murder”.104 What is it to eat well? Is it to consume voraciously, 
carnivorously, unboundedly? Or is it to eat “cleanly”, without being defiled by 
participating in social practices of consumption that are based on domination, subjugation 
and violence? And who has the power to put to death, to determine who or what can be 
sacrificed in order to eat well? To decide who or what is “animal” and who or what is 
“divine”? What Daniel promotes is an animal-divine alliance against the hubris of human 
rulers to determine the life or death of others and a mode of consumption in which the 
subject lives on, just as Daniel lives on.  
The Book of Daniel remains silent on what exactly takes place between Daniel and 
the lions, except after the event, in Daniel’s explanation to King Darius: ‘My God sent his 
angel and shut the lions’ mouths so that they would not hurt me, because I was found 
blameless before him; and also before you O king, I have done no wrong’ (6:22). The God 
whom Daniel follows overrules human mastery and shows the living to be ultimately in his 
power. Following such a God destabilizes the notion of the human as a master-subject to 
reveal it as a deconstructed subject. I have shown how this is conveyed with regard to 
Daniel, but another crucial example is that of King Nebuchadnezzar, who also becomes a 
deconstructed subject in becoming animal. Or rather, he always already is animal. In 
Daniel 4, a dream of King Nebuchadnezzar’s comes to fulfilment and he is turned into an 
animal. King Nebuchadnezzar symbolises the power and mastery of the human subject 
who plays god. Placing Daniel in the context of Jewish court narratives more broadly, 
Wills argues that the figure of the king in such legends varies but that it essentially 
performs the function of “absolute power”.105 Nebuchadnezzar’s name, from Nebo, means 
to protect the boundary. The word for “besiege” (rWc) used of Nebuchadnezzar’s entrance 
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to Jerusalem at the very beginning of the book means literally to cramp, confine or bind 
(1:1),
106
 as if his entire character is marked by protection and mastery over the other’s 
freedom through restriction and subjection. But it is precisely the boundaries that guard the 
human as exclusive master from both animality and divinity that are challenged in the king 
being made an animal.
107
 Deleuze and Guattari suggest that a metamorphosis proposes two 
sorts of deterritorializations: “that which the human imposes on the animal by forcing it to 
flee or to serve the human, but also that which the animal proposes to the human by 
indicating ways-out or means of escape that the human would never have thought of by 
himself (schizo-escape)”.108 In a sense, both are intimated here in the implication that 
Nebuchadnezzar has treated his subjects like animals that must flee from him or serve him, 
and in his becoming-animal that is an escape from his master-identity. The difference is 
that it is not the animal that suggests this to Nebuchadnezzar, but another nonhuman other, 
namely God. God is the nonhuman other who sets in motion this escape from himself as a 
figure of mastery, to what he becomes, a deconstructed subject, deterritorialized, grazing, 
and finally gazing up to the heavens. Here, divinity and animality are brought into the 
economy of the human to reveal the king’s vulnerability as a deconstructed subject, an 
animal.  
Nebuchadnezzar looks out over his ‘magnificent Babylon’ which he has built ‘as a 
royal capital by my mighty power and for my glorious majesty’ (4:30). With the words of 
self-admiration still in his mouth, he hears a ‘voice from heaven’ (4:31) telling him that his 
kingdom will be taken away from him. ‘You shall be driven away from human society, and 
your dwelling shall be with the animals of the field’ (4:32). This fate, ‘made to eat grass 
like oxen’ until ‘seven times’ have passed over him, is so that he will learn ‘that the Most 
High has sovereignty over the kingdom of mortals and gives it to whom he will’ (4:32). 
Immediately this takes place: ‘He was driven away from human society, ate grass like 
oxen, and his body was bathed with the dew of heaven, until his hair grew as long as 
eagles’ feathers and his nails became like birds’ claws’ (4:33). When he comes back to 
himself in v. 34, he speaks in the first person, having recovered his reason or power of 
knowing: [D;n>m; (4:34 [4:31 in BHS]). He has awakened to ‘the Most High’, his 
‘sovereignty as an everlasting sovereignty’, who does what he wills ‘with the host of 
heaven and the inhabitants of the earth’ (4:35). At the same time, his ‘majesty and 
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splendour’ are restored to him, he is re-established over his kingdom and more greatness is 
added to his rule (4:36). His conclusion: ‘Now I, Nebuchadnezzar, praise and extol and 
honour the King of heaven, for all his works are truth, and his ways are justice; and he is 
able to bring low those who walk in pride’ (4:37).  
What appears to have happened, then, is that Nebuchadnezzar is judged by the law 
of this God to become-animal, in order to reveal the king as a deconstructed subject: 
ultimately without mastery, knowledge or self-possession. A human sovereign is no higher 
or grander than a grazing animal, they are essentially similar, near one another, while God 
as the highest is irreplaceable as the sovereign power.
109
 As Seesengood and Koosed put it: 
“True worship is a response to true power, and all (human) authority has limits. Kings are, 
at best, a simulacrum and must remain mindful of the real power, God”.110 Steven 
Shakespeare speaks of the absolute other as God who sets in motion something “akin to a 
religious experience” but that is not that of a presence, rather “a response to a call, it is a 
grace that precedes every action, dethroning our dreams of sovereignty”.111 This could well 
describe Nebuchadnezzar’s transformative experience in being called, but God is not the 
absolute other, rather the nonhuman other, showing the “human” to be a category of faux-
divine mastery and unveiling the animality of his subjects. 
Humans are thus shown to be merely glorified animals, giving themselves power to 
rule as divine-like masters, attempting to subjugate animals and exclude God from the 
political in order to ground this position of power. Nebuchadnezzar’s transformation could 
be read as a hierarchical order in which God is highest, humans are in the middle and 
animals are lowest. In Paul Ricoeur’s foreword to Lacocque’s The Book of Daniel, he 
comments that King Nebuchadnezzar, “condemned to graze like a beast, is Adam and 
every other Master whose inhumanity leads back to a bestial condition”.112 But arguably, it 
is the king’s human mastery in playing god that is the problem and that has to be altered, to 
be shown as what he essentially is; the “bestial condition” is the condition of all in the face 
of God’s power. What is emphasised is that all the living are equally puppets or 
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domesticated animals in the hands of God. This is intimated in the very beginning of 
Daniel, when it is written that the Lord gives King Jehoiakim of Judah ‘into his hand’ (1:2; 
again the NRSV translation is “power” but the word used is that for hand: dy"). It is also 
shown in the address of Daniel to the king: ‘You, O king, the king of kings – to whom the 
God of heaven has given the kingdom, the power, the might and the glory, into whose hand 
he has given human beings, wherever they live, the wild animals of the field, and the birds 
of the air, and whom he has established as ruler over them all’ (2:36-38). A king may be 
established as if a ruler, but essentially, he is no different from the animals of the field and 
the birds of the air in them all being in the hand of God. This is also what takes place with 
Daniel as a deconstructed subject. Whereas previously Nebuchadnezzar is addressed with 
the greeting to ‘live forever’ the scene in chapter 4 is a lesson as to his finitude as a 
deconstructed subject.  
King Nebuchadnezzar must thus recognize that the Most High is master over the 
realm of mankind (4:25); the human king does not rule: heaven rules (4:26). When King 
Nebuchadnezzar does come to this realisation he calls God and his kingdom everlasting, 
his dominion lasting forever (4:34), an echo of the greeting previously addressed to him: 
‘O king, live forever!’113  This greeting to human sovereignty as ‘living forever’ (2:4; 3:9; 
5:10; 6:6, 21) is a denial of mortal life as if human kings are nonhuman and could live ad 
infinitum. In 4:35 Nebuchadnezzar expounds how all who dwell on earth are in God’s 
hands – no one can question this mastery. The point would be, then, that Daniel’s God is 
more than a tribal deity,
114
 and thus cannot be replaced by other human or pagan gods, this 
nonhuman other is an “other” and singular power. In this sense, it is about God as the 
figure of specifically nonhuman power in opposition to human faux-divine dominion. If as 
Lacocque puts it, “Daniel finds himself in the very centre of idolatrous power, par 
excellence, Babylon”,115 then what is idolatry or misplaced mastery is not merely a 
particular king and his gods but rather the centering of power in a human subject that 
builds on the exclusion of animal and divine.   
The first half of the Book of Daniel, then, presents an optimistic fantasy for 
incorporation into empire, encoded in the Babylonian context. While Daniel and his 
companions are akin to the trapped lions in being conquered subjects of foreign kings, they 
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ultimately triumph in being allied to nonhuman powers that are higher and other to human 
faux-divine rulers who are revealed ultimately as domesticated subjects too. The 
impression the first half of Daniel leaves is thus one in which living in another’s domain 
and being subjected to a foreign master does not mean renouncing one’s life. Here, Daniel 
and his companions remain domesticated lions; they may abide in the “pit” of Babylonia 
but they are still living creatures who can insist on eating well, on living on, following their 
God who trumps human power dynamics by revealing the animality of all.   
 
Daniel in the Dark: From Domestication to Destruction 
The Maccabean armed revolt against the rule of Seleucid King Antiochus IV is thought to 
have been precipitated by an edict in 168 BCE that prohibited Antiochus IV’s Jewish 
subjects from practicing their religion.
116
 Two related aspects of this revolt are particularly 
pertinent for Daniel, namely, acts of eating or not eating, and the political as animal, 
particularly in a negative sense of political battles as wild ferocious animality. While it 
seems clear that the first half of Daniel constructs a positive spin on assimilation, the 
second half descends into a dark nightmare populated predominantly of wild, terrifying 
animal figures. How might the shift in this text be understood, from domesticated 
animality in alliance with God as a successful integration into political power-play, to a 
reign of terror made up of warmongering hybrid animals? Arguably, what takes place is 
that the animality in the first half of Daniel, where all are shown to be deconstructed 
subjects or domesticated subjects of divine rule, escalates in the second half to the other 
spectrum of animality, namely the wild, ferocious and carnivorous. Here, the political as 
animal is visualized as far from domesticated cohabitation and rather as carnivorous, 
savage brutality in a dark political realm of terror. The neat order erected in the first half 
with animality under divinity has in the second imploded, blurring all boundaries as to who 
is who. 
One of the central themes emphasised in the Maccabean stories that depict the 
Maccabean revolt are food customs and the refusal to conform to non-Jewish food habits. 
As in Daniel, to refuse to eat appears to be a powerful symbol of resistance. But while the 
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first half of Daniel posited the possibility of being incorporated into a foreign empire, the 
Maccabees take a very different approach, refusing to assimilate and rather reverting to 
violent tactics.
117
 The second half of Daniel can be read within the context of anxiety at 
such a political battle between warring factions in the Maccabean revolt, haunted by the 
fear of the political as wild animality, in the shadows of the domesticity of court life. 
Whereas the first half of Daniel spells out a desire for being domesticated by and in foreign 
empire, in a fantasy of integration and assimilation, the second half conveys the anguished 
fear at being devoured by wild beasts and trampled underfoot. Whereas political animality 
denoted humility and domestication, the political as animal of Daniel’s dreams and visions 
has turned this humble vulnerability under foreign masters into a terror in the face of 
carnivorous, violent force. I argue that this could be read not only in relation to foreign 
kings, however, as this is imagined as a possible cohabitation, but rather that the revolting 
Jewish factions fighting against foreign rule also emerge as another force of political 
animality that takes on the face of ferocious menace. Daniel’s God too takes on a 
potentially carnivorous face, as if Daniel suddenly finds himself the pet of the wrong 
master and prey to his fellow Jews and God. 
1 Maccabees chronicles the events following Antiochus IV’s supposed edict 
prohibiting Jewish religious practice, with the resistance started by priest Mattathias which 
catalysed the Maccabean Revolt. The narrative describes Mattathias and his sons fleeing 
into the mountains. Mattathias’s son and successor, Judas Maccabeus, gained a significant 
group of fighters and set in motion what might be characterized as guerrilla warfare, soon 
even confronting Seleucid armies in open battle. Three years after the beginning of the 
religious persecution the Maccabean forces succeeded in taking back, purifying and 
rededicating the Jewish Temple. War continued, despite Antiochus V officially cancelling 
his father’s persecutory edict in 163 and restoring the Jewish Temple’s political-religious 
autonomy.
118
 The first independent Judea in 450 years was proclaimed. In this warfare, one 
of the prominent emphases in the Maccabean accounts is food. It is a core symbol of 
retaining traditional customs rather than assimilating to foreign powers, perceived as 
impure outsiders. Assmann suggests that Jewish identity in this era was a fusion of the 
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political as a question of association and dissociation, and the religious as a matter of cult 
and customs.
119
 Food can thus be seen as pertaining to both association and tradition. 
Albert I. Baumgarten writes: “Food of the gentiles had been an especially sensitive matter 
in the era leading up to Maccabean victory”, mentioned for instance by the author of 
Jubilees criticizing Jews who ate gentile good, and the accounts of Antiochus’s decrees 
which tried to prevent Jews from living according to their food laws, forcing them to 
violate these laws by sacrificing and eating pork (1 Macc. 1:47; 2 Macc. 6:18-7:42).
120
 
Houston brings up the story of Eleazar, and that of the seven brothers in 2. Macc. 6.18-31 
and 7.1-42. “Eleazar, we are told, had his mouth held open while the officers forced pork 
into it, but he spat it out, preferring to die under fearful torture, and for the same reason did 
the seven brothers and their mother in ch. 7.”121 “The permissible sources of food, not 
defiled by the gentiles, were severely limited at the time of the persecutions according to 2 
Macc. 5:27. It is therefore no surprise to note the importance placed on food by the 
different sects.”122 Food is connected to law and to social relations, a mark of the bodily to 
survive, shared by all creatures, and a feature of tradition, hospitality and particular groups 
of people.
123
 It is thus a question of incorporation or resistance, of accepting the 
“hospitality” of foreigners or of fighting against it, of giving up one’s own customs or laws 
or retaining them at all costs.  
The representation of a Jewish revolt against Seleucid rule could thus be seen as a 
refusal to comply as caught, caged, domesticated animals, and thus their position in the 
wild signals their own untameable nature. Baumgarten draws attention to the flight to the 
wilderness in 2 Maccabees (5:27), “where they kept themselves alive as wild animals 
do”.124 He emphasises that this was not merely tactical necessity, but that as 2 Macc. 
explains: ‘they continued to live on what grew wild, so that they might not share in the 
defilement”.125 Baumgarten writes about the importance of maintaining boundaries as to 
insiders and outsiders, as to who was Jewish and who was non-Jewish. For Daniel, to be a 
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Jew in exile is to be a domesticated animal to human rulers and above all to God as a 
higher ruler; for the Maccabees to be a political animal signifies fighting against their 
human adversaries like a pack of wolves defending their God. If there were Jews who were 
no longer recognized as such but rather, as Assmann puts it, “counted among the 
heathens”126 there would be a palpable and potentially anxious “dialectics of inclusion and 
exclusion”.127 
In the second half of Daniel it is as if the domesticated scenes of the first half have 
given way to anxiety at wildness, chaos, confusion and carnivorousness. Daniel is in the 
dark, unknowing as to who is foe or friend, envisioning only ferocious animals in a world 
ruled and fought over by competing beasts. In chapters 7-12, human power is made 
synonymous with the jaws of beasts and Daniel is robbed of his previous hope and 
equanimity. In 7:17 a confused Daniel is told that the beasts he sees in dreams are kings to 
come. If the logic of the first part of Daniel has shown all under God to be deconstructed 
subjects, king and animal alike, then the second part pushes this logic to a hyperbolic 
extreme and imagines kings not only as animals – such as the grazing animal-king 
Nebuchadnezzar – but as warmongering, terrifying hybrid beasts. In 7:3 Daniel dreams of 
four great beasts, the first is like a lion and becomes like a man (7:4) on two feet and with a 
human mind, emphasising the beast-like nature of such a human. 7:5 presents the second 
beast like a bear which is told to devour much flesh (rf;B.). A leopard too appears, with 
dominion, and is a hybrid creature, partly bird and with four heads, as if to emphasise the 
disorder of human power in its beastly guise. The fourth and final beast is described in 7:7 
and is ‘terrifying and dreadful and extremely strong. It had great iron teeth and was 
devouring, breaking in pieces, and stamping what was left with its feet.’ This is 
emphasized by the repetition in 7:19 of the beast, ‘exceedingly terrifying, with its teeth of 
iron and claws of bronze, and which devoured and broke in pieces, and stamped what was 
left with its feet’. Despite the beast being predicted to be put to death and burnt in 7:11 and 
the others being deprived of their dominion in 7:12, Daniel admits ‘my spirit is troubled 
within me, and the visions of my head terrified me’ (7:15). Daniel’s previous powers of 
understanding seem to have dissipated and he needs help in understanding what he sees 
(7:16; 8:16; 9:25). In 7:23 the fourth beast is said to devour the whole earth and crush it 
and break it to pieces. Again, the promise is made that the holy ones of God shall prevail 
eventually, but by 7:28 Daniel is alarmed at the political animals he has seen and continues 
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to see. The focus on devouring, being eaten or crushed by wild beasts shows the way this 
text has shifted from a fantasy of harmonious domestication or absorption into a political 
system to anxiety about being devoured and destroyed by political rulers, as if the tables 
have turned and the desire to be at the table with kings has morphed into fear at finding 
oneself on the table.   
Chapter 8 continues with a violent battle between a ram and a goat, representing 
kings fighting one another, and the destruction of the holy ones is predicted in 8:24. In 8:27 
Daniel is overcome; chapter 9 is dominated by Daniel’s pleas to his God to help. But the 
visions continue relentlessly, with a flood (9:26), another terrifying vision in 10:8, and 
anguish in 10:16. The Book of Daniel has thus descended into a desolate anxiety at being 
eaten, gobbled up, overcome in the realisation of the fragility of animal life and the 
ferocity of human-animal power to take life. This might be understood as an anxiety at 
being surrounded by political beasts, Maccabean revolutionaries desiring to kill foreign 
powers as well as “improper” Jews, on the one hand, and the conquering kings of foreign 
empires, on the other. The first half of Daniel showed the “human” master to be nothing 
but a poor attempt to mimic divine rule and that all creatures are essentially domesticated 
animals under God, the second half shows this animal world to be a ferocious and wild 
battle for power.  
The lions of chapter 6 look perhaps more ambiguous after the dark dystopian 
dreams of Daniel’s second half. Rather than seeing them as allies to Daniel and God, they 
might signify the human animal but also divine animal capacities for carnivorous power. 
Moreover, as a power consisting of the right to take life and give death.
128
 Hugh Pyper 
discusses the lion as a metaphor in the Hebrew Bible and shows that despite the popular 
conception that associates lions with noble kingship, the images of lions are perhaps rather 
used to satirize Israelite monarchs mimicking power, or, as an image of God, a topic I will 
return to below.
129
 In this middle chapter – chapter 6 – between the earlier optimism and 
the later pessimism, ambiguity emerges as to the lions as fellow creatures and friends allied 
to God and Daniel, or as foes with the traumatizing jaws of carnivorous violence that might 
turn at any moment and bite one’s head off. When Derrida wonders whether “the very 
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concept of law, that juridical reason itself, includes a priori a possible course to constraint 
or coercion and, thus, to a certain violence”,130 the lions in Daniel might indeed be seen to 
embody human law or higher power as a violent as well as a carnivorous force and 
logic.
131
  
The entry on the lion in An Encyclopaedia of Bible Animals notes that lions were so 
much a part of mythology that almost all contexts in which they are used in the Hebrew 
Bible are metaphorical, referring to human qualities as lion-like.
132
 It explains that lions are 
a figure for “the power of evil”, but as human, and so for instance the “wicked ruler” is 
seen ‘as dangerous as a prowling lion’ in Proverbs 28:15. In one of the psalms, cries for 
help are expressed because ‘my soul is among lions’ (Psa. 57:4) as if trapped and subjected 
to vicious powers.
133
 In Daniel, standing before the law of humans is to be put before lions 
to be killed and eaten as a punishment for transgression. The lions could thus be seen to 
signify human power as carnivorous animality. The jaws and carnivorous appetite of the 
lions are synonymous with human power: Daniel is condemned by a human ruler to be 
made an animal, killable and edible to other animals and animal powers. As in the first 
half, the lions are what can be caught and caged, domesticated, like the Jews in exile, but 
they are also a power that is wild and ferocious. In the second half of Daniel, as if to 
emphasise the potency of such powers, lions – and other animals – are hyperbolic 
representations of human political power that testify to the beast-like carnivorousness and 
ferocity of the political. The power of being animal in the first half has exceeded all 
bounds – from domesticity to the wild in the second half. 
It is as if the lions of chapter 6 have become a haunting emblem of political life as 
both power and powerlessness, as what is trappable and thus vulnerable and as ferocious 
carnivorousness. Despite being assured his God will prevail, Daniel remains terrified, as if 
he has suddenly awakened to a scene in which he is surrounded by wild animals and he is 
unable to pinpoint who is who. Who are the Jewish factions that seek to determine between 
insider and outsider? Is Daniel an insider or an outsider, clean or unclean, pet or prey? 
Who are the rulers who may be benign but may also be carnivorous, conquering, capturing, 
cruel? God may act as a protective leonine force against Daniel’s enemies but his animal 
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subjects may also turn against Daniel himself. If both anti-assimilating Jews and foreign 
rulers might be portrayed as wild animals, Daniel is indeed in the dark, solitary and 
vulnerable, a potential enemy to both factions. In the second half of Daniel, potential 
enemies lurk everywhere and they are mostly in the guise of hybrid, many-headed animals 
as if to spell out disorder and confusion as to identities, fidelities and boundaries.  
The beasts of Daniel might thus signify Derrida’s subject as carnivorous power and 
violent force. This is Derrida’s subject as “phallogocentric”, characterised by “carnivorous 
virility”134, desiring to eat well.135 Here, to eat well means to eat flesh, to have power over 
the other as a weaker subject, categorizing such subjects as animals. Carol J. Adams 
starkly proposes: “People with power have always eaten meat”,136 relating such power to 
patriarchal structures. Derrida too poses the question:  who could be Head of State and 
declare himself, publicly, a vegetarian?
137
  To what extent is the question of human power 
and its relation to the other caught up in a carnivorous logic?
138
 “‘One must eat well.’ It is 
a rule offering infinite hospitality.”139 Eating well is what is at stake.140 But what sort of 
hospitality? And what is it to eat well? Calarco explains that Derrida’s term 
“carnophallocentrism”, or “carnophallologocentrism” suggests a subjectivity structured by 
sacrificial (carno), masculine (phallo), and speaking (logo).
141
 In this context, speaking is 
synonymous with the power to condemn or put to death, the power or voice of the law, 
which as I will show, is in Daniel linked to the “hand” and “voice” of either human king or 
God. Daniel is what is sacrificed to the human dominion that gives itself the right to eat 
well, to put to death. Daniel is like the lions, domesticated and abiding in a pit with them, 
but he is also faced with political powers as lion-like, in the sense of their ferocity, 
carnivorous power and power to kill. It is this perspective that seems to dominate the 
second half of Daniel as a text marked by terror. The second half of Daniel, then, portrays 
a pessimistic vision of human political life as turbulent, untamed beastliness. All the living 
under God are animals, only God has and gives power, as the first half appeared to convey. 
But if all are animals then some animals are figures of terror: carnivorous and ferocious. 
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This part of Daniel overturns the fantasy of the first half, of eating at the king’s table and 
being incorporated into imperial life as triumphant domesticated subjects. Here, the fantasy 
has morphed into a fear at being devoured wholesale, as if the trauma of standing before 
the lions has produced nightmares of terrifying political beasts lurking around every 
corner.  
 
Following Daniel’s God: The Prey or Pet That I May Be 
It is instructive to return to the figure of God in Daniel, to tease out the significance of this 
nonhuman other to whom Daniel calls in the midst of his nightmarish visions. While I 
showed that the lions became synonymous with human carnivorous force and power they 
also, crucially, conveyed the possibility of not eating one’s other, of abstaining from eating 
flesh, killing life. But this takes place due to the God figure in this text. This God, then, 
interrupts with an “other” law that overrules that of Daniel’s human master. Daniel lives 
on. But who is this God who Daniel follows? I have already shown that God represents 
nonhuman power that forms the alliance with animals (and Daniel) against human powers. 
But how is such a nonhuman other to be understood? I propose that there is a two-fold 
structure to this God as presented in Daniel. First, God is superlatively other, of the 
“heavens”, as the “Highest”. But secondly, this God is simultaneously presented as 
addressable, as this unsubstitutional living God. God is living, intervening and 
anthropomorphised; in other words, proximate and present. Daniel follows him by praying, 
a response to the other akin to Derrida’s to his “unsubstitutional singularity”, “this 
irreplaceable living being”, a “mortal existence”, his cat.142 Ultimately, it is in the figure of 
this God that a following of the other as an alternative to human mastery is made possible 
in displacing mastery from humans and placing humans and animals alike as deconstructed 
subjects. But also, what this particular living God signifies is the singular responsibility in 
the relationship to “my” other in the “here I am”, as well as the risk of being possessed and 
mastered by such a relation with the other. 
Along with simply ‘God’ (Hl'a/), references to God as the “Highest” (yL'[i) are 
frequent and can be found implicitly for instance in 2:47 where God is presented as a ‘God 
of gods and a Lord of kings’, and explicitly in 4:2, 17, 24, 25, 32, 34; 5:18, 21. The 
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reference to the ‘God of heavens’ (aY"ëm;v. Hl'äa /) is recurring in chapter 2 (2:18, 19, 28, 37, 
44), and as ‘king of heaven’ (aY"ëm;v. %l,m,äl .) in 4:37 and ‘Lord of heavens’ (aY"åm;v.-arE(m') in 
5:23. In 4:26 and 4:31, 34, God is associated with heaven or the skies, as the power that 
rules, with a voice from heaven. When Nebuchadnezzar surfeits his self-aggrandizement 
and begins to follow Daniel’s God he turns his eyes to heaven (4:34). As such this 
nonhuman other is precisely what is other: unappropriable and unknowable.  Additionally, 
and as with God as a nonhuman power in opposition to the human ruler, a prime concern 
appears to be that Daniel’s God is irreplaceable, akin to Derrida’s nonhuman other as “this 
irreplaceable living being”.143 For example, when King Nebuchadnezzar presents his 
golden statue in chapter 3, and all ‘peoples, nations and languages’ (3:4) are commanded to 
bow down before it and worship it or be faced with death in ‘a furnace of blazing fire’ 
(3:6), ‘certain Jews’ are condemned for disobeying this law. Daniel’s companions, 
Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego, refuse to substitute their God: ‘our God whom we 
serve’ for ‘your gods’ and ‘the golden statue that you have set up’ (3:17-18). It is later said 
of them: ‘They disobeyed the king’s command and yielded up their bodies rather than 
serve and worship any god except their own God’ (3:28). It is admitted that ‘no other god’ 
‘is able to deliver in this way’ (3:29). When a law is passed in chapter 6 against praying to 
anyone other than the human king, Daniel continues to pray to his God (6:10), again at the 
risk of death, perceived as the only God.  Further, this God is presented as a living God. 
When Daniel is thrown into the den of the lions, the king who sympathizes with Daniel 
calls to him: has the living God (aY"ëx; ah'äl'a/) whom you constantly serve, saved you? (6:20) 
Daniel is saved because he trusts in his God whose justice intervenes to save him (6:23) as 
are Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego (3:27). Following this God involves a confrontation 
with mortality but simultaneously with life beyond the power of the human subject as a 
carnivorous mastery and hierarchy of animality. As a result, all are called to worship the 
God of Daniel, as animal subjects under the one who is the living God, whose dominion 
will last forever (6:26).   
Referring to the hand of the human sovereign (2:38; 3:15, 17) and the hand of God 
is a way of placing them side by side but by emphasising that also the human sovereign is 
ultimately in God’s hand. Anthropomorphic references to God’s hand can be found in 
4:35; the breath of life is in God’s hand in 5:23 (translated as “power” in the NRSV, but 
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the word used is that for hand: dy :). and it is God who sends a hand to write on Belshazzar’s 
wall (5:24). In 4:31 God is a voice (lq '). The hand symbolises power, and the voice is the 
call of this nonhuman other. It is intimated this this is a God ‘whose dwelling’ (rAdm.) is 
with ‘mortal flesh’ (rf;B.), as the Chaldeans assert the impossibility of telling the king his 
own dream: only a God could do this but the gods are not with mortal flesh (2:11). Daniel, 
of course, is the one who does come to know the king’s dream from the knowledge given 
to him from his God (2:19, 23, 27-28) and so Daniel’s God is associated with precisely 
mortal flesh. Along with the references to God as living, this nonhuman other is oddly 
anthropomorphic but remains largely disembodied: split between the heavenly and the 
worldly. These characterisations jar with the “other” nonhuman God of the heavens as the 
highest. Such an anthropomorphism of the divine, however, might signify the way in 
which this nonhuman other is characterised as part of the world as a particular response but 
simultaneously remains irreducibly other.   
The significance of God’s otherness is that the “other” as God cannot be thematized 
or theorized as a wholly abstract signification of power in general, but must be accounted 
for in the specific, irreducible relationality of response and address as this living one, my 
other. Chrulew explains how the name of God for Derrida might express a “denuded 
alterity, stripped of predicates, the unsubstitutable singularity of any other”.144 To some 
extent this is the case, but in Daniel, and in Derrida’s own emphasis on his cat as an 
“unsubstitutional singularity”, a crucial aspect is the possessive “my” other or “the” other 
whom I encounter as a particular other. The relational response takes place in addressing 
the other with a spoken or tacit self-presentation as a deconstructed subject, open and thus 
vulnerable to this other who is there before me and who I follow. This God being 
unsubstitutional showcases the way in which no relation can exist as a theoretical 
generality, but always as a response – “here I am” – in a particular here and now to what is 
perceived as a particular other. God as this living nonhuman other, then, is present, but 
simultaneously “other” in being the highest, of the heavens, irreducible and inexhaustible 
in appearing as a disembodied hand or voice. This would signify what Aaron S. Gross calls 
religion as “a relation with the other that does not demand the other’s assimilation; it is an 
                                                          
144
 Chrulew, “Feline Divinanimality: Derrida and the Discourse of Species in Genesis”. 
Chapter 2: Derrida’s Cat or Daniel’s God? 
 
 
110 
 
encounter with the overwhelming command of the other’s face looking down upon us”.145 
Further, as an “other” law that interrupts the human law characterised by force, mastery 
and carnivorousness, it would appear that the God who overrules and opposes human 
dominion would thus represent non-carnivorous power. God as “living”, a “hand” and 
“voice” signifies the possibilities of a justice that handles, calls, lives and judges 
differently, not according to a mastery that kills, eats and condemns to death. But there is 
an abiding tension in the book between this optimistic view of a non-carnivorous power 
that enables a living on with one’s others, and the threat of being devoured, crushed or 
mastered and thus being lived off. Hence, for Daniel as an exiled Jew subject to competing 
political factions, the tension lies between being or becoming pet or prey.   
Stefan Beyerle suggests that the book of Daniel “envisages a radical replacement of 
social organization” and ought to be seen as utopian, in the sense of a dream for a non-
carnivorous, harmonious order.
146
 In turning Nebuchadnezzar into a specifically grazing, 
non-carnivorous animal, and in stopping the lions from exercising their carnivorous 
appetite by eating Daniel, God as a nonhuman power appears to invoke a response to the 
living that is perhaps best described as a utopian dream: non-carnivorous. Showing human 
subjects to be always already deconstructed, he presents the condition for non-mastery. 
This God, then, is a call for a recognition of the deconstructed subject every living being 
therefore is, and the possibility of non-carnivorousness: one does not eat one’s pets, one 
lives with them. At the same time, however, the otherness of God could be seen as 
untameable wildness and the anthropomorphic elements of God’s hand, voice and 
livingness could spell out the possibilities of such a God-figure to be like a human master, 
and thus also, within the logic of the text, like a terrifying beast. In the second half of 
Daniel, this anthropomorphism of God is increased, while the human rulers become more 
beast-like. For instance, a ram symbolises the kings of Media and Persia (8:20), a goat the 
king of Greece (8:21). God as the highest power becomes, in chapter 7, associated with the 
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‘Ancient One’ who sits on a throne with ‘the hair of his head like pure wool’ in 7:9. He is 
soon accompanied by ‘one like a human being’ (7:13) who is given an everlasting 
dominion and whose kingdom will never be destroyed. It is as if these characterisations in 
the second half of Daniel erupt in an escalation of God as present and proximate as a 
human-like ruler and the human tyrants as increasingly carnivorous, violent and virile 
figures with their devouring, trampling, battling bodies and horns. Seesengood and Koosed 
argue that in “the cosmic array of Daniel, tyrants become beasts. God becomes human. 
God, the human, destroys the tyrants, the beasts”.147 Evil, they write, becomes consigned to 
the image of the animal as beast, and therefore must be killed. The image of animality in 
Daniel, then, relies ultimately on the killability of animals.
148
 Human tyrants are 
conceptualised as animals, they argue, in order to make them killable to the human-like 
God.
149
 Yet I would argue the text is more confused than such a delineated taxonomy. 
These representations are rather a testament to the confusion displayed in Daniel as to who 
is who. As Koosed and Seesengood themselves write: “the borders of God, human and 
animal are repeatedly blurred.”150 Are the rulers of foreign empires benign domestic 
animals or beastly powers? Is God human-like, or indeed, beast-like as a living God and 
super-power? Is he a master of his pets or a predator to prey? Are the lions my fellows in 
captivity or my carnivorous foes? Who is in fact “clean” and who “unclean”, who Jew or 
non-Jew?  
Koosed and Seesengood argue that “Daniel is replete with the Animal as symbol”, 
as “part of the strategy of the apocalypse to construct a great divide between humans and 
animals, one that allows humanity to be divided into the good and the evil where the evil is 
consigned to the category animal and slaughtered accordingly”.151 But I suggest that 
humans in Daniel are all shown to be hybrid animals, domestic and wild, clean and 
unclean, distressingly indeterminately. The question is whether to be a grazing, domestic 
animal or a wild and carnivorous one: all alike are mortal, killable, and ultimately pets or 
prey in the hand of the divine. The dread of the second half of Daniel is thus both directed 
at the vulnerability of all creatures in such a world – of domestic pets in the domain of 
more powerful masters – and at the power of political – human and divine – predators. The 
second half of Daniel conveys the ferocity of political power to reinforce the pet-like status 
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of God’s subjects as vulnerable creatures, and the potential ferocity of political rulers in 
ruling over land and the living. In the same way that the human kings in Daniel are 
essentially domesticated animals that mimic divine power, it could be remarked that God’s 
anthropomorphic elements and superlative position as merely a higher rather than other 
power to the human, marks this figure out as a potentially violent force also competing for 
power. With such properties, this God may act as a living, ruling master and take life, deal 
blows with his hand, and condemn or sentence with his voice. If he has a voice, does God 
also have a mouth? Does he need to eat? Wisdom and power are said to belong to God 
(2:20), he raises and removes kings, gives knowledge and wisdom (2:21), he reveals 
secrets (2:28), he is a great God (2:45) and everlasting (4:3), he rules over the realm of 
mankind (4:17, 25); all those who dwell on earth are accounted as nothing in the face of 
the power of heaven, all are in God’s hand (4:35),the breath of life is in God’s hand (5:23), 
men are to fear and tremble before this God, he is the living God and he rules the kingdom 
(6:26). Is the conclusion thus that to follow God and be a deconstructed subject is in fact to 
play puppet to a Master-God, to be a domesticated animal or pet vulnerable to being eaten 
or killed? As Pyper points out, lions in the Hebrew Bible are also represented as God. 
“Yahweh can be represented as the roaring lion that opposes Israel’s enemies. Yet he is 
also depicted as turning on Israel itself, regarding it as prey.”152  
On the scale of mastery as the “Highest”, this God too may be like a human-beastly 
master, merely higher, more master. In the alliance between lions and God, then, God and 
lions too become interchangeable, like Derrida’s “cat or God”. As Pyper puts it: “What is 
strong and fierce enough to protect me can also threaten me, and the image of the lion 
uncannily ties together this duplicity of protector and threat, ruler and unruly.”153 Pyper 
wonders whether a wider metaphor of lions may be at work in the Hebrew Bible, seeing 
the world and its politics as God’s hunting park, “where the nations can be either his 
quarry or his hunting beasts” where Israel is either witness or victim?154 If the living are 
puppets or pets in the hand of God, just as Daniel became an animal-victim to human law 
and the lions function as puppets and pets, the haunting notion lurks that to follow this God 
is also to be potentially followed, hunted, played with, puppeteered, even crushed and 
devoured. God is a life-saving benign master but he is also conveyed as “other” to this, a 
potential leonine force, or as the master over his animal subjects. Creaturely 
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characterisations flurry across this text, making it impossible to discern finally who is who, 
who friend and who foe, who pet and who prey. In the weakness emphasised by the idea of 
the deconstructed subject, notions of the autonomy, power and freedom of the living 
dissipate. What remains is the haunting idea that God too may display violent mastery: that 
my other may be what/who masters me.  
Shakespeare writes of the way in which Derrida conveys that faith is risky because 
it is always potentially misplaced, the one followed might turn out to be a spectre, an 
emptiness.
155
 But in this case it is rather the risk that the one followed is a master in whose 
hands I become a puppet, a mere play-thing, akin to the lions in the pit, awaiting their 
feeding or starvation. Perhaps this ambiguity is also what is intimated when the lions in 
chapter 6 cease to be non-carnivorous and overpower those who have conspired against 
Daniel. Devouring them, their wives and children, the lions break all their bones in pieces 
(6:24). The non-carnivorous can become the carnivorous, and vice versa: the other as other 
is ultimately irreducible and inexhaustible. The only possibility of encounter with, and 
response to, the other is marked by risk. To follow Daniel’s God, then, is to exist in “the 
very ordeal of the undecidable”, to partake of “faith through a form of involvement with 
the other that is a venture into absolute risk, beyond knowledge and certainty”.156 Nick 
Mansfield proposes that power always presents itself as that which “offers as well as 
hurts”, adding that “critique of power must at some point become the willingness to 
assume power, in fact is already the assumption of power”.157 As a critique of, and 
intervention into, the human mastery that attempts to be “top dog”, then, divine power is an 
assumption of power that could become dangerous. But the risk and double bind of 
(following) the power of the other is also an opening “to the gift and to the gift of death 
that puts me into relation with the transcendence of the other”.158 Transcendence would 
signify here the way in which the other always eludes my control, is always more than I 
can encompass and calculate. The “gift” would be the confrontation with mortality, with 
finitude, with “the borders or the ends of man”159 which is the condition for responding to 
the other as a vulnerable being with the possibility of not eating (the other) or being eaten, 
in an infinite appropriation that can be survived, living on in the sense of survival and 
hospitality on one’s others. As Hélène Cixous puts it of that love she calls a “god”: “only 
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that which gives me life can take it away from me.”160 Daniel’s God gives him life in the 
first half of Daniel; in the second half, the dread at life being taken away turns this gift into 
threat and terror. 
Derrida argues that non-carnivorousness is perhaps the impossible. Speaking of 
vegetarianism he says that “a certain cannibalism remains unsurpassable”.161 “It is not 
enough to stop eating meat in order to become a non-carnivore.”162 There are other 
carnivorous processes in living with, near, besides, on and off one’s others.163 It is always 
possible to “incorporate, symbolically, something living, something of flesh and blood – of 
man and of God”.164 Eating the other always remains a temptation and a possibility. This, 
Derrida writes, is not merely an admission of potential violence in every other, but also the 
very temptation of love in proximity to, and possession of, “my” other, my pet.165 As 
Derrida states, one must eat, and one lets oneself be eaten.
166
 There is no possibility of 
avoiding violence towards the other wholesale. But as Ruth Lipschitz suggests, this is a 
call to a self-critical attention to boundaries and representations that come to constitute 
“hierarchies of conquest”, as well as opening up the ethical imperative of “eating well”.167 
To eat well would be to offer hospitality in a relation of responsibility that is not immune 
from appropriation. Following the other, be it Derrida’s cat or Daniel’s God, is thus 
perhaps a matter also of loving one’s other as “this irreplaceable living being”168 with all 
the irreducible risk and faith this entails, what Cixous calls “the love of the wolf, the 
complicity that attaches us to that which threatens us”.169 This is what Shakespeare affirms 
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in the risk of following one’s other: namely, a drive or desire for the other170 that is always 
already insatiable because the other remains other and thus to some extent always more, 
but at the same time, this other is a particular singular other, my other, my pet. As Hugh 
Pyper glosses it: “To love and be loved is to be open to being prey, and also to 
acknowledge that one can be predator.”171 The gift Derrida speaks of then, of death, is 
precisely the finitude that marks my relation to the other as other, life-affirming as well as 
always already potentially life-destroying. The implications of “eating well” are as Turner 
writes, “not simply to refuse to eat the other and as a consequence to properly respect the 
other”.172 “One must eat not just because there are basic needs to be met such as the need 
for nutrition, but rather because one must identify with others in order to form any self of 
one’s own.”173 The question, as Rachel Muers poses it, is “whether we can draw them 
[animals] in to our spheres of interest and concern without consuming them 
completely”.174 In other words, whether we can let the other live on. As Daniel shows, the 
question is one of being consumed, either in a desire for incorporation and assimilation or 
in anxiety at being devoured and destroyed in one large gulp. Derrida’s cat as his own is 
the sign of possession and appropriation in a particular relation, which is also the 
condition for love and any encounter with any other, such as Daniel’s God. Following this 
living other is to display the condition for loving the other as unsubstitutional, but 
simultaneously to reside in the risk of being mastered or puppeteered, as prey or pet, in the 
hands of this, my other. 
 
Conclusion: The Finitude of (Ir)Responsible Faith 
In this chapter I pursued Derrida’s nonhuman other as “cat or God” in order to examine 
more closely what the relationship is between Derrida’s following the animal and the 
notion of following God as a nonhuman other. With Derrida’s response as a “here I am”, a 
self-presentation that signifies both the automaticity in every utterance as well as the 
singular responsibility of the response to one’s other, I outlined Derrida’s concept of a 
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deconstructed subject. The deconstructed subject is what responds to the law of the other, 
before the other, following the other, in a “here I am” that marks vulnerability, faith (in not 
wholly knowing), automaticity and iterability, and the singular responsibility in responding 
to the particular, singular other. For Derrida, this “here I am” is situated as a response to 
God in The Gift of Death, posited in the question of who can demand a life to be taken, 
who can sentence to death, who can give death or life. By turning to the Book of Daniel, I 
have shown another scene that poses questions as to who has the power and mastery over 
life and who can give death, displacing it from human mastery to the nonhuman as a non-
carnivorous response. Carnivorousness is not escapable, however. It haunts in that a 
relation to one’s other is always marked by a degree of appropriation and desire for 
assimilation or absorption as well as risk at being devoured and crushed wholesale.  
In the Book of Daniel, the political is animal. The political realm as animal is a 
testament both to a power of solidarity with the nonhuman as equal domesticated creatures 
under a higher divine power, and a dread at the vulnerability of being animal in the face of 
carnivorous battles for domination and consumption. I have proposed that the first part of 
Daniel is a fantasy of incorporation into foreign rule, where Daniel and his companions 
successfully integrate as animals conquered and brought into a new territory. Conquered 
animals, they become heroic subjects in solidarity with their nonhuman others, animal and 
divine, thus undercutting the human hubris that desires to rule exclusively and govern the 
life and death of other animals. Building on Derrida’s scene between “cat or God”, I have 
suggested that the Book of Daniel presents another such scene, with Daniel in the sight of 
lions and his God. This is a double judgement scene, before the human law as carnivorous 
animal force but also before the law of the nonhuman as a greater and “other” power that 
resists carnivorousness. This nonhuman other is shown to be higher than human mastery 
over life and death and is thus a power that interrupts and overrules. This is the God whom 
Daniel follows, an unsubstitutional nonhuman other who undercuts human mastery and 
shows the living to be ultimately in his power. Following such a God is what reveals the 
human as a master-subject to be a deconstructed subject. While the mastery of such a God 
is retained as the highest power, a glimpse of the possibility of non-mastery can be traced 
in the call for the non-carnivorousness of the lions and the grazing animal that 
Nebuchadnezzar becomes. God as “living”, a “hand” and “voice” signifies the proximate 
presence and possibility of a justice that judges differently, not according to a desire for 
mastery in killing, eating and condemning to death. God is both the figure of the other and, 
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as Chrulew puts it a “less-other-otherness”, “a finite God subject to time” who is thus 
relational and responsive.
175
  
At the same time, however, these anthropomorphic elements spell out the 
possibilities of such a God figure to be more like a ferocious human-animal ruler, living 
and participating in the political world of warring carnivorous creatures. With such 
properties, this God may act as a living, ruling human master and take life, enact violence 
with his hand, condemn or sentence with his voice, and devour with his mouth. On the 
scale of mastery as the “Highest”, this God too may be like a carnivorous master, merely 
higher, more master. Daniel and Nebuchadnezzar, as deconstructed subjects who follow 
this God, come face to face with their animality and thus mortality as domestic subjects.  
This confrontation with the ends and limits of power is the haunting atmosphere of the 
second half of Daniel, where the sense of harmonious cohabitation has dissipated and what 
remains is a nightmarish vision of the political as untameable animal others: ferocious, 
carnivorous, violent.  
The first part of Daniel can thus be seen as a retort to human hubris in political 
structures that capture human and non-human animals and exclude the idea of a more 
powerful God to anchor human power as the highest. In this part the nonhuman is held up 
as a triumphant divineanimal alliance that Daniel participates in as an animal who follows 
his God, as pets in a domesticated world in divine hands. The second part of Daniel 
descends into a dark dreamscape where the animality of all is visualized as terrifying. If all 
are seen as equally domesticated under God in the first part of Daniel, animal and king 
alike, then the second part envisions a world in which human and animal are fused as 
terrifying beasts, where boundaries are blurred, and the fear of being devoured or crushed 
underfoot is paramount. Ultimately, I have argued that following Daniel’s God is a 
response as Derrida’s “here I am”: both puppet- and pet-like in trusting God in the face of 
death and a life-affirming responsible response. Thus, to follow God in Daniel is to 
recognise oneself as a deconstructed subject, without mastery in the face of the other as 
other; but it is simultaneously to be responsive to the irreducible unsubstitutionality of the 
other as my other. The other as other denotes the infinite distance of the untameable other, 
and the possessive pronoun “my” signifies both the risk of possessive mastery and the 
response to living with, alongside, near the other as a particular proximate other in finitude 
and faith. In the biblical archive, Daniel is a prime text for displacing mastery and power 
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from humans as glorified animals. This displacement, however, comes with the risk of 
perceiving the living as puppets or domesticated pets to a higher divine master vulnerable 
to being devoured and destroyed, hence the dark anxiety-ridden visions of the second part 
of Daniel. Affirming the imperative for faith and the fidelity of the “yes” to the call from 
the other in order to live on, then, always runs the risk of being the least responsible 
response as well as the most. 
  
 
Chapter 3 
Derrida’s Thou Shalt Not Kill:  
Acts 10 on Edibility, Animality, and Hospitality 
 
The “Thou shalt not kill”, with all its “limitless” consequences, Derrida asserts, “has never 
been understood within the Judeo-Christian tradition, nor apparently by Emmanuel 
Levinas, as a ‘Thou shalt not put to death the living in general’”.1 Rather, and crucially, its 
significance has resonated in cultures for which “carnivorous sacrifice is essential, as 
being-flesh”.2 The other, is always “man as other, other as man”.3 This is Derrida’s 
entrance to the question of the “other” in regard to ethics and the most fundamental moral 
law in regard to life and the taking of life. He positions this question of life and its 
sacredness or killability up and against the “Judeo-Christian” tradition and Levinas’ 
important contribution to the discourse on otherness. Derrida’s primary concern with this 
commandment is the tension between protecting some life by deeming the taking of it as 
“murder”, and allowing other killing or taking of life to be legitimized. It is a matter of 
reflecting on the limits of ethics, its tacitly accepted parameters, but also on the 
relationship between killing, death and the “other” in capacities of power, violence, 
compassion or vulnerability. Derrida’s concern for the “who” or “what” of the other and 
the fellow in regard to such a commandment “not to kill” is thus raised as to concepts and 
classifications of life that enable distinctions between those who are killable and those who 
are not. Put plainly, within the logic of the commandment “Thou shalt not kill”, to kill a 
human is generally to commit a crime, namely murder, whereas to kill an animal is not 
considered murder, but rather, a lawful killing: hunting, putting down, slaughter or 
sacrifice.
4
 In this chapter, I will convey how “Thou shalt not kill” functions in Derrida’s 
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 Of course, there are exceptions. There are cases where slaughter, sacrifice or the killing of animals is 
unlawful, but this is not usually on the grounds that killing an animal is in principle against the law. Killing 
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work on animality and provide a discussion of its significance for his discourse on 
animality. Building on Derrida, I will develop this discussion in regard to the Acts of the 
Apostles chapter 10, analysing how this narrative in the biblical archive can be interpreted 
in response to Derrida and his allusion to killing, conceptions of humans and animals. 
Finally, this chapter will draw together the discussion of Derrida and the interpretation of 
Acts 10 in regard to human/animal distinctions, killability and the “Judeo-Christian”.  
 
Derrida’s Thou Shalt Not Kill 
With this commandment forbidding murder, seemingly in line with God’s commandment 
in Genesis 9, Derrida is eager to probe the underpinnings of such a regard for some life and 
at the same time disregard for other life. The point of his emphasis on this commandment 
is to think about the ways in which distinctions between humans and animals become 
enshrined in laws that signify the sanctity of life, but with exceptions that de-sanctify or 
demote other life. Essentially, Derrida is suspicious of qualifications and legitimizations of 
“murder” based on classifications and categorizations of calculated otherness. Derrida 
critically questions how to determine such absolute distinctions regarding the purported 
killability of non-human life forms and the determination of who is a “who” and who is a 
“what” for the inclusion and exclusion of ethical consideration. The refusal to recognise 
the animal other as a fellow or brother, exemplified in the commandment not to kill 
(humans), is, for Derrida, tantamount to an automated dogmatism in the ethical order that 
eschews a properly awakened responsibility. In other words, to exclude animals from the 
sanctity of life by allowing for their killability is a custom that is now automatically 
adopted, without further thought, and dogmatically defended on the grounds of 
human/animal difference when it comes to the perceived intrinsic difference in the life and 
death of humans as opposed to animals. Ironically, the unique responsibility of human life 
is precisely what many philosophers have wanted to deny animals, but what Derrida 
accuses such an ethical order of failing to live up to. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
penality. While this would be considered an exception done in the name of protection of others and the law 
condemning murder, such exceptions could have similar effects to those of excluding animals from moral 
laws relating to murder. Derrida discusses this issue in his Death Penalty seminars (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2013). This, however, is outside the scope of my discussion. 
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The Fraternity of Brothers 
The biblical example Derrida uses to explore further the “Thou shalt not kill” in relation to 
the question of who is killable or not – the fellow, brother, and animal other – is the story 
of Cain and Abel in Genesis 4. Here he also reflects on God as a figure of justice who 
waits to see, who repents of his preference for the sacrificial animal, and sees the animosity 
this creates between the two brothers.
5
 What happens to the fraternity of brothers, Derrida 
asks, when an animal comes on the scene?
6
 In his allusion to Cain and Abel, Derrida 
suggests that the otherness of the animal, understood as an animal rather than a brother or 
fellow, ensures a fraternity based on exclusion. Paola Cavalieri discusses this attitude of 
“perfectionism”, where attributes thought to belong to some beings are higher or better and 
are used to exclude others thought to lack such attributes.
7
 This attitude “accepts degrees in 
moral status”, where some individuals matter more than others.8 Animals are at the bottom 
of such a system.
9
 The competition of mastery between Cain and Abel leads from the 
killing of an animal to the killing of a brother; Abel offers an animal sacrifice to the Lord 
and Cain, seemingly jealous of the favour shown Abel, kills his brother. Derrida’s aversion 
to an ethics founded in the exclusion of animals as too other, is based in his belief that 
there is a thin line between a fraternity based on the exclusion and othering of a group of 
living creatures (animals) to other forms of exclusion and legitimized violence. Such an 
exclusion of animals from the realm of criminal killing on the grounds that animals are 
non-fellows or non-brothers opens up for a philosophy that sees my neighbouring people 
as not “neighbourly” enough, my brother as not “brother” enough. This is what Elizabeth 
Weber calls “the spectre of eugenics, the determination of belonging via blood and the 
corresponding bloody exclusion of the other” that haunts human group dynamics.10 Weber 
explains that Derrida, in “learning, from the ghost”, challenges both victims of legacies and 
the différance within these legacies: “how to address ourselves to the other, not just to the 
ghost, but to the other tout court. It requires defending justice not only for the known 
‘other,’ the familiar and related ‘other,’ but also for the other other”.11 
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The question of what happens to the fraternity of brothers when an animal comes 
on the scene foregrounds Derrida’s proposal that it is imperative to rethink an ethics that 
has been programmed towards human subjects. For Derrida, this is about the conditions of 
ethics itself as a radical opening to the other. But for ethics to be such a radical opening, 
this other cannot be calculated in advance as this or that, the other cannot be pre-
programmed as “human”, “similar” or “like me” because what this does is to specify in 
advance what the other can or cannot be, and thus the other is no longer conceived as other 
but merely a reflection or construction of myself, my desires and calculations. Such an 
ethics is precisely what Derrida indicts as a dormant ethics. The condition for ethics is one 
that situates me after the animal other, who goes before, whom I come after. He writes that 
a thinking of the other cannot first and foremost privilege the one conceived of as a brother 
but that “the infinitely other who looks at me” should: 
privilege the question and request of the animal. Not in order to put it in front of 
man, but in order to think that of man, of the brother and the neighbour from the 
perspective of an animal request, of an audible or silent appeal that calls within us 
outside of us, from the most far away, before us after us, preceding and pursuing us 
in an unavoidable way.
12
  
In the allusion to Cain and Abel, Derrida is implicitly making a point that will arise 
in Acts 10 also. Namely, that the reference to the animal entering the arena in regard to 
Cain and Abel is either an allusion to the potential violence of every other, even brother to 
brother, after the sacrificial killing of an animal, or, it is an invitation to regard the animal 
in a different more “brotherly” light. The murder of Abel (4:8) follows the sacrifice of the 
animal which Abel offered to God and which God prefers to Cain’s ‘fruit of the ground’ 
(4:3-5). By killing his brother, Derrida suggests that Cain falls into a trap (‘sin is lurking at 
the door’ 4:7), having become prey to an evil lurking both in the competition between the 
brothers and awoken by Abel’s animal killing.13 If the animal can be killed why not a 
brother too who has shown Cain – and his offering – to be lesser before the Lord? Derrida 
reflects on the God who then extends his protection on Cain after all, as if God had 
repented: as if “he were ashamed or had admitted having preferred the animal sacrifice. As 
if in this way he were confessing and admitting remorse concerning the animal”.14 The 
significance of this interpretation in The Animal that Therefore I am appears to be that the 
killing of an animal is part of a competition of power that foregrounds the killability of 
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more than the animal: a brother too may become an other who is killed or sacrificed for the 
performance of power. As such, it is perhaps the animal who must become a brother before 
a relation to every other can be founded in a regard for life and “fraternity”. How does one 
recognize a fellow? Derrida asks.   
Is the ‘fellow’ only what has human form, or is it anything that is alive? And if it is 
the human form of life, what will be the criteria for identifying it without implying 
a whole determinate culture, for example European, Greco-Abrahamic culture, and 
in particular Christian culture, which installs the value of ‘neighbour’ or ‘brother’ 
in the universality of the world, as totality of all creatures?
15
  
Derrida proposes that the “confusion of all nonhuman living creatures within the 
general and common category of animal is not simply a sin against rigorous thinking, 
vigilance, lucidity, or empirical authority, it is also a crime”.16 He qualifies this by denying 
the generality of the term “animal” and emphasising the plural “animals” or the neologism 
animot
17: “Not a crime against animality, precisely, but a crime of the first order against 
the animals, against animals.”18 Humanity and human rights, Derrida implies, are terms 
that have been admirable attempts at universal, inclusive concepts of equality, freedom and 
compassion based on principles of protection, but are founded in a fundamental distinction 
between the “human” and the “nonhuman”. This is crystallized most forcefully perhaps in 
the distinction between a permissible killing of animals and the criminal murder of 
humans.
19
 One source of such a distinction could be traced to the passages in the Hebrew 
Scriptures, the Ten Commandments, that refer to “Thou shalt not kill” in terms of a 
prohibition against killing humans (Exod. 20:13, Lev. 24:17 (21), Deut. 5:17). The Hebrew 
verb xc;r' in Exodus 20:13 is in the NRSV translated as murder rather than kill or slay, 
avoiding in advance any confusion in the word “kill” as to whether it also includes non-
humans. In Leviticus 24:17 the verb used is hk'n", meaning to strike, slay, hit, kill, in regard 
to the life or soul: vp,n< of man (~d'a').  Leviticus 24:17 reads in the NRSV: ‘Anyone who 
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kills a human being shall be put to death’, and is followed in v. 18 with: ‘Anyone who kills 
an animal shall make restitution for it, life for life’, repeated in v. 21: ‘One who kills an 
animal shall make restitution for it; but one who kills a human being shall be put to death.’ 
Deuteronomy 5 also lists the Ten Commandments and like Exodus xc;r' is translated: ‘You 
shall not murder’ (Deut. 5:17). But are there crimes only against humanity, Derrida asks? 
Is Thou shalt not kill for man alone?
20
 It is in the catch-all concept of the animal, thus 
perceived as distinct from the human species, that a separate ethical order with its logic of 
difference between killing and murdering can continue to be upheld. Masking the inanity 
of such a forced concept of the animal in general singular, Derrida indicts this confusion of 
all nonhuman living creatures as a collapse of critical thought and crucially, a crime. It 
cannot continue to be conceived as an acceptable “crime” comfortably external, or alien, to 
the ethical realm. As well as being a polemical gesture to draw attention to the somewhat 
arbitrary and hypocritical distinction between humans and animals, Derrida’s insistence 
that such a dogmatic line-drawing is a crime, is not a call for a homogenization of humans 
and animals as the same, but an attention to and respect for irreducible difference and 
complexity, and a call for more responsibility in ethics regarding all life.
21
  
Referring to the crime of this word “animal” and the legitimized violence that goes 
with it, is also a way of opening up the philosophical subject of human/animal difference to 
what is taking place today. Namely, the industrialization of animal life, genetic 
manipulations, artificial insemination, production and over-production, hormone and drug 
treatments, on an enormous and systematized scale. No one today, Derrida argues, can 
deny this “event”, “that is, the unprecedented proportions of this subjection of the 
animal”.22 The reason Derrida draws attention to the commandment not to kill, then, is that 
it is the fundamental principle and law in ethics that could – if it were not directed only at 
human life – protect animals from such cruelty and violence, and what he regards as crimes 
against animality. 
 
The Sanctity or Edibility of Life 
Referring to the biblical commandment “Thou shalt not kill”, Derrida takes Levinas to task 
for accepting this as: “You shall commit no murder”. Not on the grounds of an error in 
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interpretation of the biblical text – Derrida does not comment specifically on the biblical 
passages in this instance – but as an indictment towards Levinas himself as a prominent 
and powerful thinker of the ethics of the other, unable to question this distinction between 
the human face of the other and any other face or other.
23
 This commandment not to kill 
“forbids murder, namely, homicide, but doesn’t forbid putting to death in general, no more 
than it responds to a respect for life, a respect in principle for life in general”.24 This 
commandment then, features as a powerful biblical legacy that has continued to haunt 
philosophy in its proclivity towards human life and disregard for animal life. For Levinas’ 
conception of the subject, Derrida contends that what is considered ethically wrong is not 
making an attempt on life in general but “only on human life, on the neighbour’s life, on 
the other’s life as Dasein”.25 In light of the “lawful” killing of Jews, homosexuals and 
disabled people in Nazi Germany, rooted in particular ideas about what it is to be properly 
or purely human, such a qualified notion of humanity and modified regard for life is 
slippery. This is why Derrida polemically makes use of words such as genocide and 
holocaust in his discourse on animal abuse.
26
 It can no longer be repressed “that men do all 
they can in order to dissimulate this cruelty or to hide it from themselves; in order to 
organize on a global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence, which some 
would compare to the worst cases of genocide”.27 As Stephen Morton sees it, “Derrida’s 
point is that the violent logic of manufactured death that was first exemplified in the Nazi 
death camps has become normalised through practices such as the factory farming of 
animals”.28 Derrida proposes that we should neither abuse this term genocide nor refuse 
wholesale to use it with its powerful and painful connotations, precisely to cause unease at 
the mass killing and suffering of animal life for the putative well-being of humans.
29
 What 
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is worse, this is a matter of common knowledge, a permitted violence and killing, in what 
Morton calls “the necropolitical forms of sovereignty that continue to kill particular forms 
of animal life – whether human, subhuman or non-human”.30 This is why Derrida insists 
on an awakening to the horrors of animal suffering and the compassion this fact ought to 
awaken.  
Everybody knows what terrifying and intolerable pictures a realist painting could 
give to the industrial, mechanical, chemical, hormonal, and genetic violence to 
which man has been submitting animal life for the past two centuries. Everybody 
knows what the production, breeding, transport, and slaughter of these animals has 
become.
31
  
Derrida argues that if the animal can be killed without it being “murder” or even “killing” 
properly speaking – in other words, without the “Thou shalt not kill” coming into play – it 
is because the animal is considered alien to protection on the grounds of sanctity, the 
sanctity of life. Alluding to Levinas, he shows that the way in which ethics and 
metaphysics relate to the “Thou shalt not kill” become construed around the person as face 
and the human face, thus making responsibility towards humans proper and anomalous to 
animals.
32
 Derrida concedes the demand of this responsibility but calls for such a 
responsibility to specifically engage in a critical thinking that ceases to dogmatically assert 
the separation between humans and animals in general. Such a responsibility ought, he 
argues, to be directed towards animals, indeed as a response to animals. Derrida calls for a 
responsibility that is both more humble and more excessive; that demands more of our 
ethical relations, and at the same time recognises the always possible, and even inevitable, 
failure and collapse of responsibility. To turn to animal rights in order to evoke the 
possibility of rethinking this division between the sanctity of the human face and the 
ethically negligible life of an animal is not enough according to Derrida. As he points out, 
however far rights to protect animals have come and however commendable this is, they 
only forbid certain forms of cruelty or torture, without forbidding the killing of animals in 
general, be it for the production of meat for food, or for experimentation and dissection.
33
 
“Killing an animal, at any rate, is not held to be cruel in itself.”34 What Derrida is calling 
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for, is what he called “a protestation based on principle” “against the general singular that 
is the animal”.35 “Responsibility carries within it, and must do so, an essential 
excessiveness.”36 For Derrida “there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that 
must not pass through the proofs of the incalculable or the undecidable. Otherwise, 
everything would be reducible to calculation and causality, and, at best, ‘hypothetical 
imperative.’”37 If responsibility is not excessive, it is not responsibility.38 “What 
deconstruction would call for would be a different kind of rights, prescribing, in a different 
way, more responsibility.”39 As discussed above in relation to Genesis 9, responsibility and 
ethics for Derrida would not be about calculating a mutuality or “sameness” between one 
subject and another, in terms of what can be expected in return or measuring what the other 
merits in an encounter. Nor can it be based wholly on agreement – I accept these laws if 
you accept the same laws, we both agree to abide by them. Rather, in his notion of the 
“after you”, responsibility is always about a response that comes after the other and 
without wholly knowing the other. This is not purely a prescriptive stance on Derrida’s 
part; there is also the suggestion that such an asymmetry is always at work in every 
relationship between self and other.  
 
On Death and Dying (As Such) 
Derrida traces Levinas’ belief that “Thou shalt not kill” refers to humans to the 
Heideggerian view that only humans die as such.
40
 Derrida does not attempt to prove that 
animals do in fact die “as such”, but rather questions what such an “as such” means except 
being a dogmatic assertion. Korsgaard argues that it is clear that many non-human animals 
are “complex centres of subjectivity”, that is, beings who experience pain and pleasure, 
fear and hunger, attachment, curiosity, play.
41
 Why, then, are they banished to a place 
outside the realms of ethics? While Korsgaard goes on to argue that the lesson to be learnt 
is that the capacity for the above-mentioned experiences is grounded in “our animal 
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nature” (humans and animals alike),42 Derrida takes a somewhat different turn. Derrida is 
keen to avoid any certainties on characterisations of nature, but he does, similarly to 
Korsgaard, situate his thesis in regard to a capacity for a sharedness.
43
 Derrida draws us 
back to non-power rather than the power or property “to die” (and thus having death as if it 
too were a human power to possess) by positing mortality  
as the most radical means of thinking the finitude that we share with animals, the 
mortality that belongs to the very finitude of life, to the experience of compassion, 
to the possibility of sharing the possibility of this nonpower, the possibility of this 
impossibility, the anguish of this vulnerability, and the vulnerability of this 
anguish.
44
  
Because we cannot know anything about the “as such” relation to death or measure in any 
tangible way whether animals do or do not have such a relation (nor whether humans do), 
he emphatically reorients the question towards a shared capacity for suffering, stating that 
no one “can deny the suffering, fear, or panic, the terror or fright that can seize certain 
animals and that we humans can witness”.45 Derrida follows Jeremy Bentham here on 
asserting that the question that ought to be asked in regard to animals is whether they can 
suffer.
46
 The very form of this question, Derrida writes, changes everything about the 
discourse on human/animal distinctions that is built on a theorization of power, what 
powers the human possesses and what powers the animal is deprived of. Asking about 
animal suffering reorients this discourse to non-power, vulnerability, and towards a 
thinking of and in compassion.
47
 Following this, then, and in light of the absurdity of the 
catch-all concept animal in the general singular, it would be hard if not impossible to 
justify a rigid distinction between killing and murdering as anything but a dogmatic or 
myopic decision to accept such an artificial differentiation. Troubling the distinction 
between killing and murdering in the face of the undeniable possibility and reality of 
animal suffering, opens up Derrida’s “immense question of pathos and the pathological”, 
that is, suffering, pity, and compassion; “and the place that has to be accorded to the 
interpretation of this compassion, to the sharing of this suffering among the living, to the 
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law, ethics, and politics that must be brought to bear upon this experience of 
compassion”.48  
Derrida marks the condition for ethics as an opening to any other, exemplified in 
the animal other as the irreducibly different and unknowable “fellow” or “neighbour”. The 
animal as the other is a particularly pertinent figure for the otherness of “any other” 
precisely because this word animal designates such a vast and complex array of living 
creatures with such hugely different contexts, habitats, characteristics, forms, habits and 
modes of life. At the same time, however, he suggests that the difference between a human 
and animal, also marks the difference between any two humans in the world. As Derrida 
argues in The Beast and the Sovereign vol. II in regard to the concept of “world”, world is 
what all share in an objective sense, humans and animals alike, what is undoubtedly 
different between the species we call humans and the group of living beings we all 
animals, and: 
In spite of this identity and this difference, neither animals of different species, nor 
humans of different cultures, nor any animal or human individual inhabit the same 
world as another, however close and similar these living individuals may be (be 
they human or animals), and the difference between one world and another will 
remain always unbridgeable, because the community of the world is always 
constructed, simulated by a set of stabilizing apparatuses, more or less stable, then, 
and never natural, language in the broad sense, codes of traces being designed, 
among all living beings, to construct a unity of the world that is always 
deconstructible, nowhere and never given in nature.
49
 
In other words, the difference that can be said to exist between a human and an animal also 
exists in principle between any two living beings. There is a sense in which the world is 
shared in certain ways by the human species. But this difference is not absolute, nor does it 
provide the ground for ignoring the similarities between animals and humans, or a reason 
to exclude animals from ethical consideration. 
Derrida’s “after you” is a specific demand to humans to take responsibility and 
cease to put human well-being first in an unquestioned, unthinking manner. At the same 
time, his emphasis on following, excessive responsibility and mortality testifies to the 
nonpower of humans too, coming after the animal other in response to the animal and in 
sight of a God who sees and takes account. The main points of discussing the 
commandment that prohibits murder is to question why this applies only to the group of 
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living beings we call humans and not to this vast, amorphous term the animal. What power 
structures are at play in such a restricted, discriminating, carnivorous ethics? What is it 
about the life of animals that does not count in the face of death? Why is it not a crime to 
kill animals, and who (or what) is encompassed or encompassable in this word “animal”? 
 
Acts 10 on Edibility, Animality, and Hospitality 
The commandment “Thou shalt not kill” appears in Exod. 20:13, Lev. 24:17 (24:21) and 
Deut. 5:17. In regard to killing, this commandment is qualified further by more detailed 
laws regarding which animals are in fact killable and edible, along with instructions on 
methods of killing and eating. These so-called “purity laws” of clean and unclean animals 
are expounded in Leviticus 11 and Deut. 14.3-20. But instead of going over the textual 
landscape of these laws which are rooted in the Ten Commandments with a focus on the 
sixth commandment not to kill, I propose that we turn to a different biblical text, namely 
chapter 10 of the Acts of the Apostles in the New Testament.
50
 This is a segment of the 
biblical archive in which questions of law and killability play out in both continuity with, 
and rupture from, the commandment not to kill in the Torah. There are three reasons why I 
think this particular text warrants discussion in relation to Derrida’s discourse on the 
commandment not to kill. The first is that Derrida is less interested in the commandment 
itself, but rather its legacy, manifestation, and negotiation in discussions about the animal 
as other: who is in the ethical circuit and who or what stands outside? The narrative of Acts 
10 stages questions of fellowship, hospitality and the other who becomes a fellow. But it is 
also about the laws that underlie or limit fellowship. It is a passage that grapples with the 
legacy of the law “Thou shalt not kill”, in relation to legitimized and lawful killing and 
dreams for universal, shared fellowship. Following on from my discussions in the previous 
chapters on Noah and the edibility of animals, and then Daniel around questions of 
fellowship and hostility, I show here too that power is oriented around acts of eating in 
relation to the other. As Richard I. Pervo points out in his commentary on Acts, Peter’s 
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initial refusal to eat the animals that are presented to him in his vision reflects “the classical 
Jewish rejection of forbidden food in the face of pressure”, linking him thus to Daniel and 
the Maccabees.
51
 As demonstrated in 1 Macc. 1:62, refusing to eat unclean food becomes a 
way to ascribe identity and assert resistance.
52
 But in Acts 10 Peter retracts his refusal to 
eat unclean animals and comes to accept the edibility, or cleanness, of all animals. I will 
explore the significance of this for the conception of animality in relation to concepts of 
hospitality, fellowship and the “other”. 
The second reason for turning to Acts 10 is that scholarship on this book frequently 
describes Acts as promoting a concept of universalism – that is, a religion and God for all 
and a subsequent universal or common equality and fellowship – that is linked particularly 
to this chapter, and that would appear favourable to animals. But the category which, I 
propose, has been forgotten in this “universal” fellowship is precisely animals, despite 
their prominent place in the vision that leads to the very concept of universalism. I argue 
that this universalism is grounded on the animals of this text, but that this foundation has 
been eschewed. It is necessary to bring Derrida’s debate on the commandment not to kill to 
Acts 10 and more explicitly examine its crucial but neglected animal figures, their 
significance, function and logic in the text. Acts 10 both espouses a universal fellowship 
founded on the idea of animals as fellows, and, at the same time collapses into a human 
fellowship that limits its universalism in ways that are detrimental to more than animal 
others. It thus plays out both Derrida’s dream for an unconditional hospitality and is a 
textual manifestation of the consequences of legitimized and lawful forms of killing and 
killability.  
The third reason is that to engage critically with the rather limited references to the 
“Judeo-Christian” in Derrida’s work on animality, Acts 10 forms a crucial point in the 
biblical archive between the “Jewish” and the “Christian”. The Acts of the Apostles, 
thought to be written by the same author as the Gospel of Luke, and as a supplement to this 
Gospel, is a narration of the events and challenges of the time and mission of Jesus’ 
followers after his earthly life. It is a unique text for providing a narrative of the Jewish 
sect that becomes the Christian movement in the middle of the first century CE under the 
Roman Empire. Written towards the end of the first century, it is focused around the 
figures of Peter and Paul as early founders of what becomes known as Christianity. Acts 10 
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is frequently seen as a crucial moment for the history of Christianity; from the Jesus 
movement being a Jewish sect to its mission to the Gentiles. But it is also seen as distinctly 
“Jewish” in many respects. Acts is thus an important document in the biblical archive 
regarding early Christianity, its gestation and formation, and its relationship to Judaism. 
One of the crucial points over which this formation and discussion takes place is the 
question of the traditional Mosaic laws regarding animal classifications as clean or unclean 
– showcased pertinently in Acts 10. It is a text that has evoked, and still evokes, much 
debate over the extent of its Jewishness or break from Jewishness, emergent Christianity, 
or its embedded Jewish references and framework.
53
 The narrative raises questions 
concerning law, killability and edibility in relation to categories of animals as well as 
categories of humans. While scholarship has mostly staged these categorisations in 
reference to Jew and Gentile, Jew and Christian, or Jewish-Christian and Roman, the 
“Judeo-Christian” is here inextricably tied to the animal figures of this text.   
What takes place in Acts 10 is a scene in which Peter has a vision on a rooftop, 
where a sheet descends before him. ‘In it were all kinds of four-footed creatures and 
reptiles and birds of the air’ (10:12). In this vision Peter hears a voice say to him: ‘“Get up, 
Peter; kill and eat.”’ Peter responds that he cannot do so as he would not, and never has, 
eaten anything that is ‘profane [koino,j] or unclean [avka,qartoj]’ (10:14), but the voice 
persists a second time, saying: ‘“What God has made clean, you must not call profane”’ 
(10:15); this is said to be repeated three times. Peter’s vision coincides with a visitation 
from a group of messengers sent by a Roman centurion called Cornelius, who have come 
to invite Peter to return with them to meet Cornelius who is a ‘devout man who feared God 
with all his household’, who also has had a vision and message from ‘an angel of God’ 
(10:3) that has asked him to meet with ‘a certain Simon who is called Peter’ (10:5). Peter 
goes with these men and, as a consequence of his vision, he eats in fellowship with 
Cornelius and his household despite the prohibition of Jews to eat the “unclean” food of 
Gentiles. To explain, Peter declares that he now understands ‘that God shows no partiality, 
but in every nation anyone who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him’, that 
he is ‘Lord of all’ (10:34-36). Chapter 10 ends with the Gentiles receiving the Holy Spirit, 
and all the ‘circumcised believers who had come with Peter were astounded that the gift of 
the Holy Spirit had been poured out even on the Gentiles, for they heard them speaking in 
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tongues and extolling God’ (10:45-46). The Gentiles are then baptised ‘in the name of 
Jesus Christ’ and Peter stays with them for several days (10:48). 
The central point that plays out in Acts 10, then, is the difference between laws 
concerning clean/unclean animals and Gentiles without such laws, how such difference is 
overcome by Peter’s vision of the cleanness of all, the impartiality of God, and the 
fellowship made possible in the aftermath of this vision. Peter’s vision and visit to 
Cornelius is one of the longest narrative units in Acts, making it a crucial episode for the 
main concern of Acts, namely the legitimacy of the gentile mission.
54
 Early on in Walter 
Houston’s essay on clean and unclean animals in Animals on the Agenda: Questions about 
Animals for Theology and Ethics, he conveys the relationship between the laws of 
Leviticus and Deuteronomy and Acts 10.
55
 The point of the author of Acts, Houston writes, 
is opposite of that in God’s words in Lev. 20:24-6, where God makes a ‘clear separation’ 
between the Israelites and the non-Israelites (20:24), ‘and you are to make a clear 
separation between clean beasts and unclean beasts, and between unclean and clean birds’ 
(20:25).
56
 There is here a relation, seemingly, between God’s exclusive relationship to 
Israel and to the distinction between clean and unclean animals. Houston argues that the 
purpose of this is “to mark the chosen people out as distinctive”.57 Now, in Acts 10, “a 
major component of the purity code has been abolished”,58 and thus what Acts 10 
seemingly radically undoes is this major distinction, first between animals and then 
between Jews and Gentiles. 
Acts 10 is a biblical narrative with a vision of and about animals at its centre. At the 
same time, it is part of a text, The Acts of the Apostles, that is frequently associated with 
universality, with Acts 10 as a prime example of such universality. This universality is 
frequently seen as unique, a mark of social advance, characterized by an impartial attitude 
towards people and one God for all. It is conceived as a liberation from distinctions and 
discriminations: a universality that commends equality and fraternity towards the other as 
any other based in a universalism concerning a religion and God for all. This 
indiscriminate attitude of universal fellowship is crystallized by the encounter between 
Peter and the Roman centurion Cornelius, and symbolized in the hospitality and table-
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fellowship at the heart of Acts 10 between these two figures. A central concern of this text, 
then, is the question of the fellow and other in regard to hospitality and customs of eating, 
that in turn depend on attitudes to what animals can be killed and eaten and how. What is 
interesting to note in regard to Acts 10 and the two points mentioned so far – that is, 
animals and universalism – is that the animals are never again referred to in the narrative 
after their appearance in the vision. On top of this, they are barely mentioned in 
scholarship, certainly not seen as important, despite their position as the central content of 
Peter’s vision. The universal fellowship espoused in regard to this text is seemingly never 
imagined beyond a human fellowship.  
The animals of Peter’s vision, like the Gentiles Peter later associates with, are made 
“clean” in his vision, making this text appear a moment in the biblical archive that would 
be favourable to animality. It would be a moment of Derrida’s “after you”: a human 
fellowship (between Jews and Gentiles) coming after the altered relationship with animals. 
Peter’s vision is, after all, first of all about animals. Why, then, are the animals completely 
forgotten in the text as well as in scholarship? With the emphasis on a universalism marked 
by an impartial God of all, and the possibility of hospitality opened up beyond what is 
portrayed as distinct groups, it would seem a prime text for a greater regard for animals 
too. It is necessary to return to the vision of Acts 10 with its animals in order to interrogate 
how the notion of universalism as equality and hospitality is generated as a result of this 
vision and how it relates to the animals in question. I will do this by showing that there are 
two quite contrary conclusions that can be drawn from closer attention to Peter’s vision, 
the analogy it sets up, and the logic that ties Peter’s vision to the fellowship between Peter 
and Cornelius’s household. One is of indiscriminate killability and the other is of 
unconditional hospitality. Finally, I will point out that there is a further category that 
appears to be bypassed in scholarship on this passage in conjunction with the theme of 
universalism as hospitality, fellowship and equality. This is the reference to the living and 
the dead. I will tie this back in with the discussion of Derrida’s reflections on mortality that 
relate to his critique of the “Thou shalt not kill” and the question of life.  
 
Universalism 
Joseph Tyson draws attention to the symbolic importance of the setting of Acts, with the 
early chapters of Acts (1-12) situated around Jerusalem and Judea, and then broadening out 
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to Damascus and Antioch, referring also to Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Cyrene. The setting 
highlights a movement that begins in Jerusalem and that gradually emerges beyond 
towards a larger world, thus placing the origins of Christianity first within Judaism and 
then broadening out to include Gentiles.
59
 One way this chapter has been interpreted in 
scholarship is as a pivotal moment in such a movement from localized particularity in a 
distinctive tradition with particular laws, rituals and customs (most prominently 
circumcision and purity rules for food) to concerns for the world more generally or 
universally.
60
 This is often seen precisely as a universalizing, inclusive move away from a 
religious particularism associated with exclusivism and laws that separate people into 
different categories, to the emergence of a universalism unbound by such laws and 
differentiations.   
It has almost become a reflex in scholarship to deem Acts a text that promotes 
universalism, with its impartial God (10: 34). F.F. Bruce, for instance, argues that Acts 10 
“marks a definite step in the extension of the church from a Jewish fellowship to a 
universal basis”;61 Philip Esler speaks of Luke’s “universalist tendency”;62 and David Pao 
too mentions the “universalistic emphasis” of Acts.63 François Bovon is another example 
of a scholar who discusses the ways in which Luke-Acts is open to “universalism”,64 C.K 
Rowe argues for the Lukan conception of “universal” Lordship up and against the Roman 
Imperial power;
65
 Robert F. O’Toole mentions the theme of universality that weakens “any 
rigid distinctions between the people of God and the world”;66 Marion L. Soards writes 
that the “universality of God’s work and Jesus’ lordship are emphasized” in the speeches 
of Acts.
67
 In his analysis of Peter’s sermon in vv. 34-42, Pervo outlines the “distinctive 
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theme” as universalism.68 He notes that this concern with the mission to the Gentiles and 
its connection to notions of divine impartiality and universalism are reinforced by allusions 
to Paul’s letters.69 But Luke appears to apply and reinforce such ideas in the context of 
Greco-Roman views about the unity of the human race.
70
  Laura Nasrallah too proposes 
that “Luke-Acts crafts a universalising narrative of Christian identity that would be 
attractive or at least comprehensible to philosophical and political minds at the time”, thus 
aligning this sect with a contemporary Gentile, Greco-Roman culture.
71
 David L. Matson 
discusses the way this first report of a household conversion in Acts affirms the theme of 
universalism signified by a move from the temple to the home as the focus of Christian life 
and worship.
72
 James D.G. Dunn mentions the “more universal destiny” Acts 10 appears to 
foreground as a salvation for all rather than only the restitution of Israel.
73
 In her discussion 
of early Christianity in the missionary activity exemplified in Acts 10, Clare K. Rothschild 
talks about a “universalizing form of Judaism”.74 
In a similar way to Derrida’s hope that animals too could be included in the 
compassion extended towards human life in ethics, (and thus liberated from a category, 
“animal”, that ensures their killability), many scholars have clearly seen in Acts 10 a 
liberation from the exclusivity of a particular people of God, thus extending the people of 
God to a universal category for one and all. This can be traced in large part to passages of 
Acts 10 that showcase the fellowship between Jews and Gentiles with the emphasis on a 
‘Lord of all’ (10:36) and Peter’s reference to an ‘impartial’ God (10:34). Universalism, in 
this context, is frequently seen as a break-through, as social advance in terms of equality 
and a fraternity towards, or fellowship with, the other, specifically exemplified by the 
Gentile other. O’Toole, for instance, identifies Luke’s theme of the mission to the Gentiles 
as “social advance”: “No longer does one have to belong to a given people or observe all 
the details of the Torah (cf. Acts 15:28-29) to be saved.”75 Martin Hengel conceived of the 
figure of Peter as a bastion of tolerance, propagating a form of liberalism that mediates 
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between Jewish and Greco-Roman extremities.
76
 Dunn seemingly espouses Hengel’s 
figure of the liberal Peter 
77
 calling him “the liberated Jew”.78 Dunn further describes the 
events from Peter’s vision to his encounter with Cornelius as a “major” “transformation”, 
an “epochal” step, a “decisive breakthrough”,79 “a step forward of momentous 
significance”.80 But, forgetting its animal figures, the text and its reception also seemingly 
forget the possibility of more radical implications for an actual universalism of and for all. 
Pervo points to this when he admits that the concept of divine impartiality is difficult 
“because it often occurs in contexts that seem to assert partiality”.81 The scholarship that is 
keen to emphasise universalism has failed to recognise that a universalism that is limited, 
with conditions, the worst kinds of abuses toward those beings who are left outside the 
scope of moral concern”.82 “Universal consideration”, Calarco proposes, “would entail 
being ethically attentive and open to the possibility that anything might take on a face”,83 
or perhaps rather, as I will discuss later, the life and death of the other, to be judged only by 
the “Lord of all”. 
Apart from focusing on Jewish-Gentile, or Jewish-Christian-Roman social 
interaction, scholarship has seemingly seen the universalizing theme of Acts 10 in human 
terms, without regard for what this might mean for the animals that set in motion the 
disregard for the Levitical and Deuteronomic laws in the first place. Bovon asserts that the 
“way to God” is “for human beings”, for a “human salvation”.84 Despite seeing Luke-Acts 
as a demand for radical social reform in the erasure of special treatment for some over 
others and speaking of the “radically new” entering history with Luke’s writing, O’Toole 
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circumscribes this radical dignity and eternal hope he finds in Luke-Acts only to “human 
nature”.85 Dunn reads Peter’s vision as leading to the recognition “that God does not make 
distinctions between human beings in general as to their acceptability or unacceptability on 
grounds of their basic identity (ethnic, social or religious)”.86 Rothschild refers to the 
“premise” of Acts as bringing people and events together in such a way that “all of human 
life” “is interrelated under the broad auspices of divine guidance”.87  Mostly however, the 
specifically human universality is left implicit. It is clear from overlooking the animals of 
Peter’s vision and the emphasis, as shown, on the human characters and who or what they 
represent in the text. Presumably, this happens because it seems unthinkable that animals 
should form a part of universal fellowship, however impartial this God may be. Animals in 
this passage are only referred to in passing as particular objects of laws around categories 
of clean/unclean, or in referential, explanatory terms to describe the difference between 
traditional Jewish relationships with animals in opposition to the more “free for all” 
Gentile relationship to animals as food. Animals are thus primarily killable and edible, the 
only difference in regard to Jewish tradition is the more particular rules and rites around 
which animals are killable and edible. It appears to be clear then, as Houston argues, that 
Peter’s vision “is not really about animals”.88 Rather, it is about calling “no human being 
profane or unclean”.89 I will go on to show why this is problematic and misses crucial 
aspects of the text. 
Before doing so, however, it is worth pointing out that the text itself to some extent 
supports this emphasis on the specific relationship between two humans and the groups 
they represent. As such, it is perhaps not strange that this fellowship has become 
generalized to a human universality. In 10:25-26, Cornelius falls before Peter, worshipping 
him and Peter raises him from the ground, saying:  ‘Stand up, I too am a man’ (Acts 
10:26), thus emphatically asserting the similarity and even fraternity between Peter and 
Cornelius in the aftermath of Peter’s vision. Justin R. Howell proposes that Peter’s 
response in correcting Cornelius “implies that they are both humans under the authority of 
another, namely Jesus”.90 Further, in his speech Peter explains the shift that is taking place: 
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‘“You yourselves know that it is unlawful for a Jew to associate with or to visit a Gentile; 
but God has shown me that I should not call anyone profane or unclean. So when I was 
sent for, I came without objection’ (10:28-29). This scene precedes the hospitality 
Cornelius extends to Peter. It stages the equality between Jews and Gentiles to make the 
point that hospitality is now possible, and the distinctions previously separating them are 
erased. It shows the underpinnings of Peter’s own interpretation of the vision, as triggering 
the possibility for the relationship and fellowship between the Jewish Peter and the Gentile 
Cornelius.  
Gilhus suggests that the shift from sacrificial cults to Christian cults without animal 
sacrifice is associated with cultural progress, while animal sacrifice is considered 
primitive.
91
 She argues that this became entangled in a sacralization of the human and 
concomitant desacralization of the animal.
92
 The laws and rituals around purity and 
animality could also be perceived in this light as becoming associated with “primitive” as 
opposed to “progress”, universalism becoming thus connected to social advance as 
discussed earlier, and to what became identified as Christianity. Gilhus suggests that in the 
emergence of Christianity there was a gradual shift of emphasis from animal bodies in 
sacrificial rituals to the human body. Acts 10 could thus be seen as a site from which such 
a shift from animals to humans could take place as Christianity became Christianity. 
Explaining the importance of animal sacrifices in the Roman Empire and the cult of the 
emperor Gilhus explains how multitudes of animals were sometimes slaughtered in orgies 
of ritual killing. On the accession of Caligula, for example, 16, 000 cows are recorded to 
have been sacrificed in Rome over the course of three months.
93
 There was criticism of 
such blood sacrifices; after the first century, Christian polemic against blood sacrifice was 
presented, she argues persuasively, “in an apologetic context and was an ingredient in 
standard Christian counterattacks against paganism”.94 She proposes that Christians 
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substituted the animal body for the human body, most prominently “in the master body of 
Christ”.95 Essentially, then, Greco-Roman sacrificial discourse was continued but 
combined with the spiritualizing and personalizing religious trends associated with early 
Christian groups. In the Eucharist the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ was 
celebrated and seen as a higher form of sacrifice, thus implicitly trumping animal sacrifice 
with not only human sacrifice but a death considered to be the human sacrifice.
96
 Thus, for 
Christians, Gilhus goes on, “the animal sacrifice was a significant cultural borderline 
between themselves and pagans”.97 While animal sacrifice became linked to barbarism98, 
much sacrificial language can be found in the New Testament.
99
 “Real animals were 
excluded from Christian rituals, but animal imagery was still used, for instance when 
Christ was identified with the sacrificial lamb.”100 But the human body essentially took the 
place of the animal body; to become Christian was also sometimes construed as passing 
from a bestial state to full humanity.
101
 Baptism was one important trope for being reborn 
and receiving true life, and has a prominent place in Acts 10 as the pinnacle of the 
fellowship portrayed.
102
 Through the ritual of baptism, humans could become “real” 
humans, while pagans remained animals. “To be an animal implies not being fully 
alive”.103 
Discussing the Christian reaction to dietary laws Gilhus mentions Acts. She makes 
the connection between the reaction against dietary prescriptions and animals fading out of 
focus, becoming thus less relevant to what became Christianity in contrast to their 
important place in the Mosaic laws.
104
As she notes, this subject is most vividly described 
in Acts 10:10-16, and Acts 11:5-10. In the narrative of Peter’s vision the verb qu,w – to 
sacrifice – is now used for the killing of animals rather than the special sacrifice of some 
selected animals. Now animals fulfil “their true destiny as food for humans”105 and 
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Christians need reject no food.
106
  The implications are that the butchering of animals from 
now on is to be secularized. Gilhus concludes that  
it is clear that one important way in which the Christians defined their relationship 
to other people was through their attitude to these people’s use of meat and 
sacrifices. Christians differed from Jews because they ate meat that was prohibited 
according to Jewish dietary proscriptions and from pagans because they did not 
sacrifice animals or eat meat that they knew had been taken from animals that had 
been sacrificed. By eating some types of meat and not eating others, the Christians 
erected barriers against Judaism and paganism and laid a foundation for their 
emergence as an independent religion.
107
 
This is not a shift about animals, but about the people who eat and sacrifice them, about 
distinctions of difference. According to Gilhus the New Testament more generally takes 
away focus from animals.
108
 With its emphasis on the human instead of animal body, she 
describes a hermeneutic movement in many New Testament texts that point away from 
literal meaning of animals towards allegorical meanings.
109
 Thus, to be a fisher of men and 
casting one’s net for those who will be part of the Kingdom of God is not about fish at all, 
but rather the fish function as mere ciphers for humans. “When differences are wiped out, 
sameness abides, and from now on the internal differences between animals were made 
subordinate to their fundamental difference from man.”110 But arguably it is not as simple 
and clear-cut as that. Is the distinction between “humans” and “animals” drawn quite so 
starkly in Acts 10? I will argue that it is possible to read Acts 10 in more disquieting ways 
for both humans and animals. On the one hand, it can be read in a far more sinister way for 
inter-human relationships as well as human-animal relations. On the other, it could be read 
as a radical opening of hospitality to animals as fellow creatures. 
 
The Animal Vision: Killability or Hospitality? 
It is perfectly clear that Peter’s vision refers to the distinction between, and designation of, 
clean and unclean animals. From the actions that follow this vision and Peter’s own 
comment about no longer considering ‘anyone profane or unclean’ (10:28), it is also clear 
that when he utters these words to Cornelius he is referring both back to his vision and to 
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the Gentiles he is in company with. Pervo highlights that the revelation to Peter is not 
simply given, rather, the “revelation is an interpretation of the vision” that unfolds in 
Peter’s encounter with Cornelius.111 “That interpretation is the moment of decision.”112 
This, Pervo argues, is Peter’s moment of conversion, which is presented not as a direct 
command, although this is implied in the vision itself, but as the result of Peter’s 
reflection.
113
 Seemingly, this interpretive move draws a connection between the vision of 
animals and accepting the hospitality of Gentiles. Gentiles are conceived as analogous to 
the now universally clean animals. Like animals, the Gentiles must similarly not be 
considered profane, common or unclean. The NRSV translation of this verse states that 
Peter has learnt he must not call “anyone” unclean, but in the original Greek the word that 
is used is a;nqrwpoj, that is a man or human. Peter has understood his vision as: he must 
call no man or human unclean. This is the crucial interpretive leap that takes place in this 
text. Acts implies that that the impetus for the gentile mission is a consequence of the 
decision to interpret the vision in a non-literal way.
114
 In other words, to understand the 
vision as being about Gentiles or humans more generally rather than about animals per se. 
Dunn spells this out in two stages, first, that Peter recognises God makes no distinctions 
between “human beings in general as to their acceptability or unacceptability on grounds 
of their basic identity (ethnic, social or religious)”.115 Secondly, “on the basis of that 
recognition” Peter sees that God accepts Cornelius and his fellow Gentiles in the 
outpouring of the spirit in 10:44-46.
116
 Peter tacitly constructs an analogous connection 
between the animals once considered unclean and the Gentiles once considered not to be 
the people of God.  
Derrida proposes that analogies designate “the place of a question rather than that 
of an answer”.117 An analogy “is always a reason, a logos, a reasoning, or even a calculus 
that moves back up toward a relation of production, or resemblance, or comparability in 
which identity and difference coexist”.118 In other words, difference between the elements 
involved in an analogy is imperative in order to set up a relation between one distinct 
element and another. But at the same time, by setting up such a relation, the analogy is 
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assuming, or perhaps rather creating, a comparability or resemblance between the two 
anomalous elements to become analogous. If notions of “clean” and “unclean” are not 
arbitrary designations but concerned with the ordering of ideas, or a way to map out moral 
analogies on the bodies of animals, as Mary Douglas has suggested,
119
 what sort of re-
ordering takes place and what happens to the analogous elements in play? What happens in 
the analogical leap from animals being clean to Gentiles being clean?  If analogies draw 
different elements into play in order to shift from one to another, are there not necessarily 
connections conceived between these elements, even if the original element is conceived as 
merely a cipher to be moved away from? Can such connections be entirely dismembered or 
ignored?   
The vision could of course be read as referring only to food laws and the dismissal 
of such laws regarding animal distinctions. In this case the hospitality accepted by Peter 
from Cornelius would merely be the consequence of foregoing such divisive laws. There is 
thus no practical, ritual obstacle to their eating together any longer. But in that case Peter’s 
comment to Cornelius would appear strange, where he refers back to his own vision about 
animals but replaces the animals with “human”, thus mapping the meaning of the vision 
onto Gentiles. Peter clearly makes a connection between the now universally clean animals 
and the Gentiles he encounters, now no longer to be considered ‘unclean’ (avka,qartoj) or 
‘common’ (koino,j) in 10:28, the very words used of the animals in the vision (10:14). A 
reasoning is at work in this analogy that sets up a closer resemblance between animals and 
humans than has been acknowledged. Rachel Muers discusses the way in which Adams, in 
Neither Man Nor Beast, suggests that nonhuman animals in Christian history do not even 
get so far as being marginalized.
120
 This is perhaps the case with the reception of Acts 10 
(and its own narrative trajectory after the appearance of the animals), whose animals are so 
erased that they are not even side-lined. Muers points out that in many cases, how to read 
nonhuman animals in texts depends on the question of how to treat the “literal sense”.121 
Reading Acts 10 more “literally” then, will yield other interpretive results than the human 
universalism emphasised that neglects animal life altogether. Crucially, if the emphasis on 
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universalism in scholarship is to be followed, then the cessation of distinctions between 
animals is precisely the ground upon which distinctions or discriminations amongst 
humans cease. What, then, does this mean for animals when read more literally, rather than 
the immediate analogical jump from animals to humans or Gentiles?  
To recapitulate, in his vision, Peter is shown a large sheet descended from heaven, 
on which all kinds of four-footed animals, reptiles and birds of the sky feature (10:12). 
When Peter is told by a voice: ‘Get up Peter; kill and eat’ (10:13), Peter refuses, asserting: 
‘By no means, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is profane or unclean’ (10:14). 
The voice then says a second time that what ‘God has made clean, you must not call 
profane’ (10:15). This message is emphatically driven home by its repetition three times 
before the sheet ascends (10:16).  As Dunn notes, the interlocking visions of Cornelius and 
Peter (recalled again in 10:30; 11:5-10) similarly emphasise the divine approval given by 
the narrative: “God approves and wills the next step.”122  What appears to have taken place 
is that the animals that were once considered unclean or profane are now deemed clean, 
and Peter, already described as hungry (10:10), can eat freely. As a result of Peter’s vision, 
all animals ought to be considered clean – thus making it possible for Peter to kill and eat 
any of the previously prohibited animals shown in the sheet – and so all animals are 
indiscriminately killable and edible. Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok exclaim about this passage: 
“the implications for the moral status of animals are” “not encouraging”.123 Seen in this 
light, this is a biblical text that might furnish an example of the “Bible” or the “Christian” 
tradition as de-sanctifying and demoting animal life by turning animals from distinct and 
differentiated creatures into the catch-all concept of the animal in general singular – as 
Gilhus suggested. If the Leviticus and Deuteronomy passages that delineate clean and 
unclean animals and the particular ways in which animal slaughter and sacrifice should 
take place could be said to afford animals a somewhat more sacred status for clean 
animals, and a non-killable, non-edible status for unclean animals,
124
 then Luke’s supposed 
undoing of this demarcation is a de-sanctification and expansion of killability to all 
animals. As all clean and thus killable and edible, the category of “the animal” that Derrida 
criticizes so forcefully could be seen to emerge. As we saw with Gilhus, this change 
seemingly involves a sacralizing (humans)/desacralizing (animals) movement. Perhaps, 
                                                          
122
 Dunn, The Acts of the Apostles, 131. 
123
 Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok, After Noah, Animals and the Liberation of Theology, 4. 
124
 I am not suggesting that protection of animal life was a motive behind the purity laws, rather that they 
might be seen as somewhat better for animals in that some were not deemed killable and so presumably fared 
better than in a world-view where most or all animals are seen as de facto killable, edible objects, though 
there are perhaps few human cultures that do regard all non-human animals as equally edible.  
Chapter 3: Derrida’s Thou Shalt Not Kill 
 
 
145 
 
however, the distinction between humans and animals here is too starkly drawn, and the 
desacralizing movement is not so easily referable to animals only, but also to any other. If 
as Houston proposes, the object of dietary prescriptions, along with the prohibition of 
blood, was “to inculcate reverence for life”125 then this change would imply a negation or 
rejection of such reverence. 
A significant point arises from a more “literal” reading of the animal vision and its 
import, concerning the analogous connection between the animals of the vision and the 
encounter between Peter and Cornelius. What happens to the command that accompanies 
the vision of the animals to ‘Get up, kill and eat’ (10:14)? This command seemingly 
remains contained within the vision, and, like the animals, the command is never referred 
to again in regard to the rest of the narrative in Acts 10. But if it is Peter’s vision that 
furnishes the ground for his fellowship with Cornelius in the analogical connection he sets 
up from all kinds of animals to humans (and specifically to Cornelius), then there might 
appear to be a more sinister logic to this passage. The haunting command to “kill and eat” 
given to Peter in his vision, remains a tacit remainder in the encounter with the Gentiles in 
Cornelius’s home. Instead of retaining the specialness of God’s people as the people of 
Israel with laws of clean and unclean animals, this new commandment and vision undoes 
such distinctions, correlatively contracting any regard for the specialness of some life 
forms into the killability of all life as “clean” and thus edible and killable. As such, the 
universally killable animals are analogous to universally killable Gentiles. Not only 
detrimental to all animals in a wholesale way, but also, the logic of this analogy 
circumscribes Gentiles – and all – as similarly edible and killable. Further, as Gentiles in 
this passage seemingly symbolise the other who becomes a fellow, it is the other in general 
who becomes always already vulnerable to the carnivorous violence lurking between self 
and other in any community.  
One objection to my reading is to see the animals of Peter’s vision purely as a 
cipher for Jewish-Gentile fellowship and not intended to be taken literally in any sense. 
But such an objection fails to take account of the specificity of the context of Acts 10, 
situated as it is in the interaction between Jews and Gentiles over matters of the specific 
laws and relationships concerning animals. Additionally, it fails to recognize the 
impossibility of regarding a metaphor or analogy as merely the arbitrary construction of 
resemblance between two or more elements. Where there is an analogy, there also is a 
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logic of similitude and a reason(ing) at work. Regardless of authorial intention, any 
metaphor or analogy continues to function and does so beyond control. If the analogy is 
held to mean one thing, namely that because animals are now all clean, Gentiles too are all 
clean, then it would be difficult to see why the other central tenets of the vision ought not 
to bear significance for the movement of meaning from clean animals to now clean 
Gentiles. Who can police what takes place in the symbols and play of an analogy? Who 
can say that “kill and eat” can be erased in relation to Gentiles whereas other aspects of the 
vision are significant, when Peter clearly states an analogical resemblance between the 
animals and Gentiles? Or erase for all time the animals altogether when their presence as 
the source of fellowship is so crucial? The relationship between Peter and animals as all 
clean takes place, after all, before his fellowship with the “cleansed” Cornelius. The human 
other comes after, following the animals. To hold that animality as a subject is entirely 
irrelevant to Acts 10 would be strange, considering the entire narrative context around 
fellowship, hospitality, eating and its relationship to food laws that build on laws relating 
to animals. 
One way of understanding this, would be to see in this movement a fantasy for 
access and appropriation of those who could become missionized and baptized to be 
followers of Jesus. Such a desire for access and appropriation might be characterized as a 
consumption of what has been off limits but which now can be consumed or converted. 
Bovon suggests that conversion is clearly of the highest priority in Acts, and this drive for 
conversion could be understood as a desire for consuming and controlling the other.
126
 
Consumption and conversion become two sides of a coin, in the analogical resemblance 
between the edible, killable animals and the convertible, appropriable Gentiles: just as now 
the hungry Peter can eat all animals, he can consequently convert all others, thus 
construing a link between the possibility of indiscriminate consumption and indiscriminate 
conversion. Like Peter’s hunger on the rooftop, prior to his vision, and the correlative 
admission to kill and eat all animals and any animal, a hunger for conversion and mission 
might be said to drive the “consumption” of Gentiles to also become followers of Jesus as 
Messiah. This would be a drive to make the other same or similar, and thus, the Gentile, 
who has hitherto, in caricature anyhow, remained an other to Jews, becomes made same. 
Rowe argues that Peter’s “Lord of all” with his emphasis on “this one” as Lord of all, is a 
sign of rivalry against the Roman Emperor as Lords, intimating that an emergent Christian 
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community of God under their Lord might fight back, teeth and claw. If as Ben 
Witherington III claims, Acts 10 shows the beginnings of the Christian movement 
spreading from Jerusalem to other parts of the Roman Empire, it seems that this origin 
point is located in this very issue of animals and power: social interaction and its power-
dynamics. Esler reminds us of a later passage in Acts, namely 20:17-35 in which the 
Ephesian evkklhsi,a is portrayed as a flock, fighting against fierce wolves. What Luke 
conveys in terms of the troubles of the first Christian communities was, he argues, the 
notion of a flock, threatened by various enemies.
127
  As such, the image of animality and 
violence in the proposed killability of all would be a recognition of both the power needed 
to survive as a new and emerging religious movement, and of the vulnerability as “edible” 
or killable in the face of enemies.
128
 It is a case of Lawlor’s conclusion, that every “single 
other is wholly other (tout autre est tout autre), and therefore every single other might be 
the enemy”,129 and further, that every fellow or neighbour who is lived with, besides or 
near, is always already potentially threatening rather than hospitable.
130
 In other words, 
understood with the concomitant command to kill and eat, the violent undertones driving 
the mission to the Gentiles might be a potent response to Roman power
131
 as well as 
potentially strong Jewish opposition. Denise Kimber Buell too remarks on the way early 
Christianity has become associated with “an inclusive movement that rejected ethnic or 
racial specificity as a condition of religious identity”.132 She posits the view that many 
early Christian texts in fact utilized discourses relating to ethnicity, race and religion to 
promote itself as authoritative,
133
 showing how this often went hand in hand with an anti-
Judaism.
134
 Buell suggests that early Christianity used “ethnic reasoning”135 to “legitimize 
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various forms of Christianness as the universal, most authentic manifestation of humanity”, 
offering a way for Christians to define themselves up and against others and a way to assert 
superiority as precisely the universal.
136
 As she points out, ethnicity was played out in a 
dynamic of fixed race and mutable identity, arguing that Christianity capitalized on this 
discourse with the possibility of conversion as rebirth and baptism as new life. To gain 
rebirth or new life, however, one must first be killed/“killed”.  
Another way of understanding such a carnivorous logic of conversion-consumption 
is by identifying it with the shift from animal symbolism and sacrifices to an at least 
symbolic form of human sacrifice, as I discussed earlier in regard to Gilhus’ views. In the 
discourse around Jesus as the sacrificial human victim, and the “cannibalistic” symbolism 
of the Lord’s Supper, we find a table fellowship in which the eating and drinking of Jesus’s 
flesh and blood become one of the primary rituals for Christianity.
137
 Like Gilhus 
discussed above, Hans-Josef Klauck writes about the centrality of sacrificial practice as a 
social and religious ritual in classical antiquity. In addition to pagan animal sacrifices, of 
course sacrifices were offered in the temple in Jerusalem, which was in full function until 
its destruction in 70 CE.
138
 Klauck argues that, like Judaism, one of the striking aspects of 
the emergence of Christianity was the way in which it took on a sacrificial culture.
139
 “Not 
only does sacrifice remain alive in Christianity as a theological and spiritual category; it 
even achieves a stable position in the heart of Christian thought and Christian piety.”140 As 
I discussed above, while Judaism was associated with certain practices in relation to 
animals and sacrifice, a form of controlled and systematized ritual violence, Christianity’s 
focus on sacrifice is less a break from Judaism and could thus be seen more as a shift from 
animality to a human or humanist emphasis. Thus, a carnivorous and cannibalistic logic 
emerges in Acts 10 that arguably could be seen as foregrounded in the understanding of 
Peter’s vision as the edibility and killability of animals and humans as clean. However this 
is glossed, it is impossible to disregard the direct commandment to kill and eat in the vision 
that haunts the fellowship with Gentiles when transferred from animals to men, or by 
extension, to all.  
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What the narrative of Acts 10 stages is a shift from an acceptance of the law of 
clean and unclean animals to the animal in general singular, and, a shift from the 
separation between Jews and Gentiles to an all-encompassing and indiscriminate mission 
and fellowship in the erasure of the food-laws.  No laws, then, protect any animals, in 
principle, from killability and edibility. Further, read more closely, the shift that takes 
place ensures the killability of all humans too who are similarly deemed “clean”. If Peter 
correlates Gentiles with these now killable and edible animals, the mission to the Gentiles 
takes on a more sinister appearance. By this logic, Gentiles – like all animals – fall into a 
universal category of creatures that are all in principle killable. Without the distinctions 
between animals – as clean or unclean – and the rituals associated with slaughter and 
sacrifice, animals arguably could become unthinkingly and generally killed and eaten 
without notions of law, ethics, fellowship or hospitality coming into play. As a result, 
shifting analogically towards Gentiles or humans, the “other” in general thus becomes 
vulnerable to a carnivorous logic. Such a foundational violence at the heart of this 
universalism would spell out a power-play couched in the terminology of accepted 
consumption and killability of animals, but extended beyond animals to others. Rather than 
a universal openness to all, such a dynamic would be characterized by a limitless 
carnivorous logic.  
The second possible conclusion derived from the logic of Peter’s vision and its 
consequences is contradictory to the first. Namely, that if the Gentiles are thus conceived 
of as equals under an impartial God and Lord of all, it would seem the animals too – now 
no longer perceived as unclean – are clean in the sense given to the Gentiles, as fellows. 
Pervo draws attention to the evocation of Gen. 1:24-25, 6:20 and 7:14 in the animal 
categories of Peter’s vision, as a form of Gentile Christian apologetic that is arguing 
against Mosaic regulations by appealing to “the original intent of the creator, in this 
instance, the goodness of creation”.141 In other words, the vision – with its different kinds 
of animals that mirror the groups of animals in Genesis – is revealing the goodness of all 
creation, without separation between animals as clean or unclean. Difference is preserved 
without qualitative distinctions in terms of goodness. If the link between Gentiles as clean 
and thus fellows is so clear, then why is the relation to animals as those who first became 
clean equally clear, as the very ground upon which an understanding of clean Gentiles is 
founded? The transformation of the category of “Gentile” to be considered clean and thus 
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included in Peter’s mission and fellowship is founded in the transformation of animals 
from partially clean to all completely clean, and thus, they too presumably are to be 
considered fellows, included in this hospitality. In fact, the animals would form the very 
foundation for fellowship and hospitality. Rather than an indiscriminate killability then, the 
vision leads to an unconditional hospitality. In this sense, Acts 10 could indeed be read as a 
universalizing move, but not in the exclusively human terms usually assumed, or merely in 
regard to the Jewish-Gentile, Jewish-Christian-Roman, but in a larger embrace of animals 
too as fellows. The premise for Gentile fellowship would be precisely animal fellowship, 
thus inscribing the animal other as the first-comer, and the logical next step extending to 
Gentiles, and as such every other.  The vision stating that nothing God has made clean 
should be considered unclean would refer not only to humans or particular group identities 
in the context of this text. Rather, it could be read as deeming nothing “profane” or 
“common” and thus not demoting or discriminating against anyone on the grounds of 
profanity or impurity. As the animals are at the heart of this conclusion with regard to 
Gentiles, it would seem strange to exclude them from consideration. Douglas suggests that 
to “some extent men covenanted with their land and cattle in the same way as God 
covenanted with them”.142 Clean animals, such as cattle, were “literally domesticated as 
slaves. They had to be brought into the social order to enjoy the blessing”.143 Here the 
ambiguity of this position is at its most poignant: being “clean” involved being brought 
into a social order as fellow creatures, but the cattle of course, are also deemed “slaves”.  
If scholarship has followed in Peter’s interpretive footsteps and accepted the 
equality of Jews and Gentiles, of humans, rather than attend to the implications of the 
vision in both a closer and larger sense, it is perhaps because of the automatism that marks 
animals off from the ethical circuit as edible and killable by tacit common sense 
agreement. The command to kill and eat is thus left unquestioned because we all know who 
is eaten and who is not: Gentiles would not be suitable subjects for consumption, whereas 
animals are. Gentiles might be suitable subjects for hospitality; animals are “naturally” not. 
Animals are not seen as a central concern for a biblical text even if they constitute the 
central tenet of a visionary experience in such a text. What the analogy of Acts 10 
foregrounds, however, in the most basic sense, is the way in which various groups of 
people might categorise one another as too other for fellowship, and the ease of limiting 
fellowship and “fraternity” – itself of course a limited and limiting name. If Peter’s vision 
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undoes such distinctions and exemplifies this with the hospitality given by Cornelius “the 
unclean Gentile” and accepted by Peter “the clean Jew”, then it also opens up for the 
possibility of other distinctions being undone and reconstructed with a greater regard for 
the life of all. 
Like the hospitality now open to Gentiles, then, animals too would be possible 
subjects of hospitality, open to a fellowship and recognition in difference but not 
domination or demotion. Of course, this sounds somewhat absurd, as if I (or the text) were 
proposing a C.S. Lewis Narnia scene of human and animal fellowship, or inviting to a 
Lewis Carroll Mad Hatter Tea party overlooked by the Cheshire Cat.
144
 It is not that I am 
attempting to conflate humans with animals or animals with humans and am thus 
proposing an invitation of animals to our dinner-tables or humans to the drinking-trough. It 
is not about erasing or conflating difference and complexity. But it is about rethinking the 
boundaries of hospitality when it comes to power and the very real performance of power 
regarding who or what sits on the table awaiting to be eaten – as life that is categorised as 
fundamentally edible – and who are privileged to partake and participate around the table 
in this spectacle of power, man over beast, humans over non-humans, or, as this text shows 
between different groups of people. Further, then, the automatic assumption that violence 
and murder is only prohibited between humans by law, might be opened to a law that – on 
principle – forbids deliberate and unthinking violence and killing of animals. In this sense, 
the change in status of animals as now all clean would not be a death sentence to “the 
animal” but rather the contrary, an elevation of animals to hospitality in a dream for 
universal and unconditional fellowship. 
 
Animal Categories and the “Judeo-Christian” 
Derrida’s critique of the “Thou shalt not kill” as an ethical principle that contains the 
corrosive effects of exclusion and exception shows how the acceptance of the killability of 
some life forms opens up for the calculability of the “other” who can be included or 
excluded, met with violence or welcomed according to ethnic, national, cultural, political, 
economic, or religious strategies. Implicit conceptions of universalism as “Christian” and 
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exclusivity and intolerance as “Jewish” sometimes lurk in scholarship on this text.145 Such 
an assessment would fit with Derrida’s reading of the “Thou shalt not kill” as an ethical 
law that has posed as universal but rests on an exclusion of the animal other.  
If there is in some scholarship on Acts 10 a tendency to map an emergent 
Christianity onto concepts of universalism and openness to the (Gentile) other, then the 
failure to perceive this second possible reasoning of the passage of animals also as fellows, 
becomes a way to forge a universalism embedded in an embryonic humanism. In other 
words, the universal conceived of as Peter’s Lord of all and impartial God, would only be 
partial in fact to human life, and a Lord not to “all” but to all humans. Or, indeed, as a 
humanist universalism.
146
 This universalism is thus undercut by the tacit exclusion of the 
animal lives that are at the source of the so-called universalism. If the interpretation of Acts 
10 as a universalist-humanist move has been used as an attempt to dismember a perceived  
“Jewish” past (signifying exclusive particularity and primitivism) and forge a ruptured or 
reformed Judaism in Christianity, such a humanist universalism is still wholly in line with 
the “Thou shalt not kill” understood as “Thou shalt not murder (humans)”. A generous 
interpretation of such views – seeing in it more than anti-Jewish, pro-Christian propaganda 
– might conclude that Acts 10 represents a dream for universal hospitality, fellowship and 
liberation from entrenched separations between groups of people, but that – perhaps 
inevitably – remains limited in scope – inevitably, because any dream for such an infinite, 
open hospitality is perhaps the impossible. A less generous interpretation would propose 
that at the very foundations of the emergent Christianity in Acts, there is an 
unacknowledged violence in the exclusive humanism allied to the command to kill and eat 
that has been forgotten and repressed. Muers argues that negative views of “‘the animal’, 
‘the literal’ and ‘the Jew’ have often gone together in Christian history, with results 
ranging from the faintly problematic to the disastrous”.147 “For multiple reasons, therefore, 
including the rethinking of relationships between and within human communities, it may 
be time to look again at the animals in the margins.”148  
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Much discussion in scholarship on Acts is given to questions over the explicit or 
embedded “Jewishness” or emergent “Christianness” of the text. This is also important for 
Acts 10 in particular, for judging the import of Peter’s meeting with Cornelius. I suggest 
that the apparent “sectarianism” of the text, and, at the same time, difficulties in 
delineating who belongs to what group or group identity, could be read as exemplified in 
the various groups of animals mentioned in Peter’s vision and their emphatic similitude as 
all similarly clean. If this is recognised, then the differences between various groups or 
group identities as well as a “universalism” after all the animals are made similarly clean, 
can be seen as staged on this blue-print of animal difference and sameness (as clean). The 
“Judeo-Christian” is thus both a designation for a complex and ambiguous inter-mingling, 
and a performance of “same” and “other”, played out over the animals in Peter’s vision.  
In Bovon’s assessment of Luke-Acts he proposes that it is a text that is “both the 
most open to universalism and the most favourable to Israel”, 149 identifying the Jewish 
roots and a desired universal expansion in equal measure.
150
 David Pao sees Acts as 
continuous with a Jewish past and tradition in what he calls the “model of the Isaianic New 
Exodus in which the salvation of the Gentiles becomes part of the program of the 
reconstitution of Israel”,151 thus paving the way for a narrative attuned to its Jewish 
tradition. How much Jewish-Gentile separation was upheld in terms of social intercourse is 
debatable,
152
 and how this took place in practice is difficult to verify.
153
 Tyson, for 
instance, calls Acts profoundly anti-Jewish and pro-Jewish at the same time.
154
 In regard to 
Luke’s writings, Jervell asks whether it is “mere coincidence or solely pious ornamentation 
that the alleged universalistic gospel of Luke insists on a circumcised Messiah?”155Jervell 
is keen to point out that scholars have been too quick to promote Luke as an advocate of 
Christianity as a universal people of God.
156
 In other words, it is too early a text to speak of 
coherent, systematic theologies of “Christianity” and too simplistic to cut across people 
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along stark lines of religious affiliation and separation. Jervell proposes further that it is 
significant that the notion of the law in Luke-Acts appears to be tied to ritual aspects rather 
than moral, and so is about “the mark of distinction between Jews and non-Jews”.157 
Hence, the text plays out the construction of difference in visible signs or the negation of 
expected signs.
158
 Although it is misleading to read Acts in terms of a rupture between 
Judaism and Christianity, Tyson draws attention to the fact that if – as is commonly 
thought – Luke wrote after the Roman destruction of the Jewish Temple in 70 CE, and 
after the surrender of the Jews to the Romans at the end of the first rebellion, i.e. 73-74 CE, 
this would be a crucial time for these communities to reflect and rethink their own 
identities.
159
 Dunn notes the “sibling rivalry” or “sectarian” tension conveyed in Acts 10, 
and proposes that this tension was “integral, in fact, to Christianity’s emerging identity”.160 
Acts 10 stages both such connections and such tensions.  
What seems to be overlooked is that this is played out in the classifications of 
different kinds of animals in Peter’s vision. The categories of animal presented in 10:12 
are:  four-footed (tetra,pouj), reptile (e`rpeto,n) and bird (peteino,j) (10:12). In other words, 
unlike Derrida’s animal in the general singular, the divisions here are three-fold, 
suggesting further ‘all kinds’ in pa,nta preceding four-footed animals (10:12). Human 
groups and terms for different groups of people mirror this, featuring prominently, and 
suggesting the way in which the “animal” is not singular, but neither is the “human”: e;qnoj 
(10:45, Gentiles), lao,j (10:2, 10:41, 42, people), avnh,r ( 10:5, 10:17, 10:19, 10:21, man), 
suggenh,j (10:24, relatives), fi,loj (10:24, beloved or friend), a;nqrwpoj (10:26, man or human), 
VIoudai/oj (10: 28, Jew), avllo,fuloj (10:28, foreigner), peritomh/j pistoi. (10:45, the circumcised 
believers), ui`oi/j VIsrah.l (10:36: sons of Israel), ma,rtuj (10:40, 10:41, witness). Such signifiers 
might well be evidence of what Nasrallah, following Buell, deems the prominent use of 
commonly available discourses about civic identity and ethnicity as well as notions of 
correct religious practice in Acts, to pose questions of affiliation, belonging and group 
loyalties within the Roman Empire, both for purposes of distinction and unification.
161
 But 
the implication is that while such differences might remain in discourses about identity and 
community, when all animals are made similarly clean and so enter into a shared state of 
life, so these human groups and classifications too are similarly brought together as 
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“clean”, for better or worse, as fellows or enemies. In this sense, the human fellowship 
discovered and emphasised in Acts 10 mirrors the shared state of life given to all animals, 
despite their differences. This explains, then, the way in which Acts 10 is on the one hand 
riveted by discussions of “Jewishness” and “Christian” identity as if they were clear-cut 
and differentiated, but at the same time is marked by the professed impossibility of 
delineating such stark identities and dividing people into distinct categories.  
 
A Messianism for the Living and the Dead 
There is another aspect of Acts 10 that becomes relevant regarding categorisations of 
humans and animals. This aspect comes to the fore in Peter’s speech to the Gentiles in 
Cornelius’s house. Although important – Rowe, for instance, calls it the climax of Acts 
10
162
 – it is not usually mentioned in regard to the universalism of this chapter or its 
characterisations of different groups. Following on from Peter’s speech about the impartial 
God and Jesus as Lord of all, Peter speaks of Jesus as the one ‘ordained by God as judge of 
the living and the dead’ (10:42). Directly before the Gentiles receive the ‘gift of the Holy 
Spirit’ (10:45), Jesus Christ as ‘Lord of all’ is also the one who will come to judge: not 
some groups, not even some groups of humans, but ‘the living and the dead’ (zw,ntwn kai. 
nekrw/n). Although nothing further is made of this here, arguably any latent humanism is 
undone in this category that orients itself around finite life and mortality. Pao calls this a 
“soteriological equality of the Jews and the Gentiles”.163 He argues that the ancient 
Israelite tradition with its national story and special relationship with God is in fact a 
foundation narrative for Acts and the identity of the early Christians,
164
 leading to a 
“redefinition of the people of God”.165 At the same time, like the others who have 
commented on the potential radical nature of the equality and fraternity in Luke-Acts, Pao 
does not specifically discuss the soteriological equality as an embrace of all the living and 
all those who die – in other words, presumably, humans and animals alike. Rather he 
specifically identifies an equality between Jews, Gentiles, Christians as “all” and “living”.  
However, amongst the complexities over who should be considered clean or 
unclean, Jew or Gentile, Acts 10 contains this point of opening to all who live and all who 
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die as the condition for the “all” of Peter’s Lord of all. Such a reference to the living and 
the dead would confirm the interpretation of unconditional hospitality that posits animals 
too as fellows, moving beyond a human universalism to an equality of all life in the hands 
of the one who will come to judge. It would correlate with Derrida’s remark that “the logos 
of Christianity defines itself as the life of the living”,166beyond such classifications of 
“human” and “animal”. Such an understanding of this passage would be potentially open to 
“an unconditional hospitality that exposes itself without limit to the coming of the other, 
beyond rights and laws”167 and also perhaps beyond “the profound strategy of all 
nationalisms, patriotisms, ethnocentrisms” that work to limit fraternity. 168 Perhaps what 
the indiscriminate killability in Acts 10 shows, then, is Giorgio Agamben’s point about 
“life” in that it appears to be what is open, “what cannot be defined, yet, precisely for this 
reason, must be ceaselessly articulated and divided”.169 In terms of the “ethics and politics 
of the living”, Derrida writes, we know “less than ever where to cut – either at birth or at 
death”.170 “And this also means that we never know, and never have known, how to cut up 
a subject. Today less than ever.”171  
In The Beast and Sovereign vol. II, Derrida obsessively returns to the questions of 
life and death, especially in regard to Heidegger and his contention that the animal does not 
die as such (as I explained above). To distinguish between man and animal “we must 
clarify the essence of the animality of the animal” “and the essence of the humanity of 
man” he writes.172 “Now we can determine the animality of the animal only if we have 
already shed light on life, the essence of the life of the living, what makes life life 
(Lebendigkeit des Lebenden, the livingness of the living), as opposed to the inanimate, the 
lifeless (Leblosen), of what cannot die.”173 It seems clear to Derrida that it “belongs to the 
essence of life, and thus to animality, that the animal lives, that it is alive, because it can 
die”.174 For Heidegger, he shows, the animal does not only have no relation to death as 
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such, but to the structure of the “as such” in general.175 Rather than pursue this line of 
thought, however, what Derrida does is to shift the parameters of the question of life and 
death, beyond that of the solipsistic subject contemplating its own mortality or relation to 
death. Derrida, as before, turns the question to what comes after, and death as a relation to 
the other “after you”, which is inscribed in a non-power and vulnerability. He reflects on 
death as a being-dead in the hands of the other.  Derrida writes “that being dead, before 
meaning something quite different, means, for me, to be delivered over, in what remains of 
me, as in all my remains, to be exposed or delivered over with no possible defence, once 
totally disarmed, to the other, to the others”.176 But having to presuppose that the others are 
those who might die after me, who might survive me, have at their disposal my remains. 
Derrida thus shifts the terms to the inherent powerlessness of the life of the living in their 
death, not their own death as such, whatever that might mean, but death as the limitation of 
the “I”, autonomy and responsibility, in the hands of the other who could be any other and 
do anything with my remains.  
The other appears to me as the other as such, qua he, she, or they who might 
survive me, survive my decease and then proceed as they wish, sovereignly, and 
sovereignly have at their disposal the future of my remains, if there are any. That’s 
what is meant, has always been meant, by ‘other’.177  
The category of “living and the dead” in Acts 10 could also be read in this light as a giving 
over of power to the judge to come, thus deferring judgement of distinctions, and rather 
yielding to a “to come” in which every life and death is given over to the other. In 
Derrida’s reflections on the death of the self in the hands of the other, he proposes that the 
sovereignty of this other can also assert itself before I am dead. I can always die a living 
death at the hands of the potentially violent and violating other, they might put me to a 
living death.
178
 “If there is an other to whom I am delivered over when I die a living death, 
it is par excellence, if I may say so, the one I call my fellow, the other mortal, the cannibal: 
not just the living carnivore (the beast), but the anthropophagic man, the cannibal.”179 The 
other – as animal or human – is thus not automatically a responsive or welcoming other, 
but is always already potentially the powerful carnivore. This might well describe the 
power-play that lurks in Acts 10, the putting to death of another’s life, the skulking 
cannibalism and carnivorous logic towards the other, the clean Gentiles and clean animals. 
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Whether we are speaking about carnivorous consumption or a zeal for mission, the taking 
of another’s life to name it otherwise, from one form of life to “death” or to “new life”, 
there is a violent appropriation potentially at play.  
 But the issue raised in Acts 10 over Jewish/Christian and Gentile social intercourse 
is not finally resolved in or by chapter 10. Chapter 15 revisits this theme and brings it to a 
head. Here, the legitimacy of the mission to the Gentiles is more systematically questioned 
and confronted. As Pervo comments, this might seem surprising to the readers of Acts, as 
the issue seems wholly resolved with Cornelius’ conversion in Acts 10.180 But chapter 15 
is “central in that it brings together the various threads of the plot”: Peter with his mission, 
Paul and Barnabas with theirs, and those concerned with observance.
181
 It is the question of 
circumcision that sparks the debate afresh, prompting Paul and Barnabas amongst others to 
go to Jerusalem to resolve the issue once and for all (15:2). Speaking to members of the 
church, apostles and elders, some Pharisees amongst them exhort that believers must be 
circumcised and follow the Mosaic Law (15:5). In response to this and the discussion that 
follows, Peter gives a speech (15:7-11), where he again emphasises the lack of distinction 
between ‘them and us’ (15:9). Paul and Barnabas then tell the council about the work they 
have done with and through the Gentiles (15:12). Finally, James steps in and offers a 
speech (15:13-21), where he concludes they should not ‘trouble those Gentiles who are 
turning to God’ (15:19) but, as a compromise, they should ask that they will ‘abstain only 
from things polluted by idols and from fornication and from whatever has been strangled 
and from blood’ (15:20). The ‘apostles and the elders with the consent of the whole 
church’ (15:22) decide ‘unanimously’ (15:25) to adhere to James’ suggestion and issue a 
letter with this request to ‘the believers of Gentile origin in Antioch and Syria and Cicilia’ 
(15:23), repeating James’ words, to ‘abstain from what has been sacrificed to idols and 
from blood and from what is strangled and from fornication’ (15:29). The chapter ends in a 
triumphant tone (despite a rift between Paul and Barnabas), with exaltation (15:31), peace 
(15:33), the proclaiming of the ‘word of the Lord’ (15:35) and the ‘strengthening of the 
churches’ (15:41). 
 Clearly, this chapter with its so-called Apostolic Council serves the purpose of 
systematizing and confirming through explicit discussion and agreement what chapter 10 
has already laid out through its narrative of vision, divine command, interpretation and 
                                                          
180
 Pervo, Acts, 368. 
181
 Ibid. 
Chapter 3: Derrida’s Thou Shalt Not Kill 
 
 
159 
 
encounter. Pervo confirms that this chapter does not break new ground but provides a 
further theological justification for Jewish-Gentile intercourse in James’ reference to 
scripture (15:15-18), where he cites Amos on the possibility of all people to seek the Lord, 
even all the Gentiles (15:17).
182
 It is striking that although this chapter refers back to 
Peter’s vision, the allusions to Mosaic Law do not include any reference to animals. 
Rather, the issue focused on is circumcision, which is abandoned as a demand for Gentiles. 
What remains, then, is the prohibition against ‘pollution’ (avli,sghma), ‘fornication’ 
(pornei,a), what is ‘strangled’ (pnikto,j) and from ‘blood’ (ai-ma) (15:20), but Peter’s 
animals are not mentioned, nor are the terms for profane (koino,j) or unclean (avka,qartoj) 
used. It is as if the terms of debate have here already shifted from what could be seen as 
Peter’s view of Gentiles essentially as or like unclean animals to a request for Gentiles to 
abstain from associating with particular practices, thus ensuring some continuity with 
Mosaic Law. In other words, chapter 10 has provided a foundation for chapter 15 in laying 
out the connections between unclean animals and Gentiles and breaking this connection by 
dismissing the category of “unclean” from God’s creatures. Now, in chapter 15, the debate 
can be performed with a softer and more malleable perspective on the distinction 
separating Jews from non-Jews. The terms of profane and unclean are not brought up as 
measures for sharp distinctions; rather the issue of blood, strangulation and fornication is a 
compromise and question of association. This could be seen as a move from a formal and 
clear categorical distinction between clean/unclean to a rather more informal difference in 
degree between Jew and Gentile.  
As Acts 15 shows, however, the category of “unclean” does not wholly disappear 
but continues to haunt this nascent Christian discourse. Acts 10 does not in fact 
successfully banish the idea of the “unclean”. But, instead of being associated with 
Gentiles in general, the haunting form of “unclean” becomes a mark now of what is not-
Christian. Gentiles might now be Christians: they are not de facto unclean. However, 
whoever does not follow the “Lord of all” and its advocates, or ignore the authority of the 
Apostolic Council, risk falling onto the side of the “unclean”, a persona non grata outside-
position. A discourse of pollution and association with what is unclean thus continues to 
linger as a different “them and us” discourse emerges in the multiplying Christian groups 
in Palestine. In this sense the Lord of “all” could potentially become a violent constraint to 
missionize and homogenise people into this “all” that is always already marked by 
particular power dynamics as to “same” and “other”. The brother or fellow then risks 
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becoming a Christian brother, and the other whom is outside is neither determinedly 
human nor animal but simply the non-Christian. This would be a penning in of difference 
in order to affirm the “all” in Christian terms. Such a perspective would erase otherness in 
the name of a universalism that is always prone to particular ideologies or theologies, and 
to the power of this ideology-theology over that ideology-theology. Even after the neat 
discussions and agreements of the Apostolic Council of chapter 15, then, irresolvable 
tensions persist as to who is a fellow and who is not as an “unclean” other. 
 At the same time, the desire to avoid blood could be read in conjunction with Jesus 
as the judge of the living and the dead, in a testament to the shared mortality of humans 
and animals as creatures of flesh and blood. The reminder to avoid blood, then, would be a 
reminder of the mortality of all and the Lord who is precisely Lord of all life, all-the-
living, all-the-dying. As I argued in the chapter on Genesis 9, the reference to “life blood” 
and the life-blood of the other/brother is confused and confusing. Who is this other? Who 
is my brother? Do I abstain from consuming the blood of every other or only who I deem 
or recognise as my brother? If animals are all clean, as Peter’s vision affirms, but blood 
must be avoided, as Acts 15 confirms, perhaps the conclusion is indeed that animals – like 
Gentiles – are fellows that are to be lived with rather than lived off. 
 
Mortability 
Rather than being merely an evil to be avoided, the tension between otherness and risk of 
violence is arguably inherent in the very structure of the relationship between self and 
other for Derrida. An ethics that is awakened, is awakened precisely to the dangers and 
risks of otherness, to the impossibility of a guaranteed safe encounter with the other, 
because this other cannot be programmed in advance, nor can a violent response to an 
“after you” be foreclosed absolutely and thus immunized against. To immunize against 
such potential violence is to refuse encountering the other as other, in the same vein as a 
system of ethics that precludes animals would be a programmed relationality to the other as 
a prescribed, particular and pre-ordained “other”. Ways in which Lordship and power are 
understood are also pertinent in Acts 10. Rowe argues that the Lordship Luke proposes for 
Jesus as the universal Lord of all in Acts 10 is not as one wielding “overwhelming and 
intrusive power, or, as Seneca put it for the young Nero, arbitrating ‘life and death for the 
nations’”, rather, Lordship is construed as humility or service.183 In this sense, the deferral 
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of Jesus’s judgement as the one who will come again, is not an awaiting of a powerful 
force to violently or forcefully re-insert distinctions and assessments, but also participates 
in the encounter with the other that abides in vulnerability and an “after you”: the judge too 
will come after.  
Here we return to the God Derrida describes with regard to God’s human subjects, 
the brothers Cain and Abel. God is a figure who waits to see how the two brothers will act, 
and whose judgement appears suspended, giving over responsibility to the two brothers to 
decide how to respond to animals, to one another and to God. The “Thou shalt not kill” – 
for Derrida’s condition for ethics as a principle protecting all life – then, would be an 
opening to killability as the mortality of all the living, the vulnerability and non-power of 
the capacity to die. In addition to symbolizing the vulnerability in regard to the other as 
precisely an other (who may kill), killability would become not the legitimization of one’s 
death at the hands of the other but rather mortability: the ability or capacity to die. It would 
mark the beginning of the possibility of hospitality, of a decision to not kill and eat the 
other that would instantiate a possible fellowship in a shared mortality and vulnerability. 
Such an ethics would do justice to the “unsubstitutional singularity” and incalculability that 
is the mark of every other.
184
  
The aporia of the two conclusions from the vision in Acts 10 must perhaps remain 
an aporia. But, there is a way of thinking this contradiction together, in Derrida’s 
awakening to the conditions for ethics in the response to the animal other. What Derrida’s 
discussion of the “Thou shalt not kill” arguably leads to is precisely these two strands of 
thought. He proposes a radicalised position in regard to the other and ethics that resists 
programming the other in advance as human, or otherwise, before deciding what is owed to 
this other. This takes the form of an unconditional hospitality. In this sense, he opens up to 
the animal as a fellow or neighbour; animals ought, as such, be included in an ethical 
circuit that always already prescribes more responsibility. The ethical response to every 
other, then, is always excessive and thus always culpable, at fault. Naturally, not all life 
can be protected at every time. Of course there are numerous lives we sacrifice by not 
saving them from being trod underfoot, from the streets, the animal depots, starvation and 
extinction. But Derrida refuses an easy answer that would redeem such sacrifice of life as 
acceptable, as killable. Many such deaths are perhaps inevitable but they cannot for that 
reason be enshrined in ethics or law as acceptable or legitimized by allowing in advance a 
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vast number of living creatures be subsumed in a category as “killable” or dispensable, or 
simply not worthy of our ethical consideration and compassion. His condition for ethics as 
a regard for all life is perhaps the impossible, but as such it opens up for the only possible 
attitude that could be regarded as ethics at all: a radical regard for the life of the other 
whom I come after, and the vulnerability of their life in a finitude that is shared. This takes 
the form of a vision of an infinite and unconditional hospitality in the recognition of every 
other as a fellow, a neighbour to whom I respond. Such a foundation for ethics might be 
considered idealistic, but Derrida’s notion of the other is not uncritically naïve. This is 
where the first interpretation of the vision in Acts 10 comes in, as indiscriminate killability. 
The killability of all that this interpretation prescribes is perhaps nothing but the 
recognition of the mortality and vulnerability of all life and the potential violence and risk 
of every other. The sovereignty of the other might always present itself as a carnivorous 
consumption of my life, a taking of life or putting to death. Such a risk is inherent to any 
encounter, and perhaps even more so in the scenes of hospitality foregrounded in a 
fellowship that welcomes in principle every other and allows this other to go before me 
and take a place besides me at my table.  
 
Conclusion: Hospitality Now  
I have discussed the ways in which Derrida uses the biblical commandment “Thou shalt 
not kill” as a spring-board to challenge the accepted killability of animals. He uses the 
notion of a stark divisibility between humans and animals to think further about the life of 
(all) the living, the fellow and the other, the pathos of compassion and mortality, the 
finitude of life. The purportedly universal law against killing is founded on an exclusion 
that undercuts the very possibility of upholding such a law without the possibility of 
further and potentially limitless exceptions and exclusions. The animal other is conceived 
of as killable in principle, and as such, other “others” become construable as “animal”. 
Interpreting Acts 10 has demonstrated the tension over animal killability in regard 
to classifications of what it means to be Jewish, Christian and Gentile as well as in regard 
to notions of fellowship in the biblical archive. The narrative showcases this tension in 
relation to the law not to kill and its concomitant clauses of clean/unclean. While 
scholarship on Acts 10 has frequently emphasized the differentiations between Jews, 
Jewish Christians and Gentiles, exegetes have at the same time endowed this passage with 
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a strong sense of universalism and a move towards universal fellowship. By interrogating 
these claims to universalism, I have been able to show that both the scholarship and the 
narrative seemingly lean towards a human universalism, undercut by the forgetfulness of, 
or disregard for, the animals on which inclusive fellowship and equality is founded.   
Examining more closely the animal vision in Acts 10 and its analogy between 
clean/unclean animals and Jews/Gentiles, I have shown that it yields two possible 
interpretations in seemingly stark contrast to one another. The first interpretation 
emphasises the command in Peter’s vision to kill and eat in the new cleanness of all 
animals and by extension Gentiles. The shift from laws of clean/unclean, then, and the 
opening up to Gentiles, is a move that carries with it a violence and acceptance of the 
killability of all animals, human and non-human. In the analogical resemblance set up 
between animals and Gentiles, Gentiles too are similarly killable, as what Gentiles stand 
for in this text is precisely the “clean” “other”. The second interpretation posits the 
cleanness of all animals as a redemption of animal life for fellowship, in the same way that 
Peter accepts and establishes the fellowship and hospitality of the Gentile Cornelius. The 
other thus becomes a neighbour or fellow, building analogically from animals having 
gained a new status as no longer profane. Animals, then, are the fellows of otherness upon 
which fellowship is founded.  
 The separations of different human groups set up in Acts 10 shows precisely the 
way in which an ethical outlook that is programmed in advance and in principle to exclude 
some as too other, becomes potentially corrosive more generally. In this context, this 
corrosion is exemplified in either describing Jews as exclusive and non-universal, or, in 
“consuming” Gentiles as clean animals. As I have shown, Acts 10 could be read as a point 
in the biblical archive in which the conception of the animal in general singular emerges 
and universalism becomes human and sometimes also Christian.  At the same time, Acts 
10 arguably presents a dream for an impartiality and unconditional hospitality that 
recognises all fellow mortals as precisely fellows in a shared life whose finitude resides in 
the prospect of a judgement to come of all those who have lived and died.   
The aporia presented here in the two interpretations must remain unresolved. The 
narrative of Acts 10 resists both a simplistic opening to animals as fellows in the move to 
redeem them from profanity, and a reductive purely violent proclivity toward the cleanness 
of animals, Gentiles and the other as killable and edible. In the category asserted towards 
the end of chapter 10 of the living and the dead, however, the boundaries between both 
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humans and animals appear to be widened and fixed at mortality and the finitude that 
marks life, humans and animals alike. Such a mark of mortality, or mortability, would 
perhaps be something like Derrida’s capacity to die, a power as a non-power, in the hands 
(or mouths) of the other, who, in Acts 10 is configured as the messianic Jesus who will 
return as a figure of judgement over the living and dead. In this deferral of judgement lies 
perhaps the hope of a hospitality now for the living – human and non-human – as well as 
for those deemed killable.  
  
 
 
Chapter 4 
Derrida’s Wolf and Lamb:  
Revelation 17 on Sovereign Beasts and Sexual-Animal Others 
 
In The Beast and Sovereign vol. I, Derrida explores “sovereignty” as a conceptualisation of 
the human, or “man”, in relation to the subjection of animals. While the so-called 
sovereign powers defining humans are precisely for humans rather than animals, there is a 
sense in which this discourse is oriented around the human as man. Discussing this through 
the specifically French genders to the word le soverain and la bête, Derrida asserts that the 
question of sexual difference is an important aspect of human/animal distinctions. Derrida 
outlines the way in which man as a “political animal” and a “rational animal” has been 
perceived as superior to animals. But he also points out the opposite notion, namely 
political man as animal, or perhaps rather, as a beast.
1
 On the one hand, man as a political 
animal is “superior, in his very sovereignty, to the beast that he masters, enslaves, 
dominates, domesticates, or kills, so that his sovereignty consists in raising himself above 
the animal and appropriating it, having its life at his disposal”.2 On the other, conceptions 
of the human political realm are frequently characterised precisely as animal or beast-like.
3
 
Derrida is interested in outlining the contradictory ways in which animals are excluded 
from properties thought exclusive to humans, such as the political, but at the same time 
how animals feature as prominent representations of the political.  
While Derrida alludes to women as a category that has been treated in somewhat 
similar ways to the animal, on the side of the beast up and against the human as man, he 
never develops this argument, at least not in reference to female figures of sovereignty or 
animality.
4
 He refers to the animal as a “living thing to be subjected, dominated, 
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domesticated, mastered, like, by a not insignificant analogy, the woman, the slave, or the 
child”.5 In regard to Hobbes’s De Cive, he states that the sovereign appears “most often in 
the masculine figure of the king, the master, the chief, the paterfamilias, or the husband”.6 
Derrida refers repeatedly to the significance of sexual difference for the discussion of 
animality, sovereignty and what is proper to “man”.7 Sexual difference is relevant to the 
question Derrida raises between the responsivity of humans as opposed to the automaticity 
of animals around the figure of the marionette. Marionettes, he writes, are generally 
associated with the figure or figurine of a girl, a virgin, “since the name marionette comes 
first from a miniature representation of the Virgin Mary”.8 With the example of the 
marionette Derrida is implying that the woman and the animal have been conceptualized as 
marionette-figures (automatically driven and reacting by instinct) while “Man” represents 
the sovereign: responsive, responsible, rational. Further, in the grouping of women, slaves 
and children with animals, they stand on the side of the weak. When Derrida further 
discusses sexual difference in regard to the marionette he emphasizes the phallus, as an 
example of body parts as automatic reflexes, and so to some extent he remains with the 
question of “man” rather than turning to female figures of sovereignty or non-sovereignty. 
This is not wholly an avoidance manoeuvre, but a way to show how the “male” and male 
potency can be construed in similar marionette-like ways. Nonetheless, it does draw the 
discussion back to the human as man, rather than tackle the issue of women and power. It 
is crucial to address the question of women in this context, and tease out some of the ways 
in which representations of sovereignty and animality play out over female figures. The 
Whore of Babylon in Revelation 17 provides such a figure, both demonstrating woman as 
a strong sovereignty and a weak victim, a sexualized whore and a devoured animal carcass. 
I am thus able to build on Derrida’s allusions to sexual difference in regard to 
representations of sovereignty, animality and the political. If humanity has tacitly provided 
a privileged place for man to dwell, it is crucial not only to critically respond to consequent 
animal representations but also those of women, in order to reorder the power dynamics in 
the concept of the “human”. 
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In this chapter, I will focus my reading of Derrida to the figures of the wolf and 
lamb in his discourse, to delineate the way in which Derrida presents essentially two types 
of animal figures. The first is the “human-beast” as a figure of sovereignty, a hyperbolic 
way of presenting the worst aspects of human power, domination and mastery over its so-
called animal-subjects. The second is the “animal other”, which is the figure of animality 
as the subjected living being, condemned to edibility, killability, seen as lacking what is 
thought proper to “man”. These two figures are characterised by Derrida’s reading of Jean 
de La Fontaine’s fable-poem of the wolf and the lamb.9 But in this discourse Derrida 
mentions another lamb, namely the Christ-lamb. This Christ-lamb is for Derrida allied to 
life and the logos, two properties that become powerfully linked to the human: having life 
as autonomous sovereignty and having logos, conceived of as word, concept, language, 
reason. Derrida connects the life and logos of man to the figure of Christ-as-man-as-lamb. 
Gilhus shows how Stoic arguments concerning animals gained popularity in the first 
centuries CE. According to the Stoics, she writes, logos is what distinguishes humans from 
animals, animals are aloga, without reason.
10
 So what happens to the animality of this 
Christ? What becomes of the “lamb-ness”? Could this Christ-figure not also be an animal 
other, like La Fontaine’s lamb, or is he, as Derrida implies, merely a weak but nonetheless 
potent sovereign power? First I will outline Derrida’s reading of La Fontaine’s wolf and 
lamb and its significance, before discussing the references in The Beast and Sovereign vol. 
I to the Christ-lamb. Secondly, I will examine the representations of sovereignty and 
animality in Revelation chapter 17 over the representations of woman and animal.  
 
Derrida’s Wolf and Lamb  
Derrida’s conception of the sovereignty of man is complex and multi-faceted and would 
warrant an extensive discussion to do it justice.
11
 But for the purposes of this chapter, I 
summarize how Derrida’s human sovereignty becomes linked to the concept of the beast in 
analysing his reading of La Fontaine’s fable-poem of the wolf and the lamb.12 It is from 
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this reference to the lamb as the non-sovereign creature that we arrive at the Christ-lamb in 
Derrida’s discourse, which is what I will discuss further in this chapter. In fact, Derrida’s 
reading of La Fontaine’s fable is itself caught up in a theological understanding of the 
lamb, Genesis and original sin. The lamb is described as original “culpability”: the 
“ursprüngliche Schuldigsein of the lamb”.13 To go back a few steps, La Fontaine’s fable 
stages the encounter between a wolf and a lamb at a stream, where the lamb is quenching 
its thirst. A hungry wolf appears and admonishes the lamb for drinking from his water. The 
lamb, addressing the wolf as “Sir” and “Your Majesty”, tentatively defends itself, says it 
cannot possibly threaten the wolf’s supply of water. The wolf disagrees and further adds 
that the lamb spoke ill of him last year, to which the lamb responds, how could it have, it 
was not yet born. The wolf replies: if not you, your brother then. The wolf then carries 
away the lamb and eats it. The lesson learnt from this fable, as La Fontaine’s epigraph 
states it, is that “the reason of the strongest is always best”.14 Derrida writes: 
The lamb is accused of having muddied the wolf’s water, his source or his resource, 
before even being born. And when the lamb argues back and says, ‘I wasn’t born 
yet,’ the wolf replies forthwith and without a moment’s hesitation the famous 
phrase that accumulates all the perversions of collective, transgenerational, familial 
or national, nationalistic and fraternalistic accusation: ‘If not you, your brother 
then’.15  
Derrida likens the sovereign carnivorous power of the wolf to the “human” as a sovereign 
“I” in the world. The lamb, on the other hand, becomes the victim in being already 
ordained to killability as are its brothers, that is, animals in general, as the subjects of 
sovereign, carnivorous power. The reference to the original sin of the lamb is Derrida’s 
way of showing that the word “animal” is like the curse of original sin, a taint that marks it 
out in advance as “guilty”. But the “reason of the strongest” in the wolf also points to how 
Derrida proposes that the exclusive understanding of “reason” as human, has become 
caught up in a logic of violence and force that excludes and condemns animals to suffering 
and subjection. 
Essentially, with this reading, Derrida outlines two figures of the animal. One is the 
animal as beast represented by the wolf. This is in fact, he shows, the idea of the human as 
beast or animal. It ties in with political man as animality. The beast is thus Derrida’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                
La Fontaine cannot encompass all the aspects of Derrida’s discussion, but this example does to a great extent 
provide insight into Derrida’s reflections on political animals, animality and sovereignty.   
13
 BS I, 209. 
14
 Ibid., 78. 
15
 Ibid., 209. 
Chapter 4: Derrida’s Wolf and Lamb 
 
 
169 
 
concept of the sovereign human or “Man”. The properties belonging to the beast as a 
human animal are properties thought to resemble animal properties but are in fact assumed 
to be properly human, such as bêtise or stupidity and cruelty.
16
 This would be exemplified 
in the figure of the wolf in La Fontaine’s poem-fable as the sovereign figure, the “Majesty” 
who acts out his sovereignty powerfully and violently.
17
 To be stupid and cruel, Derrida 
argues, are traits that are in fact exclusively linked to humans. This is because animals are 
thought to lack the capacities for rationality, reason and responsibility, and cannot be said 
to be properly “cruel” or “stupid”, whereas a human is thought naturally to possess 
capacities for intelligence and rationality. Deprived of them, humans would appear bête, or 
animal-like.
18
 Similarly, only humans are thought of as culpable, responsible, capable of 
contracts, conventions and keeping the law, in the modern political structures of the nation-
state, and so only humans can be condemned for cruelty and held responsible.
19
 For 
animals, this would merely be their nature, automatic reflexes and reactions, not properly 
responses to and in the world. Only humans, thus, are sovereignly autonomous. This, 
reasoning, Derrida argues is linked to particular translations of the logos as rationality, 
language, word, knowledge; it is what animals are deprived of.  
The second figure of the animal is exemplified in the lamb. This would be the 
animal as an animal other: destined by its very name, its exclusion from the human 
political and ethical realm and from everything thought proper to “man”, to being 
subjected, eaten, and killed. The wolf is linked to the idea of sovereign man because of its 
“I can” attitude in this fable. As mentioned already, Derrida uses this “I can” to express the 
idea in the French word pouvoir, meaning both power and “to can”, “to be able”.20 While 
sovereignty is characterised by an “I can” – free, autonomous, above the law – the animal 
is what is deprived of the “I can”. This is because it is thought not to be capable of 
language and the sense in which language relates to saying “I”, and thus also to accounting 
for itself as an “I”.21 Further, animals are also presupposed to be deprived of the capacities 
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or powers thought to be proper to humans more generally, such as “language, history, 
culture, technique, relation to death as such, and the transmission of acquired 
knowledge”.22 They do not, then, have the capacities or powers of the pouvoir and are thus 
non-sovereign to the sovereignty of the human.  
In this same volume, Derrida makes a reference to the “zoological” Jesus and the 
example of Jesus as a baby and a lamb.
23
 Despite the ostensible difference between 
Derrida’s characterisations of sovereignty as what is fearful and powerful as exemplified 
by Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan24 or Jean Bodin’s Majestas “as the superlative of 
magnitude or grandeur, the majority of the great, of the magnus”,25 Derrida nonetheless 
calls the Christ-lamb a figure of “divine presence or sovereignty”.26 What characterizes 
sovereignty is “excess, hyperbole, an excess insatiable for the passing of every 
determinable limit: higher than height, grander than grandeur”.27 But this, Derrida 
explains, is not necessarily a matter of size or magnitude but a matter of power, potency.
28
 
In the potency of the “I can” of sovereignty, absolute power can also be manifested in the 
figure of the small.
29
 With Christ as a baby or lamb “sovereignty passes through the 
small”, the smallest, the weak.30 What, precisely, is meant by such a seemingly 
contradictory comment is not further explicated. But, as I shall go on to show, such a 
paradoxical dynamic of weak and strong can be found in the Lamb of Revelation 17. The 
clue to Derrida’s association of Christ with sovereignty despite the latter’s “lambness” 
might be in his connection to the logos. Following this example of sovereignty as the small 
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and weak in Christ, Derrida discusses Christ as logos.
31
 The Christian logos, Derrida 
argues in his reading of Heidegger, is linked to at least two sources: logos as performative 
commandment, and logos as life.
 32
 He describes how in the Septuagint, the logos is the 
name given to the word of God as commandment, the ten commandments, hence the 
Decalogue.
33
 However, “Christ is the logos of redemption”, the logos of eternal life, the 
logos of zōē.34 Derrida understands Christ as a figure who unites in itself “both logos and 
zōē”.35 “Christ, qua man, not only has the logos; he is the logos. Incarnate.”36 This is 
significant for placing the Christian tradition in relation to Derrida’s discourse on animality 
and the legacy of distinctions between humans and animals. What Derrida argues, 
essentially, is that certain understandings of the logos and of life have set humans and 
animals apart, with humans who have the logos and a higher form of life while animals are 
deprived of logos, and thought to have “less” life. This would, in other words, yet again 
imply that the Christian legacy is complicit in a disregard for animal life, associating Christ 
with a life and logos that draws humans into its sphere but where animals become left out, 
living a lesser life without the logos.    
Derrida argues that in the very structures of philosophical thought, in what is called 
theory and ontology there is an understanding of knowledge tied to a particular 
understanding of logos as reason, word, language, rationality, concept. Determining the 
essence of the sovereign or the beast, we are always already caught up in a “a logic, a 
knowledge, the supposedly rational discourse of a knowledge; as for animality or 
bestiality, biology or zoology, these also are kinds of knowledge, discourses of 
knowledge”.37 Conceptualising the living being, the human or animal “is a theoretical 
knowledge, with its logos, its logic, its rational and scientific order”.38 This, he suggests, is 
tied up with the trope of “seeing, a theatrical theorein, a gaze cast onto a visible ob-ject, a 
primarily optical experience that aims to touch with the eyes what falls under the hand, 
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under the scalpel – and this optical model can be a sovereign autopsy”.39 Derrida argues 
that seeing is akin to sovereignty because it does not concede that the animal looked at and 
theorized may return the gaze, may be an incalculable, singular, unsubstitional and 
infinitely complex living being with an autonomous view of its own.
40
 Assuming the 
animal cannot respond, or possess an autonomous view-point of its own, the animal is thus 
conceived as already dead, before actual death, a “thing” to be examined and categorised 
by humans as if by sovereign decree.  
Derrida explains that the original meaning of “autopsia” was “the experience that 
consists in seeing with one’s own eyes, and thus of being able to bear witness”.41 Later, it 
acquired two meanings in Greek, a rare meaning “that of a participation in the all-
powerfulness of the gods and an intimate connection with them” and “the ceremony of 
dissection, namely the autopsy of a cadaver”.42 In the connection he makes between logos 
and the Creator God of Genesis, Derrida writes that “sovereignty equals arkhē, arkhē 
equals logos, the logos that creates, that causes to come or advene, and that creates the 
living being, the life of the living (zoē), the evangelic logos, which basically repeats 
genesis and speaks of an origin of the world created by the sovereign, God”.43 What 
Derrida appears to be suggesting is that one way the human has been configured is on the 
model of such a sovereign seeing, as a powerful God-like figure; depriving the animal of 
all that is proper to humans is a form of sovereign command caught up in the guise of 
scientific, rational knowledge. It is “a question of a violently imposed sovereignty of logos 
as reason, understanding, logic”44 that sees and condemns, even performatively 
commanding animals to the non-human: non-rational, without language, without response, 
history, culture, technology, relation to death as such. This in turn allows for the subjection 
of animal life under a sovereign understanding of humans who are thought indivisibly to 
possess such properties.  
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In regard to logos as life, Derrida suggests that life has become construed as 
“human” through the notion that to be living is to be “automotive, autonomous, absolutely 
spontaneous, sovereignly automotive”.45 According to Derrida, Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, 
and Lacan – like Descartes – believe that “the animal neither speaks nor responds, that its 
capacity to produce signs is foreign to language and limited or fixed by a program”.46 What 
has not been taken account of is “the essential or structural differences among animal 
species”47 but also the interrogation of what a response is and how exactly to distinguish it 
entirely from a reaction, or a reaction from a response.
48
 This sovereign spontaneity is 
closely connected to language, and as Derrida discusses, language understood as the 
capacity to respond, and thus to be responsible. Animals are thought to merely react. This 
is what ties humans to a modern political order and what excludes animals. Animals are 
thus construed as automatons.
49
 It is not a matter of reassigning such properties to animals 
as if it were as simple as giving them the capacity to respond in a similar way to humans. 
What Derrida critiques is “the purity, the rigor, and the indivisibility of the frontier that 
separates – already with respect to ‘us humans’ – reaction from response”.50  
But there is a final understanding of sovereignty that Derrida toys with in Rogues, 
written at the same time as the Beast and Sovereign seminars, that opens up for the 
possibility of a different conception of power. First he explains that in “speaking of an 
ontotheology of sovereignty, I am referring here, under the name of God, this One and only 
God, to the determination of a sovereign, and thus indivisible, omnipotence”.51 It is the 
indivisibility of sovereignty that Derrida, throughout his thinking of human/animal 
distinctions has been critiquing, and the all-powerful, all-seeing force of reason that makes 
man wolf to the animal lamb. Any reasoning that constructs absolute differences risks 
being a reason as “force”, precisely because the properties often thought “proper to man” 
are construed dogmatically as powers of reason, language, response, that ensue the 
subjection of, or mastery over, animal life. But he goes on to say:  
wherever the name of God would allow us to think something else, for example a 
vulnerable nonsovereignty, one that suffers and is divisible, one that is mortal even, 
capable of contradicting itself or of repenting (a thought that is neither impossible 
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nor without example), it would be a completely different story, perhaps even the 
story of a god who deconstructs himself in his ipseity.
52
  
Here, then, is Derrida’s dream of a deconstructed sovereignty. The question is whether 
Derrida connects the Christ-lamb as “both logos and zōē”53 to a legacy of the human life 
with logos, thus excluding animals, or whether the Christ-lamb could be such a suffering 
non-sovereign figure? If the former, what happens to the “lamb-ness” of this Christ figure? 
Is this a sovereign figure that allies the logos and life of his person with the divine and the 
human at the expense of animals? Is Derrida implying that Christ as man became part of a 
legacy that has believed in the all-powerful sovereignty of humans, and particularly the 
human as male, for humans to see themselves as commanders and sovereign lords over 
animals? What or who is Christ as lamb, as animal? Is he Derrida’s figure of sovereignty 
configured in the power of the small, or is he rather the figure of suffering weakness, the 
divisible, deconstructed sovereignty Derrida outlines in Rogues?  
 
Revelation 17: The Sovereign Lamb and its Sexual-Animal Other 
Building on Derrida’s discussion of the concept of sovereignty in relation to the “human-
beast” and in opposition to the non-power of weakness or vulnerability of the “animal-
other”, I will analyse what we might call another religio-political fable, namely the warring 
Lamb with the Beast and the Whore of chapter 17 in the Book of Revelation.
54
 Revelation 
17 presents the figure of a whore riding a beast in war with a lamb, somewhat like La 
Fontaine’s wolf and lamb as an encounter between two opposing figures. But unlike La 
Fontaine’s fable, the Lamb is the one who triumphs in Revelation 17. The Lamb is a 
sovereign force: more sovereign than the sovereign Whore-Beast. How might the Whore 
and Beast that represent Rome be understood and seen? Discussing ways in which the 
political is represented as beasts, Derrida briefly mentions “the beasts from John’s 
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Revelation, which clearly present themselves as political or polemological figures, the 
reading of which would merit more than one seminar on its own”.55 However, this was a 
reading that never took place, at least in the published seminars of The Beast and the 
Sovereign. Picking up on this reference, I will analyse the Whore-Beast and Lamb in 
regard to their dynamics of sovereign power and animality, but also, importantly, of 
sexuality and the female in alliance with the animal.  
Why Revelation 17? Thought to be written sometime between the 60s of the first and 
the beginning of the second, century CE,
56
 and set in Asia Minor, modern-day Turkey, 
John’s Revelation is a text in the Christian biblical archive that caused and still causes 
controversy. Nonetheless, or perhaps because of this, it is one of the most influential books 
of the Bible in terms of its reception history. Christopher Rowland for instance, suggests 
that the text of Revelation “has probably had more effect on Christian doctrine, art and 
literature than almost any other”.57 Michael Gorman lists Martin Luther’s hesitant and 
ambiguous attitude towards it and John Calvin’s reticence;58 Thomas Paine professed its 
impossible obscurity, and Friedrich Nietzsche disparaged it as an outcry of sheer 
malevolence.
59
 D.H Lawrence wrote that as Judas was to Jesus, so is Revelation to the 
New Testament: it apparently has none of the “real” Christ or the “real” Gospel to it.60 
Positioned at the end and edge of the Christian Bible, its canonical status is slippery. But 
its apocalyptic genre and symbolism has commanded much attention. As Norman Cohn 
points out, this text has “proved extraordinarily adaptable and long-lived”.61 As a prime 
exemplar of the “apocalyptic”, Revelation has been reinterpreted “again and again to fit 
ever-changing circumstances” and has “continued to affect the perceptions of millions of 
both Christians and non-Christians right down to the present day”.62 As such its political 
animal figures form an important legacy alongside those Derrida himself comments on. 
Derrida suggest that: 
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the texts from Aristotle’s Politics, for example, or Bodin, or so many others, and texts 
that are not always books of philosophy or political science, or even books at all, are to 
be read, difficult as they may be to decipher, indispensable in all their abyssal 
stratifications, be they bookish or not, if we want to understand politics and its beyond, 
and even the bio-powers or zoo-powers of what we call the modernity of ‘our time.’63 
Revelation too, is a significant text in the Western cultural canon that has been mapped 
onto political scenes, struggles and situations, with its animal figures and zoo-powers as 
prominent examples of the religio-political. Stephen Moore suggests that it is more 
“thickly populated with nonhuman animals than any other Christian text”.64   
Similarly to La Fontaine’s wolf and lamb and Lawrence’s “I” and snake in Derrida’s 
readings, Revelation 17 too revolves around a scene by the water: ‘ “Come, I will show 
you the judgement of the great whore who is seated on many waters”’ (17:1). This too is a 
scene we, as readers, are called on to witness: ‘Come, I will show you…’ (17:1). The 
emphasis on witnessing and spectacle in Revelation is analysed by Christopher Frilingos 
who suggests that the monsters and martyrs of Revelation act as spectators in the text, with 
the Lamb as the most important spectator figure.
65
 But at the same time the Lamb is a 
spectacle at the centre of Revelation.
66
 Here, in chapter 17, the invitation to see is also for 
the readers of this book as “spectators”. Derrida’s emphasis on poetic scenes and fables are 
a way of bringing his focus on “seeing” as a scientific rational mode of knowing into 
conversation with the “moral” of a tale: it is a matter of the ethics and responsibility of the 
gaze and encounter with representations of animals in dominant textual canons and their 
legacies for encounters with living animal others. When he orients the question of the 
animal around the suffering of animals that “we humans can witness”,67 it is because 
seeing animals is not merely a neutral theoretical gaze that gives or deprives animals of 
concepts thought to be proper to humans, but because every seeing is a witnessing, and 
witnessing always involves responsibility and testimony to someone or something. Taking 
account of animal representations by paying attention to them, or affording them the 
scholarly gaze, is not, then, a singular, solipsistic, sovereign seeing, but a relational being-
with and curious attention to subjects encountered.  
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The reader, like John the witness of this scene, is invited to observe a spectacular, 
theatrical scene with this ‘great whore’ (17:1), a ‘scarlet beast’ (17:3), and ‘the Lamb’ 
(17:14). Beginning with the political, “polemological” – that is, Derrida’s allusion to the 
“logic” of war – animals Derrida himself was so intrigued by, I will outline the dynamic 
between the Lamb as a triumphant sovereign in opposition to the powerful Beast with its 
figure of the whore seated on it. In brief, what takes place in Revelation 17 is that an angel 
takes the writer of this revelation, John, to see a scene in the wilderness in which a woman 
is ‘seated on many waters’ but who also sits on a many-headed, many-horned Beast (17:1, 
3). The woman is seen to be ‘drunk with the blood of the saints and the blood of the 
witnesses to Jesus’ (17:6). John is amazed at this spectacle (17: 6) but the angel swiftly 
explains ‘the mystery’ of the Beast and woman (17:7). The Beast ‘was, and is not, and is 
about to ascend from the bottomless pit and go to destruction’ (17:8). The angel explains 
the seven heads as seven mountains on which the woman is seated, and as seven kings, 
some who have reigned, some who reign, and some who will reign (17:9-10). The ten 
horns also represent ten kings, united with the Beast (17:12-13). It is said they will make 
war on the Lamb, ‘and the Lamb will conquer them’; those with the Lamb ‘are called and 
chosen and faithful’ (17:14). The waters on which ‘the whore is seated’ (17:15) and that 
John has been shown are said to represent ‘peoples and multitudes and nations and 
languages’ (17:15). The kings and Beast are eventually predicted to ‘hate the whore; they 
will make her desolate and naked; they will devour her flesh and burn her up with fire’ 
(17:16). This is said to be God’s purpose, agreeing to give over power to the Beast ‘until 
the words of God will be fulfilled’ (17:17). Lastly, the woman is described as ‘the great 
city that rules over the kings of the earth’ (17:18).  
 
The Lamb of Revelation 17: Diminutive or Dominant? 
On the surface of it, the Lamb stands as the weak yet heroic animal figure of this text in 
opposition to the Beast and Whore. Michael J. Gorman’s 2011 publication on Revelation is 
entitled: Reading Revelation Responsibly: Uncivil Worship and Witness, Following the 
Lamb Into the New Creation. But what does it mean to follow the Lamb of Revelation? 
What does it mean to respond to it and how to do so responsibly? What do readers 
“witness” in the scene of this Lamb? Who or what is worshipped in worshipping the 
Lamb? Does the Lamb respond responsibly? Or is it for human readers to tackle this 
animal responsibly, as Gorman seemingly has it? Allusions to the Lamb in Revelation 17 
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are scarce but significant. In 17:14, it is said that the Beast and its kings ‘will make war on 
the Lamb’, and then crucially adding, ‘and the Lamb will conquer them, for he is Lord of 
Lords and King of kings, and those with him are called and chosen and faithful’ (17:14).  
At first glance the Lamb, or little lamb, – avrni,on – stands in stark contrast to the 
description of the wild Beast (qhri,on) who is ‘like a leopard, its feet were like a bear’s, and 
its mouth was like a lion’s mouth’ (13:2). Using the image of the Lamb is a way of 
grounding sympathy in an innocent counter-part to the Beast who is associated with 
ferocity and prostitution. In 14:9 it is clear that those who follow the Beast are following a 
sovereign power – with its ten kings, de,ka basilei/j – in opposition to God and the Lamb. 
Those who worship the sovereignty of the Beast, ‘and its image, and receive a mark on 
their foreheads or on their hands’ will ‘drink the wine of God’s wrath’ and ‘will be 
tormented with fire and sulphur in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of 
the Lamb’ (14:10), and there will be no rest for them (14:11). Sores appear on those who 
have worshipped the Beast and its image (16:2). As for God’s ‘bowls of wrath’ (16:1), one 
is poured on the ‘throne of the Beast’ (16:10), the kingdom is ‘plunged into darkness’ and 
‘people gnawed their tongues in agony’ (16:10). Foul spirits ‘like frogs’ come from the 
mouth of the Beast (16:13), and in 18:2 ‘Babylon the great’ who rides the beast has 
become the haunt of ‘every foul and hateful beast’. The Beast has armies and is allied with 
the kings who make war on the ‘rider of the horse’ (19:19); those who did not worship the 
Beast but who were beheaded for their testimony to Jesus and to the word of God are 
brought back to life and reign with the Messiah (20:4), while the Beast is captured and is 
thrown alive into a lake of fire (19:20) (along with a false prophet and the devil). Akin to 
La Fontaine’s wolf, this Beast is presented as a sovereign power and a ferocious one at 
that.   
Like La Fontaine’s killed lamb, the Lamb of Revelation 17 is said to be slaughtered 
(5:12; 13:8) and is thus a weak, pitiable victim figure. As Christopher Rowland points out, 
the lamb with its “marks of sacrifice” “is also the Messiah”.68 Thus the logic of this text 
posits the triumphant “good” to be on the side of the weaker animal figure, the Lamb. 
Rowland calls this “a Messiah with a difference, one who comes to the divine presence as 
a suppliant and with the marks of suffering”.69 Rowland emphasises the significance of 
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such a “weak creature” as an “agent of God’s purposes”.70 He argues that this is God’s way 
of being present, as the Lamb on the throne.
71
 This suffering lamb figure is often linked to 
the Passover lamb from the Exodus narrative as a sacrificed and saving animal.
72
 But in 
Revelation 17 it is also a sovereign force. As Matthias Reinhard Hoffmann argues, the 
apparent synonymous sharing of the throne and worship between God and the Lamb in 
Revelation 4 and 5 conveys the tight connection between sovereign divinity, Christ and 
animality.
73
 Richard Bauckham notes that the word “Lamb” referring to Christ occurs 28 
times.
74
 Seven of these refer to God and the Lamb together (5:13; 6:16; 7:10; 14:4; 21:22; 
22:1, 3). The throne of God in heaven figures frequently as a Hebrew Bible motif, 
reappearing here as a “symbol of divine sovereignty”.75 As Hoffmann argues, Lamb and 
God are “on par”.76 The messianic Lamb is thus seemingly a paradoxically sovereign 
animal-divine constellation of weak power.
77
 As such it would appear to be an example of 
Derrida’s deconstructed sovereignty, the God who is vulnerable and suffers, or the 
zoological Jesus as Christ-Lamb.   
However, pointing to the messianic status of the Lamb, Rowland also notes Rev. 
5:5: ‘the Lion from the tribe of Judah, the shoot growing from David’s stock’,78 one who 
will be able to open a scroll and who in 5:6-7 turns out to be none other than the Lamb. 
Another animal, the lion, is thus linked to the Lamb and its sovereignty.
79
 This is perhaps 
the most explicit glimpse of the way in which the Lamb in fact takes on the role of a 
competing sovereignty to the Beast that is not Lamb-like as a purely diminutive, suffering, 
sacrificial creature but rather like the Beast. What appears to happen in this biblical fable is 
that the Lamb, despite all appearances, ups the ante: its sovereignty is a higher sovereignty 
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to that of the beast, its power is more, better, stronger. As Moore argues, the paradox of 
the Lamb is that it appears to be “a docile trope for domination”80 but who becomes a 
“Celestial Superwarrior, icon of apocalyptic hypermasculinity” whose God is as terrifying 
as the Beast in his ‘great supper’ of ‘the flesh of all’, animals and humans alike (19:17-
18).
81
 Derrida writes of sovereign power and the idea of the “most” sovereign, that it is a 
matter of “placing one majesty above another, and thus upping the ante with respect to 
sovereignty”.82 This “dynamics of majesty or of sovereignty” is precisely a dynamic 
because it is about a show or movement of power, of “potency (dynamis), with the 
deployment of the potentiality of the dynast and the dynasty”.83 It is as if Revelation 17 
stages a revenge scenario to the fable of the lamb and the wolf, where the wolf has taken 
on an even more startlingly terrifying guise as a lion-leopard-bear-Beast and the lamb has 
returned from the jaws of the wolf to wreck its revenge with a superlative sovereignty, now 
with a make-over as a hybrid Lion-Lamb. Here, as opposed to La Fontaine’s tale, it is the 
reason of the lamb that wins. But does it mean that the reason of the weaker has won? That 
a deconstructed sovereignty triumphs? What is it that wins when the lamb wins?  
Wilfrid J. Harrington emphasises the lamb as a “striking antithesis” to the Beast.84 
But, arguably, the Lamb and its opposition, the Beast, are like one another in striking ways, 
taking on sovereign and particularly male forms. Paul B. Duff points out that “one of the 
most fascinating and puzzling literary techniques employed by the author of the Book of 
Revelation is to describe contrasting characters in similar ways”.85 While Duff makes this 
comment in regard to the two female figures of Revelation,
86
 I propose it is significant that 
it also holds true for the Beast and the Lamb. The Lamb is described in analogous ways to 
the Beast, marking them side by side as oppositional forces but that, significantly, mirror 
each other similarly. As Moore puts it, Revelation constantly “undercuts its own insistent 
dualisms”.87 Like the Beast with its seven heads, the Lamb is linked to the number seven: 
described with ‘seven horns and seven eyes’ (5:6; 17:3, 7). Like the Beast with its kings, 
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the Lamb is also sovereign-like, associated with thrones in 5:13; 6:16; 7:10; 22:1, 3. While 
the Beast has a lion-like mouth (13:2) the Lamb is linked to the Lion of Judah (5:5).
88
 Like 
the terrors of the Beast, the Lamb is full of ‘wrath’ (6:16). Just as the Beast is worshipped 
(13:4), the Lamb too is hailed by a multitude of peoples with palm branches in their hands 
(7:10-11). A beast (linked with the Beast of chapter 17) has horns ‘like a lamb’ (13:11), as 
if the Lamb could feasibly be mistaken for a beast. The Beast is described as the one that 
‘was and is not and is to come’ (17:8), resembling the description of God as the one ‘who 
is and who was and who is to come’ (1:8) as if the appearance of the divine-Lamb could be 
comparable or mixed up with the Beast who also is to come. Parallel to the Beast in 
chapter 17 with its seven heads as seven mountains (17:9), the Lamb stands on Mount Zion 
(14:1). They are both seemingly male with sexual needs, as the Beast has its woman in the 
Whore of Babylon, and virgins follow the Lamb (14:4). Like the ferocity of the Beast, 
torment and wrath will take place in the ‘presence of the Lamb’ (14:10). As such this 
animal-divine becomes beast-like, akin to Derrida’s wolf that ravages the lamb.89 Or as 
Tina Pippin puts it, there “is no democracy in the Apocalypse; God is as much a power of 
domination as any other power”.90 Further, the Lamb presented as a specifically male 
sovereignty and ferocious animality evokes a sense of its carnivorous violence and carnal 
virility. As if an erect man, the Lamb stands (5:6). In 7:17 the Lamb is at ‘the centre of the 
throne’ and shall act like a shepherd (poimai,nw), as if representing the man of political 
power who leads, rules and protects its animal subjects. Mimicking the figure of Master, 
husband or Head of a household ‘he’ has a woman or bride (19:7 gunh,) and in 21: 9 the 
‘bride’ or young woman (nu,mfh) is referred to again; there is also a blessing on those who 
are invited to the ‘marriage supper of the Lamb’ (19:9). The Lamb thus appears under the 
guise of its weak animality as a lamb in opposition to the leopard-bear-lion-like Beast 
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whose ten horns are kings, but operates with the very same logic of this sovereign Beast as 
Derrida’s political “man” as “wolf”.91  
Robert Seesengood explains this dynamic by emphasising the use of words 
connected to the verb nika,w (to conquer, prevail, be victorious), which attests to the 
language of war-fare but with an increasing association with the spectacles and violence of 
Greco-Roman sport.
92
 He writes that when nika,w is used in the New Testament it 
generally refers to the victory of Jesus and the early Christians over pagan culture. In other 
words, early Christian discourse was making use of Greco-Roman culture to articulate its 
own claims about “a triumphant Jesus”.93 When this verb form is used in Revelation,94 it 
tends to conform to this pattern, Seesengood suggests, and refers to the “‘Lion of the tribe 
of Judah’”, the eviscerated lamb – throat cut, disembowelled, tiny –  which has conquered 
(5:5), as well as the rider on the white horse marches out ‘conquering and to conquer’ 
(6:2). Additionally, the dragon and his allies are conquered ‘by the blood of the Lamb’ 
(12:11). The martyrs of the church who have ‘endured to the end’ are the victorious 
conquerors of the beast (15:2).
95
 Just before the Lamb is described as ‘Lord of lords and 
King of kings’ he is said precisely to conquer the kings and beast who yield their power 
and authority (17:14). The Lamb is not a wholly different or opposing power to the Beast, 
then, but is an “upping” of the powers of the Beast, presented as more sovereign: ‘Lord of 
lords and King of kings’ (17:14). Derrida states that in discourses on sovereign power it “is 
not only an alternative between sovereignty and nonsovereignty but also a struggle for 
sovereignty, transfers and displacements or even divisions of sovereignty”.96 The Lamb 
participates in Derrida’s concept of sovereignty as a logic of competition: an “I can” of 
violence that is continuously played out as higher, a continuous and performative pouvoir. 
“What counts is the more, the economy of the more, the economy of the surplus or the 
economy of the supplement, the smaller able to be more powerful or even larger than the 
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largest”.97 This is, as David F. Krell puts it, an order of knowledge that “operates as the 
hubris of the more, the sovereign plus que that is never satisfied”.98 As seen with this 
warring Lamb “the weaker can be stronger than the stronger”.99  
What, then, becomes of the Beast and Whore who are defeated by the most 
sovereign Lamb? I propose that while the Beast and Whore are depicted – in the logic of 
the text – as abhorrent objects of evil, they become “animal others” as this logic is 
overturned, when the Lamb takes on its sovereign guise and so becomes the stronger, 
dominant and thus suppressive party. Within the logic delineated by the image of the 
Lamb, with the weak as the innocent and pitiable, that is, the suffering weak as allied to the 
good, the Whore and Beast become this locus for powerlessness. They can be read as 
subjects of compassion, of pathos, and even a form of deconstructed sovereignty.  But this 
takes place in the conceptualisation of Derrida’s animal other as the weak subjects to 
power, in this context the animals of Roman arenas, and female prostitutes in Roman 
society. I will first show how the Beast is represented as an evil figure of terror but can be 
read as subjugated animal others. Then I will turn to the Whore as the other composite 
emblem of evil, who can also be seen rather as a figure demanding compassion. Revelation 
17 can thus be seen to present a denigrating vision of animals and women as associated 
with evil, but simultaneously provides the glimpse of a deconstructed sovereignty in the 
Whore and Beast as creatures demanding response and responsibility in a compassion to 
come for the suffering subjects of political systems. Together they present an alternative 
image of Rome as a space of marginalized, animal and female subjects, social others 
hidden from view in the symbolic figurations of political evil so often focused on as the 
central theme of this biblical text. 
 
The Beast of Revelation 17: Villain or Victim? 
The Beast of Revelation 17 is ‘scarlet’, ‘full of blasphemous names’, with ‘seven heads 
and ten horns’ (17:3). It is a multi-political figure, representing kings ‘of whom five have 
fallen, one is living, and the other has not yet come’ (17:10), and a belligerent figure, with 
‘power and authority’ (17:13), making war (17:14). But it is also a geographical figure, its 
seven heads symbolizing seven mountains (17:9). Elsewhere in Revelation the Beast is 
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described as coming up from the bottomless pit who makes war, conquers and kills two 
witnesses to God (11:7), in 13:1 it ‘rises out of the sea, having ten heads and seven horns’ 
and ‘on its horns were ten diadems, and on its heads were blasphemous names.’ It is ‘like a 
leopard, its feet were like a bear’s, and its mouth was like a lion’s mouth’ (13:2). It is 
linked to sovereign power by the mention of a dragon giving it power, authority and throne 
(13:2) and as such it is worshipped (13:4).  
Just as Derrida explains that representations of beasts are frequently linked to 
human sovereign power, the Beast of Revelation 17 has been used to symbolize numerous 
powers in the human political world.
100
 In its historical context, however, it is commonly 
agreed that the Beast with its heads and horns refers to the Roman Empire and Roman 
Emperors. In other words, to denote the evil of Rome, Rome is likened to various wild, 
carnivorous animals, making a negatively perceived political domination synonymous with 
the animal as “beast”. As Leonard Thompson puts it, this myth-like beast conveys “the 
Roman order as demonic”.101 But it is rather that the Roman order is portrayed as beast-
like, as hyperbolically ferocious, threatening, carnivorous, violent, and powerful, whereas 
the Lamb is thus set up as its innocent, weak counterpart. Craig Koester notes that 
Revelation is not unique in using animal images to depict nations and political powers.
102
 
He mentions the Book of Daniel and his vision of empires as animals (Dan. 7:1-8), 
proposing that the author of Revelation amalgamates properties from Daniel’s four beasts 
into the single seven-headed beast.
103
 It is also customary to link the beast who ‘was, and is 
not, and is about to ascend from the bottomless pit and go to destruction’ (17:8) to the 
legend of Nero redivivus (54-68) as an emperor who, although dead, continues to haunt the 
political imagination and is feared to return.
104
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Friesen suggests that the anti-Roman rhetoric of Revelation is a means to bind 
communities together against imperial cults.
105
 This was, he argues, a prominent part of 
Roman imperial society: “Emperors were worshipped in their own temples, at temples of 
other gods, in theatres, in gymnasia, in stoas, in basilicas, in judicial settings, in private 
homes and elsewhere.”106 Friesen argues that the passages in chapter 17 in which Rome is 
portrayed as a beast-riding prostitute, committing fornication with kings and inhabitants of 
the earth, can be interpreted as emperor-worship or the worship of other deities than John’s 
sovereign Lord.
107
 In a sense this narrative thus confirms Derrida’s model of sovereignty as 
tied to an all-seeing, all-powerful God-like power.
108
 The Beast associated with Roman 
human sovereignty imitates divine sovereignty, while the Lamb is presented as the divine 
sovereign who is the sovereign’s sovereign.109 Arguing that this text was part of a larger 
context of criticism against the Roman Empire, Peter Perry too proposes that “divine 
sovereignty” is pitted against “Rome as a city of excess, luxury and conspicuous 
consumption” in this passage.110 Thompson calls the beast a “superhuman” figure, 
revealing the way in which this figure represents the human political power modelled on 
the logic of “more than” that puts human power in the seat of ultimate sovereignty.111 In 
Revelation, then, the Beast represents Rome as an evil, artificial power that is ferocious 
like a beast and sovereign like the divine. As Perry puts it, the problem the author of 
Revelation appears to present is that “the Roman Empire does not appropriately imitate 
divine rule”.112 The Beast, in Koester’s words, “is the great mimicker of God, for if God is 
the one who ‘was and is and is to come’ from heaven (4:8), the beast ‘was and is not and is 
to ascend from the bottomless pit’ (17:8)”.113 It is thus a mere prosthesis and parody of 
power but a terrifying one at that. As such, animality as “beast” becomes a decidedly 
adverse metaphor for the human political order at its worst, associating the political with 
the animal, and the animal with the deleterious. 
                                                          
105Steven J. Friesen, “Satan’s Throne, Imperial Cults and the Social Settings of Revelation”, The Journal for 
the Study of the New Testament 27.3 (2005), 352. Friesen argues this was a rhetorical ploy rather than a 
reflection of crisis and persecution relating to imperial cults in the author’s own time. Imperial cults were a 
way of criticizing Roman imperialism more generally.  
106
 Friesen, “Satan’s Throne, Imperial Cults and the Social Settings of Revelation”, 363. 
107
 Ibid., 370. 
108
 BS I, 50. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 Peter S. Perry, “Critiquing the Excess of Empire: A Synkrisis of John and Dio of Prusa”, The Journal for 
the Study of the New Testament 29.4 (2007), 476. Perry specifically compares the author of Revelation to Dio 
of Prusa, or Dio Chrysostom as he is also known, showing a larger context of criticism against Rome, 
existing across class and social status.  
111
 Thompson, The Book of Revelation, 174. 
112
 Perry, “Critiquing the Excess of Empire: A Synkrisis of John and Dio of Prusa”, 493. 
113
 Koester, Revelation and the End of All Things, 159. 
Chapter 4: Derrida’s Wolf and Lamb 
 
 
186 
 
Stripping the Beast of its metaphorical and symbolic layers as wolf-like human 
political power or a faux-divine sovereignty however, the Beast could be seen otherwise, in 
line with the lives of wild animals in the Roman Empire, as suggested also in Frilingos’ 
instructive study on spectatorship and the Roman arena in Revelation, Spectacles of Empire: 
Monsters, Martyrs, and the Book of Revelation.
114
 Following Frilingos, Seesengood deems 
Revelation to be more like a spectacle than a vision.
115
 He argues that the “repeated pattern 
of combat scenes and exotic displays found in the Apocalypse may be deliberately 
evocative of the spectacles of the Roman arena”.116 Embedded in the language of games, 
sports and violence in the Roman arenas that is reflected in Revelation, I suggest that the 
discourse of animality and sovereignty is paramount for constructing sympathy for the 
good “team” and antipathy for the opposing “team” – and, as I will go on to show, the way 
this collapses.  
Gilhus explains two particularly pertinent performances of Roman power involving 
animals, namely venationes and damnio ad bestias. The former were essentially hunting 
spectacles that took place in arenas, often involving large numbers of animals being killed 
and were a form of mass entertainment in antiquity.
117
 In contrast to animal sacrifice which 
was an age-old institution, the arena was relatively new and its popularity increased with 
the growth of the empire.
118
 Constructing stone amphitheatres in the first century CE made 
it easier to control animals and offered more room for spectators. This was a version of 
hunting but in controlled spaces, and dependent on an imperialistic state system that made 
it possible to catch, keep and deliver the animals to Rome or other areas in the Empire.
119
 
Hence, perhaps, the association in Revelation of Rome with a many-headed beast. Gilhus 
recounts how this use of wild animals in relation to spectacles of power could be seen in 
Mesopotamia and Egypt, where conquering lions was a royal sport and aristocratic elites 
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hunted big game. A zoo with exotic animals, for example, had been proof of Pharaoh’s 
claim to rule the ordered world.
120
 In the Roman arenas animals were both imported and 
indigenous, carnivorous, wild and domestic; they had to be captured, put in menageries, 
and then were kept in cages in lower levels of the Colosseum and special areas outside the 
city.
121
 For the fights animals were brought into arenas in Rome: “bulls were set against 
panthers, rhinoceroses against bears and lions against tigers, as well as all types of animal 
against humans.”122  
The venationes can be seen as a display of power through the use of animals. As 
Gilhus explains: “The hunt had become a spectacular show over which the emperor 
presided as its patron and all classes of people participated as spectators.”123 In a sense 
these were hunts that had been “democratized”, not just for those in power but now also for 
a mass audience. Here, numerous animals were killed. While domesticated animals were 
already under human control in agriculture, such entertainment including wild animals 
showed them too as under human domination.
124
  “The venationes, as well as the gladiator 
contests, contributed to demonstrating the authority of the emperor as well as the extent of 
the empire and the wealth of those who paid for the shows.”125 Roland Auguet recounts the 
killing of a lion in Rome that was considered by Romans a symbol of their total power 
over the universe.
126
 Such accounts testify to the symbolically important and real exercise 
of power of man controlling animals and Rome controlling the world through the lives 
(and deaths) of animals.
127
 With the diversity of animals in the Roman arenas, it also 
showed off the geographical expansion of Rome’s power and influence.128  
Probably from the time of Augustus (63 BCE -14 CE) the venatio also included the 
execution of criminals and gladiator fights (munera).
129
 Gilhus explains the damnatio ad 
bestias as the sentencing of humans to beasts as punishment for severe crimes. These 
killings were staged in amphitheatres of the great cities at the celebration of feasts and for 
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general entertainment of spectators. “Humans being killed by animals, together with arena 
performances, were part of the mass entertainment of antiquity, viewed by virtually 
everyone, even if not everyone appreciated it.”130 Parading the wildness and ferocity of the 
animals thus demonstrated the ferocity and power of Roman rule but also portrayed the 
animals as puppets, doing as they are staged to do and dying for the entertainment and law 
of human rulers and citizens. Moore calls the Beast of Revelation a “martyr-making killing 
machine” (such as is depicted in 11:7), thus highlighting the objectification of the Beast as 
such an instrumentalised or objectified puppet or machine.
131
 The Beast of Revelation 17 
who is leopard, bear and lion could be read as an amalgamation of such animals used for 
Roman spectacles, representing quite literally the beastly powers of Rome.
132
 The war 
between Lamb and Beast could be seen as a battle of beastly Roman power against its 
innocent opponents. Polemically construed as humans treated like lambs, such opponents 
are portrayed in Revelation 17 as if a lamb thrown to the wild beasts of the Roman arenas. 
Revelation provides a “textual theatre” that narrates spectacles for its ancient Christian 
audience, and thus draws on available discourses in the Roman Empire.
133
 Frilingos 
suggests that such spectacles were a “particularly effective mode for the production of 
authoritative knowledge about other and self under the Roman Empire”.134 Crucially, this 
can be tied in specifically to conceptualisations of animality as Derrida’s “human-beast” 
and “animal-other” around a dynamics of sovereign power, or the lack of it. Thompson 
argues that rather than describing conflicts amongst Christians in the Roman Empire, the 
author of Revelation “encourages his audience to see themselves in conflict with society; 
such conflict is part of his vision of the world”135 and Duff too argues for the persuasive 
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purposes of Revelation to alternative perceptions of political power.
136
 In much Christian 
discourse, Gilhus writes, martyrs were turned into “cultural performers” who conveyed 
how fighting and dying for God as “lambs” became both a proper and noble sacrifice and a 
triumph against Roman power.
137
  Eusebius, for instance, suggests that John the author of 
Revelation had been persecuted and exiled to Patmos because of his testimony to the word 
of God, despite no evidence of this, and so Revelation too becomes caught up in a 
discursive cultural performance of victimhood and victory.
138
 Whether many martyrs 
actually were fed to animals or not, victims of damnatio ad bestias functioned as an 
opposition and even competition to Rome and its power dynamics as an attempt at upping 
sovereignty. Read in this light, with regard for the portrayal of the Lamb in Revelation 17, 
the idea of the innocent, weak lamb is in fact more like a discursively drawn lion in its 
triumphant power in “the ring”.139 The Lamb as a weak figure of domestic animality and 
sacrificial victim in Revelation 17 becomes thus the figure of a lion or beast: capable of 
fighting back and winning.
140
 Accordingly, the Lamb participates in the power games of 
the Roman order, in “a mimicry”, adopting the actions of the enemy.141 As such, the author 
of Revelation is not critiquing violent sovereign power but is rather caught up in a 
discourse that aims to identify “the proper colonizer”, that is, the Lamb or God.142 What 
are the implications for Revelation’s animal figures of “good” and “evil”? How does the 
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logic of this political fable function when the weak animal victim becomes like the 
sovereign beast and the sovereign beast comes to look like a victim of sovereign power? 
In light of these questions, the Beast takes on a somewhat different appearance. It is 
not merely the ferocious, many-headed negative representation of violence but – more 
literally viewed – the vulnerable, victimized exploited bodies of the hunted, captivated, 
coaxed and cajoled animals in a human arena, made to perform the image of power and 
ferocity in the place of human rulers and for the entertainment and loyalty of human 
citizens. While these animals may well be ferocious, their place in such a context is also 
that of creatures robbed of their habitat, freedom, made puppets or machines to human 
mastery, and killed for the sake of human law and entertainment. They are thus in a sense 
rather La Fontaine’s lamb than the wolf, or Derrida’s animal other, as creatures who are 
condemned in advance as mere puppets, killable and usable, in being animal. While 
portrayed as the “evil”, the Beast in Revelation inadvertently draws attention to such a 
practice, and thus shows the sovereign Lamb as participating in the violent modes of power 
Rome is criticized for. The “Beast” thus becomes the weak and suffering creature that the 
Lamb supposedly denotes.  
 
The Whore of Babylon: Abject or Annexed? 
The woman on the beast is also thought to symbolize Rome. As a ‘whore’ (17:1 po,rnh)  
and ‘woman’ (17:3 gunh,) who  rules over the kings of the earth, she is the very opposite to 
Derrida’s virgin marionette figure; she is presented as an arch-nemesis, a powerful, wild 
woman, riding the Beast of Rome. This ‘great whore’ (17:1) ‘with whom the kings of the 
earth have committed fornication, and with the wine of whose fornication the inhabitants 
of the earth have become drunk’ (17:2), is ‘clothed in purple and scarlet, and adorned with 
gold and jewels and pearls, holding in her hand a golden cup full of abominations and the 
impurities of her fornication’ (17:4). As already mentioned, the Whore of Babylon is a 
significant part of the image of Rome in Revelation 17 that offers possibilities to develop 
Derrida’s thinking of “la bête” further in regard to sovereignty, animality and sexual 
difference. In Revelation 17, it is, as I showed, the Lamb who appears to embody the male 
sovereign, a husband, king, lord and shepherd. But, associated with the kings who 
presumably are the same kings represented by the many heads and horns of the Beast, the 
Whore too is a sovereign figure, more “sovereign” than the Beast and its kings. In the last 
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verse of chapter 17 she is described as ruling ‘over the kings of the earth’ (17:18); in 18:7 
the word “queen” is used of her: basi,lissa. She is the rider of the Beast, and so when the 
Lamb triumphs it is by laying her bare through turning the Beast against her, making her 
desolate, eaten and burnt (17:16). How are we to understand this woman, then – a 
sovereign whore and a victim – in the power dynamic between Lamb and Beast, in the 
battle for sovereign power? 
Along with the Beast, the Whore of Babylon symbolises Roman power as well as 
the ancient symbol of a super-power and enemy in the Hebrew Bible, Babylon. She is thus 
a layered and hyperbolic symbolic figure of tyrannical evil political power. As Koester 
points out, seated on seven hills, connecting her to the seven hills of Rome, the Whore 
could be seen as a representation of Rome as the destructive source of the second temple, 
and Babylon as the Babylonians destroyed the first temple.
143
 She can be understood as the 
Goddess Rome, dea Roma, who as David Aune attests, is depicted on a Vespasian 
sestertius minted in the Roman province of Asia in 71 CE.
144
 On this coin the goddess 
Roma is clothed in military dress and seated on Rome’s seven hills with the river god Tiber 
reclining at the right and the she-wolf with Romulus and Remus at the lower left.
145
 Aune 
suggests that the author of Revelation might have utilised this popular image as a way of 
framing his attack on Rome.
146
 The fact that the Dea Roma is holding a parazonium – a 
small sword – on the coin might be seen as a reminder of Roman military might, which is 
amplified in the violent image of Rome in Revelation 17.
147
 Koester emphasises the 
caricature nature of this figure as an exaggerated political fable
148
 with a clear moral: this 
figure of evil will fall to destruction, but meanwhile, followers of the Lamb must avoid 
affiliating with the Roman powers associated with her.
149
 She could thus be seen as the 
female figure of Roman power that controls the animals it captures, hunts, displays and 
kills, just as she rides the Beast and guzzles the blood of ‘saints’ and ‘witnesses to Jesus’ 
(17:6). 
In order for Roman authority to be polemically portrayed as an arch-enemy it is 
thus represented as wild animals and a specifically female radical evil, conveyed, to use 
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Julia Kristeva’s concept, as abject. Kristeva’s concept of the abject is primarily 
characterised by revulsion at food, corpses and female sexual power, all qualities embodied 
by the figure of the Whore. Further, abjection is tied to ambivalence, particularly to the 
ambivalence of female sexuality as both a threat and competition to male potency and at 
the same time desirous. I have shown how the Beast can be seen as a figure both for 
Roman power over its subjects, human and non-human, but also of its victimized animal 
subjects akin to Derrida’s “animal other”. Now I will explore how a particular sexualized 
woman also appears as such a double-sided image of abject and dangerously seductive 
sovereignty on the one hand and pitiable suffering subject of sympathy on the other.
150
 
Both are linked specifically with her representation as woman and animal. With the Beast, 
the Whore is Roman imperial power as Derrida’s “the worst”, “radical evil”151 but the way 
in which Rome becomes inextricably linked to the prostitute and beast undercuts this evil 
and turns the logic around, making the Lamb appear the figure of sovereign violence and 
the Whore and Beast as a version of Rome that elicits sympathy and compassion. In order 
to defeat this “evil”, in becoming more sovereign, the Lamb turns into the killer and 
destroyer of such suffering subjects of Rome. 
Derrida relates the “more than” logic of sovereignty to height and virility, making 
the connection to erection and thus the automatism and rigidity of the erect phallus.
152
 As a 
male sovereign, the Lamb that battles for power could be read as fantasy for a virile 
sovereignty constructed as the “good”, as well as the highest, most potent. Rome, as the 
enemy of the Lamb, is conceptualized specifically as a prostitute, and it is the implications 
of this imagery that I will explore here more closely. The imagery of the Great Whore 
draws on many texts of the Hebrew Bible that liken prostitutes to cities, such as Tyre in 
Ezek. 27:3 and Isa. 23:17, Nineveh (capital of Assyria)in Nah. 3:4 and 2 Kings 16:5-16.
153
 
By characterising the figure of the Whore of Babylon as Rome, but also such cities as 
Tyre, Nineveh and Babylon, Koester suggests she is a figure for human evil power more 
generally but fails to note the specifically female association with evil.
154
 Elisabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza argues that because Revelation draws on the prophetic language of the 
Hebrew Bible, with its traditions of gendered imagery and language, the Whore of Babylon 
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should not be thought of as an actual woman.
155
 She suggests that just as the Lamb should 
not be thought of as an animal, the Whore’s symbolism for “human culture and political 
institutions” does “not tell us anything about the author’s understanding of actual 
women”.156 This may well be the case but that does not mean that her specifically female 
characterisations and context can be ignored or set aside as irrelevant or arbitrary.
157
 It 
would be impossible to “read” her without these particular characteristics.  
The debates in animal studies over the animal as an “other” to the human of course 
mirror Simone de Beauvoir’s famous characterisation of women as the “other” to man.158 
Just as she drew upon Aristotle’s understanding of women as lacking certain qualities 
reserved for man, and the Genesis story where Eve is created from Adam’s rib,159 the 
animal debate has similarly located such discursive sources as detrimental for animals. The 
Whore is such an “other” to the male figure of the Lamb, and thus Rome as evil is 
associated with a particular kind of woman, the prostitute, as well as the carnivorous brutal 
animal, thus associating evil with a sexualised woman and animal subjects in opposition to 
the Lamb’s male-divine sovereignty. Pippin argues we must refocus readings of Revelation 
on the gender-specific violence in this text, and that scholarly readings have too easily 
eschewed such images of violence.
160
 The Whore of Babylon is certainly one such image 
of violence of a woman and violence towards a woman, with her drinking of human blood 
(17:6) and then the later devouring of her own naked flesh (17: 16).  In the same way that 
the Beast of Revelation 17 has been mainly connected to Roman emperors rather than seen 
in the light of animals suffering in the Roman arenas, the Whore too is perhaps too easily 
eschewed as a symbolic emblem of Rome or indeed, of evil.
161
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John W. Marshall draws attention to the specifically sexualised violence in the 
scene with the Whore of Babylon of chapter 17,
162
 in that she is a distinctly female figure, 
made naked and also, as he puts it, cannibalistically eaten.
163
 As such she is both woman 
and animal. It is not easy to say “where the woman Babylon ends and the Beast begins, and 
not only because both are figures of imperial Rome: the woman’s savage appetite for 
human blood makes her akin to a predatory animal”.164 She is the tempting image of 
female sexuality to be voyeuristically viewed in an invitation to ‘Come’ (17:1) as a 
specifically female sexual seduction but ultimately a subject of destruction or annexation 
as Rome. As La Fontaine’s lamb is eaten, the Whore of Babylon is to be burned (17:16) 
like the remains of a sacrificial animal carcass and ‘devoured’ or consumed (17:16). 
Stripped of the marks of her seductive power, her flesh – sa,rx – will be made naked 
(gumno,j), like an animal or a raped woman. Roman power is associated with female 
powers: sexually seductive, gloriously clad ‘clothed in purple and scarlet, and adorned with 
gold and jewels and pearls’ (17:4). The great wonder proclaimed at the first sight of the 
Whore in 17: 6 could be read as curious allure or as abhorrence, with the first person use of 
the verb evqau,masa., to wonder or marvel at, followed closely by the noun, qau/ma, signalling 
amazement or admiration.
165
 But she is also construed as repellent force and bestial 
unrestrained power, breaking taboos relating to blood as if she/Rome were a carnivorous 
animal. In Powers of Horror, An Essay on Abjection, Kristeva discusses the abject or 
demoniacal potential associated with the feminine. This association “does not succeed in 
defining itself as other but threatens one’s own and clean self, which is the underpinning of 
any organization constituted by exclusions and hierarchies”.166 As Rome, the Whore is not 
wholly other but a space within which a battle must be fought, where what she represents 
must become excluded and demolished by the Lamb. Rome as abject is represented as a 
female prostitute and wild animal and thus “becomes synonymous with a radical evil that 
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is to be suppressed”.167  Related to a mother (mh,thr) of whores and to blood (ai[ma) in 17:5-
6, the Whore of Babylon becomes a prime image of an abject woman-animal. She is 
explicitly associated with what is unclean (avka,qartoj) in 17:4 over her ‘abominations’ 
(bde,lugma) and fornication (pornei,a). While the link between the Whore of Babylon and 
the Dea Roma seems probable, it is not as clear where the association with prostitution 
stems from. The connection between the Whore and animality might, however, shed light 
on this. As already mentioned, the image on the coin in which the goddess of Rome is 
depicted also shows the well-known Roman legend of the infants Romulus and Remus 
being nursed by a she-wolf. Aune explains that the Latin term lupa, she-wolf, had the 
connotation of prostitute.
168
 Revelation’s figure of the Whore could thus be toying with 
Roma’s proximity to the she-wolf as a prostitute-cum-animal. Further, her appearance in 
Revelation, colourfully clad and laden with jewellery draws on stereotypical descriptions 
of prostitutes in ancient literature.
169
 Aune goes on to discuss how the Roman deity was 
thought to have a secret name, widely thought to be “Amor”, the Latin name for love and 
“Roma”, spelled backwards.170 Romans were popularly viewed as descendants of Aeneas 
the son of Venus/Aphrodite – the goddess of love and sexuality – hence the link between 
Rome and love.
171
 “Since John depicts the goddess Rome as a prostitute, he may be 
consciously dragging the popular view in the dirt.”172  
Robert Knapp argues that in Roman towns and cities there was no shortage of 
prostitutes, hence the use of the figure of a whore as metonymic with Rome in 
Revelation.
173
 Paul Chrystal suggests that Rome alone had at least 45 brothels.
174
 
“Prostitutes were, quite literally, everywhere.”175 Prostitution was thus a widespread 
phenomenon in the Roman-Greco world, “a possibility for children, women and some few 
men, and a normalized sexual outlet for males”.176 This was a “familiar and popular 
aspect” of Roman life.177 In their article on the Whore of Babylon, Jennifer A. Glancy and 
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Stephen D. Moore, propose that readings of Revelation have been too “bookish” in their 
dealings with this figure, thus failing to take account of the Whore as a whore.
178
 It is 
perhaps another instance in which the “animal” and “woman” become too rapidly deflected 
as symbolic ciphers, and in this way disappear from view, fudged and forgotten. Glancy 
and Moore focus on the way in which the Whore is akin to a brothel or street prostitute 
rather than a courtesan. They argue that the references to pornei,a “would have conjured up 
first and foremost in the minds of the urban Christians addressed in Revelation a certain 
category of flesh-and-blood person” rather than a figure of high class literature and art in 
the form of a courtesan.
179
 As a prostitute in John’s “discourse of contempt”180 the Whore 
in Revelation would thus participate in commonly used sexual invective in Roman political 
discourse.
181
 The way in which the author of Revelation makes use of such imagery of 
prostitution, in conjunction with the image of the Dea Roma on the coin, demonstrates 
what Frilingos calls “the pulsing rhythms of Roman culture at play in the book of 
Revelation”.182 
But in addition to this reference to prostitution, there are other elements to the 
disgust conjured up by this representation of Rome as a Whore. Kristeva links notions of 
abjection to conceptions of the mother, as what every “man” comes from and what is 
necessarily left behind, retrojected from, thus becoming separate, other. Coming from the 
mother is associated with the abjection of the bodily, the unclean, blood, gore related to 
birth and separation from the body of the mother. Perhaps a primary symbol of the 
abjection of the mother is the way in which the vagina, birth and blood are related. This is 
ambiguous, however. As a vital element blood “refers to women, fertility, and the 
assurance of fecundation. It thus becomes a fascinating semantic crossroads, the propitious 
place for abjection where death and femininity, murder and procreation, cessation of life 
and vitality all come together”.183 Blood becomes associated with the female also in 
menstrual blood as the lack or failure of procreation and thus an improper sexuality not 
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tied to reproduction. It is thus “unclean”, “improper”, abject, a sign of the mother’s 
sexuality beyond the offspring and so conceived as excessive. As Glancy and Moore state, 
“the monstrous spectacle of a sexualized woman utterly out of control serves as a trope for 
imperial autocracy – absolute power exercised to excess, entirely without restraint.”184 But 
this is crucially dressed up in the apparel of animality. Like the blood the Whore drinks, 
blood here connotes also animal blood, in animal sacrifices and prohibitions against 
drinking blood. The Whore is thus associated with improper, boundless sexuality, the 
unclean, taboo, and animal carnivorousness, but remains a vital and powerful figure of 
such abjection. A “Terrible Mother” figure,185 the Whore is allied to the female prostitute 
as faithlessness or impurity as well as the animal wildness and carnivorousness of her 
Beast-like power. As a “mother” of whores and prostitute she is portrayed as Kristeva’s 
“excessive matrilineality” in relation to male power – that is, an organisation of power 
traced and inherited from the mother, and thus in competition with a male sovereignty.
186
 
Rome thus becomes the excessive woman-animal to the Lamb’s male sovereignty. The 
woman is too potentially (and potently) generative, uncontrollably so, and in domination 
over the male kings she seduces.
187
 The Whore is made an abject sign of the improper 
woman who is associated with excessive fertility in her boundless sexuality but also as one 
associated with the menstrual blood that signals waste, spreading her sexual powers in 
impure and uncontrollable ways, situated in the wilderness (17:3 e;rhmoj) as if an untamed 
(and perhaps untameable) beast. In this sense, the Whore becomes inextricably bound up 
with the wild animals of Revelation’s Beast as Rome, and Roman society becomes 
metonymic with unbounded promiscuity and wild animality. 
The faithlessness of the Whore could also be understood as Friesen sees it, in 
relation to eating meat of sacrificed animals. Such sacrifices took place in pagan rituals to 
Roman gods or in honour of human Roman power as divine-like, and so the act of eating is 
seen as faithless participation in Roman mainstream society while the animal meat here is 
seen as abject by association.
188
 To imbibe such animal flesh is thus associated with a 
disapproving view of faithless woman and a particular carnivorous carnality. Friesen 
argues that this fornication refers first and foremost to the unfaithfulness of eating 
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sacrificial meat,
189
 and so the way in which the Whore of Babylon is understood as a 
fornicator or prostitute and a negative symbol of Roman imperial power with its imperial 
cults and animal sacrifices underscores the resemblance imposed between a sexually 
licentious woman to abject animality, animal flesh and paganism.  
Kristeva suggests that what causes abjection is “what disturbs identity, system, 
order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the 
composite”.190 Abjection is above all ambiguity, Kristeva argues, and this ambiguity of 
abjection is tied to perpetual danger and risk.
191
 Abjection is a “composite of judgement 
and affect, of condemnation and yearning, of signs and drives”.192 Further, a certain logic 
of prohibition founds the abject.
193
 The Whore of Babylon’s ambiguity, and therefore 
abjection, is in part related to her particularly female sexual powers. With the description 
of her luxury she is also an alluring figure, seductive and tantalizing. As the prohibited 
other, the Whore is the power the Lamb desires to usurp and the power it is repelled by as 
“unclean”. Perhaps what she represents here is not only the sheer brute force of Roman 
power embodied in the Beast she rides, but rather the temptation to and of power: the 
seduction of sovereignty as an imagined space of unrestrained potency projected onto the 
female body in the wild, as if a free, untamed, unrestrained animal. The Whore of Babylon 
thus presents a dangerous boundary between the desired power of Rome and the rejected 
and despised Roman power: what must be killed and destroyed as too beastly and what is 
desired in consumption as satisfaction of desire. She is a dangerous boundary between 
desire and threat embodied in “the paradox of an enthroned prostitute”.194 Ambivalence 
haunts the description of her as naked, her flesh as if uncovered and relished in sexual 
rapture and between the violence of her desolation and letting the fire consume her. She is 
shown as abject in the need to repress such a desire for power and flesh.  
Caroline Vander Stichele notes the stereotype of the woman out of control, 
demanding mastery,
195
 reinforced by the image of the Whore as drunk (17:6), associated 
with the wine and drunkenness of the kings and inhabitants of the earth seduced by her 
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(17:2).
196
 Jean K. Kim connects the Whore to the references to whores in Jeremiah, 
particularly Jeremiah 3, as a metaphor for the relationship between the faithless people of 
Israel and the Lord. Kim points out that Jeremiah uses animal sexual imagery that could be 
compared to the lustful woman in Revelation 17, with the ‘restive young camel interlacing 
her tracks’ (Jer. 2:23), the ‘wild ass at home in the wilderness’ who is also licentious (Jer. 
2:24), and the ‘lusty stallions’ of Jer. 5:8.197 She argues that both “female imagery and 
animal imagery are here used to convey disgusting behaviours”,198  but the implication is 
that women are accountable for this behaviour, while animals are not.
199
 But there is more 
going on here than a simple distinction of accountability. The abject confronts us “with 
those fragile states where man strays on the territories of animal”.200 Just as the question is 
asked in Jeremiah about the ‘wild ass’: ‘Who can restrain her lust?’ (Jer. 2:24), the 
connection made between these animals and the woman of Revelation 17 as Rome is 
perhaps rather one of similar subjection to sovereign power as male, virile and carnivorous. 
The desire and wildness of such a woman-animal is thus an otherness that potentially 
escapes suppression, that poses a challenge, in that she also evokes the fragile state of male 
sovereign power. 
Concerning the relation between the Whore of Babylon and the Beast she rides, 
Pippin makes further interesting connections between the woman and animal. She refers to 
the Beast being said to ‘ascend from the bottomless pit’ (17:8). Pippin reads this as the 
jaws of an animal mouth but also as the vaginal opening of a woman,
201
 as if such a Beast 
could only be spawned by a woman or be retrojected from a beast’s mouth. And as if the 
jaws of a beast and the vaginal opening of a woman were similar, even interchangeable. 
Pippin states that “the image of the mouth of hell develops during this period and is fully 
imagined in the medieval hell-mouth iconography of a beast’s or bird’s (owl’s) mouth”.202 
Pippin also makes reference to Isaiah with its image of Sheol as an ‘enlarged’ ‘appetite’ 
and opened mouth ‘beyond measure’ (Is 5:14).203 She asks: “Does this mouth have lips? 
Could this be the poison kiss – the kiss of death? Or are these “lips” the vulva? Does this 
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mouth devour? Does this mouth have teeth – the vagina dentate, the agent of 
castration?”204 This would fit the imagery in Revelation 17 of the seductive, fornicating 
woman and the references to devouring and being devoured. Or to the temptation of this 
figure as well as her danger. There is, here, seemingly an implicit and sinister connection 
between eating and sexuality, the mouth and the vagina in being eaten by a wild beast or 
seduced by a woman. Rome as a wild animal/prostitute is thus what might eat its subjects 
or seduce them, and as such its force must be resisted in order to remain a sovereign 
subject rather than a slave or victim, but in doing so the risk is to participate in the very 
logic of power critiqued in the first place in a competition for sovereignty. 
Food, Kristeva writes, “becomes abject only if it is a border between two distinct 
entities or territories. A boundary between nature and culture, between the human and the 
non-human”.205 Kristeva discusses the way in which corpses too are a typical example of 
abjection. The Whore is imagined as both food and a corpse in the description of her fate 
(17:16). For Kristeva, as Lipschitz explains, “nothing is more abject, and hence more 
dangerous to the autonomous self, than the raw literalness and materiality of the corpse”,206 
which is both seen as part of the finite mortal creature and as other to its proper living 
body. “It is this abject return of the dead animal body and the embodied threat of the 
‘becoming-corpse’ of the subject” that the signs of a dead animal evoke in relation to the 
human form.
207
 Corpses and food are related in the animal body when the animal goes 
from life to flesh to be eaten. The Whore’s abjection is conveyed as an uncontrollable 
threatening female power which must be destroyed, but as a destruction that is legitimized 
as the Whore’s body is made non-human animal flesh, eaten and burnt like the carcass of a 
beast. But as a woman-animal, her status as “food” is ambiguous and haunting, on the 
boundaries between what is edible and what is not, what is clean and unclean, desirable 
and disgusting. The burning of the flesh is also significant in resembling something like a 
sacrificial ritual where the animal is turned from a living creature to become meat.
208
 The 
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Lamb is the figure who has died (5:12 ‘that was slaughtered’) but who does not remain 
dead (5:13 who will have dominion for ever and ever), whose flesh somehow avoids final 
death and so retains autonomy: the Whore, on the other hand, is entirely in the hands of, or 
rather mouths and claws of, the other who kills and survives her. Kristeva’s abject is 
marked by one quality of the object, namely that it is opposed to the “I”, the sovereign 
ipseity of the “I”.209 In the death of the Whore this is precisely what she is robbed of, her 
sovereignty, her ipseity and her life, made into an abject woman-animal other and a non-
living object.  
Stichele argues that the Whore of Babylon represents an “other” in colonial terms, 
“viewed as alien territory to be conquered and eventually destroyed”.210 She proposes that 
this rhetoric is founded in the female body of the Whore, thus presuming “an analogy 
between military and sexual invasion, the colonizer presented as male, the colonized as 
female”.211 The Whore’s body, as Rome, is thus what is desired to be conquered, to be 
possessed like a rape in a tension between desire and aversion towards the woman-animal 
other and the power of Rome. But, while the abject is conceived of outside or apart from 
the “I”, Kristeva argues that “from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease 
challenging its master”.212 It is interesting to note that while the Whore is shown to be a 
figure who will be killed off in Revelation 17, chapter 18 is almost wholly devoted to her, 
recounting descriptions of her and supplementing them as if she remains an obsessively 
haunting power impossible to banish. In fact, like the Beast as animals of the Roman 
arenas, the Whore might be seen as a challenge to her master, the Lamb, in being rather 
more like the weak power the Lamb supposedly signifies and thus is in fact the figure who 
elicits sympathy and compassion on the side of the good. Having erected this logic of the 
good, weak position of the Lamb against the evil, strong sovereignty of Rome, the logic of 
Revelation works against itself, by revealing the Whore as the pitiable, weak power and the 
Lamb as the strong sovereignty.  
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In depicting Rome as beasts and a prostitute, the animal and the woman take on 
particular roles as terrifying abject and powerful enemies to be destroyed by the Lamb. But 
as a female prostitute, the Whore is perhaps more like a lamb surrounded by wolves. 
Because prostitution was not illegal or seen to be breaking moral laws, as it was not 
considered adultery, prostitutes in the Roman Empire were generally left alone, 
unprotected.
213
As Knapp testifies, with very little protection for prostitutes and a frequent 
conflation of prostitutes with slaves, these women were considered “fair game” when it 
came to social and physical abuse.
214
 “The opportunities for exploitation and physical 
abuse were rampant”.215 While it was a source of income, and was recognised by the law in 
being a taxable trade,
216
 it frequently fell upon the vulnerable. Sarah B. Pomeroy, for 
instance, notes that baby girls and daughters were sometimes sold into prostitution by their 
parents
217
 and it can be assumed that many unskilled poor women made a living through 
prostitution, in a status lower even than slaves, whose welfare was at least maintained 
according to their value in a household.
218
 It was thus a dangerous life, most often located 
at the bottom of the social order. In his Ancient Women in Rome, Paul Chrystal links the 
way in which images of the phallus were popular throughout Rome, emphasising the 
dominance of male virility, or Derrida’s sovereign man, in the social order.219 Chrystal 
relates how female prostitutes and slaves were perceived as objects for men who desired to 
satisfy their sexual appetite, or to “demonstrate their virility and prowess over women: the 
prostitute allowed the client to assert his manhood and virility through serial 
penetration”.220 In Roman literature prostitutes are predominantly represented as 
marginalised, second-class citizens, vulnerable to male desire and the real and symbolic 
powers of the phallus.
221
  
In Revelation 17, then, Rome is represented as an alliance of the animal and the 
female, the animal specifically as the beast: the wild, feral, threatening, and the female 
specifically as the sexually faithless and abject prostitute. As such, Revelation 17 
associates both animals and women with evil others to be captured, devoured and burnt. 
But, as this construction of Rome can also be unveiled as the exploited, vulnerable, 
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captured animals of its arenas and the endangered, abused prostitutes of its cities and 
streets, the so-called “evil” figures of Revelation 17 emerge at the same time as weak 
suffering subjects. Rather than straightforward symbols of Roman imperial power and 
force, they prompt an awakening to the suffering of a more complex and deconstructed 
sovereignty within Rome. 
   
Deconstructed Sovereignties: An Other Rome and a Compassion Come 
 Rather than upping the ante further over the Lamb and participating in this logic of violent 
competition, the Whore of Babylon as a woman-animal might be said to represent 
Derrida’s alternative conception of sovereignty, namely a weak force. As a wild animal 
and prostitute she is both an other force and vulnerability: the rogue and the quarry. She is 
depicted as carnivorous violence, but she is also vulnerable weakness, attacked, and so 
deprived of sovereignty. She becomes an “other” to the Lamb, and “the other”, 
importantly, as “a weak force”.222  Barr suggests something similar when he remarks that 
“John’s story can certainly be read as an instance of patriarchal misogyny” but it also 
opens up for the possibility of seeing “John’s images of women Otherwise”.223 He calls the 
Great Whore or Whore of Babylon the Queen Ruler.
224
 While admitting she refers to the 
city of Rome, Barr also suggests that as a great city destroyed she could also signify 
Jerusalem, a ‘great city’ John has earlier referred to (11:8). He concludes that she is in 
other words a multifaceted symbol.
225
 Barr does not, however, draw conclusions as to what 
this signifies for concepts of power or sovereignty in Revelation, or for how these concepts 
tie in with representations of women, political power and animality. Nor does his 
deconstruction go further than describe this apparent paradox between the Whore as Rome 
and the Whore as Jerusalem. Stichele too proposes that “the righteous rhetoric of 
Revelation readily deconstructs itself, as the dualistic conceptual framework too easily 
allows for the colonized to play out a role reversal as colonizer, focused, sadly, on the 
dismemberment of the female body in text and history”.226 Building on this, and 
developing the idea further, I would like to explore what exactly such a “deconstructed” 
figure might signify.  
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Derrida puts forward the idea of the “other” as a “weak force” in Rogues, where he 
touches on many similar themes to The Beast and the Sovereign seminars. In fact, in 
Rogues too he refers to La Fontaine’s wolf and the lamb.227 Here he argues for the idea of a 
deconstructed sovereignty. Derrida refers to this in relation to the figure of God as the 
ultimate sovereign. Referring to God as an ontotheology of sovereignty, he is describing a 
model of sovereignty as the One and Only, an indivisible, omnipotent sovereign power.
228
 
It is the indivisibility of sovereignty that Derrida throughout his thinking of human/animal 
distinctions has been critiquing. That is, the idea that there might be an indivisible concept 
of the “human”, an indivisible threshold separating once and for all humans from animals. 
Indivisible sovereignty has thus been mapped onto the idea of the sovereign human or, 
rather “man”, in the conceptualisation of humans as the living being with powers of 
authority, language and reason, powers that denigrate animals to a lack of these sovereign 
properties and so to become subjects to human sovereignty. With the Lamb as a male 
figure of sovereignty against the female Whore and beast-riding queen, it is her otherness 
that threatens the indivisible power of the Lamb as King of kings.  
To repeat what was briefly mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Derrida 
goes on to say that it might be possible to think the name of God otherwise, even as a 
vulnerable nonsovereignty. Such a God would be a sovereignty that suffers and is 
divisible, even mortal, capable of contradiction and repentance – a God who deconstructs 
himself in his sovereignty and ipseity.
229
 With this thought, it is as if Derrida is referring to 
the comment in The Beast and Sovereign vol. I, where he, as mentioned above, points to 
Jesus as human and as lamb, a mortal, vulnerable creature. In that case, however, Derrida 
resisted this connection, presenting the Christ-lamb as a sovereign power, becoming allied 
with a translation of the logos as reason, word, language and life that becomes purely 
human in the Western philosophical tradition he examines. Having examined the Lamb 
figure of Revelation 17 it would appear that the Lamb is indeed allied to notions of 
sovereignty as divine-male force and power, indivisible as the sovereignty of sovereigns. It 
is the Whore of Babylon with the Beast who becomes the figure of divisible sovereignty, 
“a vulnerable nonsovereignty, one that suffers and is divisible, one that is mortal”.230 
Bauckham recounts how the image of God as an almighty powerful sovereign judge in 
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Revelation has come under heavy criticism in recent theological discussions.
231
 He notes 
that particularly feminist theologians have balked at this imagery and eschewed the 
patriarchal power dynamic displayed by this representation.
232
 As a divisible sovereignty 
the Whore of Babylon becomes an alternative figure to patriarchal power as triumphant, 
indivisible sovereignty.
233
 For Derrida, this “vulnerable force, this force without power” is 
what “exceeds the condition of mastery”.234 This would be for Derrida the horizon of a 
different thinking of power and sovereignty, a sovereignty that would not be linked to 
mastery, power, man, or to sovereign indivisibility.
235
 This would be the emergence of 
another vision of Rome, not as grittily whorish and brutally animal, but a Rome of socially 
and marginalized subjects: its captured arena-animals and its prostitutes. This Rome is not 
“lamb” through and through as merely weak; the animal and the female here remain other 
as wild, threatening powers that challenge male mastery. But this otherness is also 
vulnerable, weak, subject to virile, carnivorous powers. What are the implications of such 
an other sovereignty? 
The destruction of the Whore could be read in line with what Derrida calls 
autoimmunity. Autoimmunity is when something “can spontaneously destroy, in an 
autonomous fashion, the very thing within it that is supposed to protect it against the other, 
to immunize it against the aggressive intrusion of the other”.236 The woman is the one who 
rules over the kings represented in the many heads and horns of the Beast, and yet it is 
these members of her own “body” or alliance who destroy her when the Beast devours her 
flesh. It is a self-weakening, then, a self-destruction. Koester makes this point when he 
comments that evil “self-destructs” in regard to this scene, but does not draw further 
inferences from this point.
237
 But there is more to this than a “sobering message” “that 
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God’s judgement is carried out when he allows those who wreak destruction to become 
victims of their own practices”.238 For Derrida, facing the other in the figure of the animal 
other involves a passivity, and so a renunciation of power and the “I” as sovereign 
autonomy. Only this would make an encounter with the other as other possible. For such a 
confrontation with the animal other to be able to take place, 
it must, beyond all mastery, affect a passivity. It must touch an exposed 
vulnerability, one without absolute immunity, without indemnity; it must touch this 
vulnerability in its finitude and in a nonhorizontal fashion, there where it is not yet 
or is already no longer possible to face up to the unforseeability of the other.
239
 
Derrida connects this to autoimmunity in the sense that such a self-weakening gesture 
actually opens up a vulnerability and so a space for the encounter with the other. As 
Lawlor explains it, “the weak force will be a vulnerability that makes life unconditionally 
open to what comes: it receives”.240 “In this regard, autoimmunity is not an absolute ill or 
evil. It enables the exposure to the other, to what and to who comes – which means that it 
must remain incalculable”.241 The deconstructed sovereignty of Derrida’s other is 
connected to the messianic as the coming of good or evil. This messianism “follows no 
determinate revelation”.242 It is linked to an “invincible desire for justice” but is marked by 
a not-knowing; in the face of it one cannot “be certain of anything, either through 
knowledge, consciousness, conscience, foreseeability or any kind of programme as 
such”.243 Derrida writes further: 
This justice, which I distinguish from right, alone allows the hope, beyond all 
‘messianisms,’ of a universalizable culture of singularities, a culture in which the 
abstract possibility of the impossible translation could nevertheless be announced.  
This justice inscribes itself in advance in the promise, in the act of faith or in the 
appeal to faith that inhabits every act of language and every address to the other.
244
 
Mansfield sees this messianic coming as an openness to the other as a justice linked with 
the idea of gift: “a gift-justice”.245 It is only in being open to this spectrum of possibility 
that any event in regard to the other as other takes place. What this means for relations to 
the (animal) other, is what Mansfield calls “gift-justice as pre-justice”;  “It is the giving to 
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the other the conditions that make giving possible.”246 As Shakespeare points out in regard 
to Derrida’s messianism, he “does not promise another world after death, or a revelation of 
absolute knowledge, but institutes a different relation to the other here and now”.247 But 
this encounter with the other in the “here and now” is what institutes a promise oriented 
towards the future because it denies the sovereign competition that leads to the death or 
subjugation of the other that is the opposite of gift. Only in such an encounter and the 
promise of peace and commonality in giving or offering response and responsibility 
towards the other as other can the hope of a justice exist and compassion come. This other 
Rome, then, with its deconstructed subjects, the prostitutes and the animals who are both 
powerfully “other” and “weak” subjects, could be read as the invitation to another relation 
to the other. Rather than as a mere marionette of “evil”, this other Rome unmasks the 
suffering subjects buried in the layers of this text, to be encountered, to be given attention 
and compassion. 
Of course, there is something grotesque, or monstrous, about my reading of the 
Whore of Babylon as an abject woman-animal whose “Rome” can be seen as an exemplar 
of a deconstructed sovereignty. In a sense, this is an impossible reading. She is both too 
marred by negative associations to become an anti-hero of this kind, and, crucially, the 
implications of turning her into an anti-hero appear to glorify prostitution or more 
generally, violence done to female and/or animal bodies. The vulnerable, beaten, 
consumed and destroyed woman and animal body thus becomes potentially held up as an 
idealized deconstructed sovereignty, as if it was a sadomasochistic eulogy to abused 
bodies. As such, viewing her Rome as a deconstructed sovereignty presents a potential 
glorification of the broken female or animal body as well as of violent blood-thirstiness in 
the hope for a compassion to come. Did Derrida, then, not imagine the implications of his 
deconstructed sovereignty when imprinted on real weak and subjected women or animals 
in political systems? Further, what of the issue of amalgamating women and animals in this 
way, as if to be an animal in the Roman arenas were essentially similar to be a prostitute in 
the Roman Empire, thus surely reinstating age-old misogynistic connections between 
woman and animals? There are clearly numerous reasons why this reading might be 
viewed as problematic, even perverse.  
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In their introduction to the issue of feminism and animals, Lori Gruen and Kari 
Weil argue that despite the criticism Derrida has sometimes come under by feminists in 
animal studies,
248
 he in fact mirrors many of the concerns feminist scholars have 
propounded on the related concerns between gender and animality.
249
 The two aspects in 
his work they emphasise, and that I too have emphasized in my accounts of Derrida’s 
question of the animal, are compassion and the particularity of every context and 
encounter. If, as Schüssler Fiorenza puts it, “Revelation’s central problem and topic is the 
issue of power and justice”250 the alternative vision of Rome, then, is a recognition of 
powerlessness and in this, the demand of pathos, the presence of suffering,  justice 
becomes as a call for compassion and gift of response. Derrida poses the question: what if 
the political were based in the fabular? What if political discourse and even action were 
instituted by “something fabular, by that sort of narrative simulacrum, the convention of 
some historical as if, by that fictive modality of ‘storytelling’ that is called fabulous or 
fabular” “and which administers, right in the world of the hors-d’oeuvres of some 
narrative, a moral lesson, a ‘moral’?”251 This would certainly fit to a great extent with the 
afterlife of Revelation with the Beast and Whore as “evil” and the Lamb as the “good” in a 
viral biblical fable.
252
 In his remarks on the history of the interpretation of Revelation, Barr 
notes how Origen of Alexandria promoted a symbolic interpretation, with Revelation not 
predicting the future but “presenting images of the struggle between good and evil in the 
world”.253 There has been endless speculation as to who the seven kings referred to 
represent, that do not appear to quite fit the Roman emperors and so become endlessly 
pliable to other figurations of “evil”. Whether the Beast refers to Nero,254 however, or to 
particular emperors, or to other “evils”, it is important to note Derrida’s point about the 
political and the fabular. The point he makes is that conceptions of the sovereignty of man 
and the political constellations of human societies become symbolically caught up in 
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spectacles and symbolisms of animality that escape further notice and attention, such as 
Roman power represented in the animals of its arenas. Real living animals and women 
become invisible or forgotten in this human fabular zoo-politics.  
Taking account of a deconstructed sovereignty, then, is perhaps no more than an 
awakening to a justice that is never enough or flawless yet which never ceases to pay 
attention to the infinite particularity of irreducible singularities of contexts and creatures, 
who cannot be straightforwardly mapped onto, or remain within, symbolic territories of 
good or evil, villain or victim, figurative or literal. Responsibility and justice in regard to 
ethical encounters with others demands attention to the irreducible singularity of every 
context and every other. This is founded first of all in compassion. Suffering, pity, and 
compassion, for Derrida, and “the sharing of this suffering among the living” has to be 
brought to bear on the thinking of law, ethics, and politics.
255
 Josephine Donovan critiques 
the determination in early and influential animal rights theory to abstemiously avoid 
compassion in the risk of sentimentality.
256
 But for Derrida, the emphasis on the life of the 
animal other in an awakening to ethics, and thus also to justice and law, is about 
compassion, even about pathos. There can be no justice without a living with that is 
founded in compassion towards the other, as it is only in such an encounter with the other 
that justice can be hoped for. This is a dream for a universal compassion but one that does 
not homogenize or generalize, and as such remains perhaps the impossible. Nonetheless, it 
pays heed to specific encounters and contexts in which the status of the other as abject or 
object, as human or non-human, sovereign or non-sovereign, cannot be determined in 
advance as enemy or ally, but rather, must be curiously followed and continuously 
awakened to. Curiosity, as Derrida explains, “is primarily the desire to know, to see, and to 
inform oneself – but also to take care, to provide care (cura, treatment, both domestic and 
therapeutic, hospital-based), to inspect with care, and to care for”.257 This would be a 
knowledge, not as pouvoir, an “I can”, but as an “I follow” curiously, caringly, 
compassionately. At the same time, following can never be completely immune from 
hunting or persecution, and as such always abides in the tension between curiosity and 
captivity. This also, is something that must be lived with. Knowledge must be turned to not 
                                                          
255
 TATTIA, 26. 
256
 Josephine Donovan, “Animal Rights and Feminist Theory”, Signs 15.2 (1990), 350-75. She analyses the 
way in which Peter Singer seeks to avoid animal rights being sentimentalized. Tom Regan professes similar 
concerns about animal studies not being about emotions or sentimentality. “Animal Rights and Feminist 
Theory”, 350-351. 
257
 BS I, 296. 
Chapter 4: Derrida’s Wolf and Lamb 
 
 
210 
 
only as Derrida’s “reason of the strongest” but as a curiosity and care for reading and 
treating otherwise, in resisting a regard that fixes the other as the already-guilty quarry. 
 
Conclusion: Compassion Come 
In this chapter I have outlined the figure of the lamb as the animal other in Derrida’s 
discussion of animality and sovereignty in The Beast and Sovereign vol. I. While the lamb 
is the exemplar of the animal other for Derrida’s thinking of human-animal relations in 
regard to the other and the ethics of otherness, the beast is the figure of the human as a 
sovereign indivisible “I” with the power and privilege of its supposedly exclusive “I can” 
and “I see”.  Alluding to another lamb, the Christ-lamb, Derrida briefly engages with what 
might be sketched as the Christian legacy on conceptualisations of the “human” as that 
which has logos and life as they are tied to reason, autonomy and sovereignty. Derrida 
appears to designate the Christ-lamb as an example of sovereignty in the figure of the 
small or weak, but nonetheless characterised by potency and power. In fact, it appears that 
what Derrida implies – although it is not stated explicitly – is that the Christ-lamb as logos 
and life is complicit in the model of sovereignty in which the human or man plays God as 
indivisibly sovereign, with animals, women and slaves as subjects to this sovereignty. 
Presenting the scene of Revelation 17, I suggested that in the competition for 
sovereignty the Lamb becomes a divine-male sovereign figure of power akin to La 
Fontaine’s carnivorous wolf; as the Lamb instrumentalises the Beast to devour, lay bare 
and kill the Whore of Babylon, the Lamb himself becomes (symbolically) a carnivore and 
“beast”. As such he is no longer the victim of the Roman domination the author of 
Revelation critiques, but rather a participant in its logic of power. Revelation 17 could be 
seen as denigrating both animals and women in one fell swoop by characterising political 
evil – Rome – as a beast and whore. A logic of sympathy for the weak is implied in the 
figure of the Lamb up and against the evil powers of Rome as a many-headed Beast ridden 
by a blood-drinking prostitute. But the Lamb is not in fact such a weak figure, rather, he 
becomes a hyper-masculine representation of indivisible sovereignty that participates in the 
very logic of carnivorous, virile force it supposedly critiques. As the Lamb becomes Beast-
like, another image of Rome emerges. This image is the Rome of suffering animals and 
women, in the captured and killed animals of the Roman arenas and the abused and 
vulnerable prostitutes of its cityscape. Revelation 17 thus seemingly presents both a 
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denigrating vision of animals and women as emblems of evil political power, but 
simultaneously overturns this vilification by providing the glimpse of a deconstructed 
sovereignty in the Whore and Beast as creatures demanding a compassion (to) come for the 
suffering subjects of political systems. My reading shows, then, that Revelation 17 does 
contain the possibility of a sovereignty that is deconstructed, allied to animals and a 
woman, thus presenting a way of reading sovereign power otherwise, but that is hidden in 
the shadow of the Lamb who becomes wolf. 
  
 
 
Conclusion 
Living On (With) Derrida, the Bible, and Animals 
 
Derrida’s tone in The Animal that Therefore I am is perhaps surprisingly earnest with its 
“naked words”, as Matthew Chrulew notes.1 He judges this earnestness “far from the 
habitual mode of deconstruction”.2 One reason for the slowness of catching up with 
Derrida’s work on the animal might be the persistent investment in Derrida as an abstract 
philosophical thinker whose work, for all its emphasis on context and current issues, can be 
generalised into a “deconstructive” how to question, interrogate, unravel and cleverly 
reveal, without taking account of the particular what (or who) of his thinking. The 
temptation might well be to succumb to a deconstructive methodological machine in 
reading Derrida, this becoming its own obsessive point of orbit, merely churning out 
questions that remain in the atmosphere without orientation or destination. To identify 
Derrida’s interest in canonical traditions is undoubtedly correct, but fails to follow through 
the what or who of such an interest, and the singularity of such a subject. Derrida’s 
deconstructive thought is indeed “a way of inheriting” texts, traditions and canons, 
“following in the foot-steps of what was done and breaking from it in its name, opening up 
from the past a never closed future”.3 It is perhaps a “a recurrence of the past that 
facilitates the possibility of a future”,4 but this is not an end point. What are we inheriting? 
Or who? Who do we carry, as Leonard Lawlor might ask.
5
 And where to? Into what future? 
Or, to echo Derrida, who are we following? This question is of course linked to 
inheritance. While “To follow and to be after” are indeed at the heart of the question for 
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 Chrulew, “Feline Divinanimality: Derrida and the Discourse of Species in Genesis”. 
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 Fagan et al, Derrida, Negotiating the Legacy, 5. 
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5
 See Lawlor’s discussion of carrying and what he argues is its importance for Derrida’s discussion of 
animals, in This Is Not Sufficient, 10, 74, 92, 96-97, 113. With the notion of carrying, Lawlor is adding his 
own trope to Derrida’s emphasis on following, by drawing together Derrida’s discussion of responsibility for, 
and in the face of, the other and of Kraft and tragen in BS II, 105-112. 
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Derrida – indeed, “the question of the question”6, and thus of philosophy – they are also 
crucially “the question of what we call the animal”.7 Why the animal? Because the animal 
denotes for Derrida the foreclosed subject of philosophy, the other who has been conceived 
as so “other” that it is not followed, or not even attended to. Why? Perhaps because such a 
subject appears silly, too easily associated with children, fables, and, with a sentimentalism 
that appears awkwardly out of place in the corridors of critical theory. Derrida is perhaps 
also increasingly perceived as rather passé, associated with the 1968 thinkers, now seen as 
somewhat crusty around the edges; or with the French “high theory” associated with the 
1980s, having overrun its due-date. “[I]s not the spirit gone?”, as Bruno Latour asks.8 He 
continues: “While we spent years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the 
appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real and incontrovertible 
facts hidden behind the illusion of prejudices?”9 Latour is writing in frustration about the 
lack of public trust in scientific discourses around climate change, due, perhaps to 
postmodern suspicions of objective claims to the “real”. A similar question could be posed 
as to the importance of acute animal suffering, the perceived “strangeness” of such a 
subject for someone so embroiled in the mires of “theory” as Derrida. As I have tried to 
show – and will go on to discuss further in this conclusion – taking account of animal 
suffering is a matter of critical thinking addressing legacies that have come to impact on 
conceptions of human power and animal inferiority. The question of the animal is a matter 
for critical thought that cannot be reduced to a facile dichotomy between theory and 
practice. 
 As if confessing to the absurdity of his hope, Derrida calls his interest in 
autobiography and animals a “crazy project of constituting everything thought or written 
within a zoosphere, the dream of an absolute hospitality and an infinite appropriation”.10 
Such an absolute hospitality would be an opening or openness to every other, as well as the 
texts which we inhabit. An infinite appropriation would be the testament to the tension 
between the necessity of appropriation in engaging with any other, text or topic, and the 
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Conclusion: Living On (With) Derrida, the Bible, and Animals 
 
 
214 
 
way in which this engagement must be ceaseless, never resting, so as not to “capture” the 
other and put an end to relationality by asserting an overpowering control. In the emphasis 
on autobiography and the autobiographical “I” throughout The Animal That Therefore I 
Am, Derrida describes himself autobiographically as a philosopher-animal. For Derrida this 
involves reflecting over the philosophical tradition he follows, and questioning what such 
following means. “What does one do when one follows? What is it I am doing when I am 
(following)?”11 There is no way of being without following and no following without 
responsibility; there is no stance of solitude “away from” the ethical, the political, the 
demands of justice, compassion and critical thought. The other that I follow may see me, 
may demand of me a response, it is to the other that I follow that I respond and I return his 
or her gaze. The “I”, the philosopher, the subject, does not stand solipsistically or in 
superiority as a powerful super-subject. There is always vulnerability before the other who 
sees me. Through the risk of vulnerability, Derrida’s thought orients us towards response 
and responsibility, to a future that is always other, never the result of a fixed program 
continuous with monolithic traditions or a given history, but that is always still to be 
thought. As such, Derrida’s work is not stable or static. While animals might be a pertinent 
and urgent appeal to challenging notions of the other as a human other, thus implicitly 
denoting a calculating ethics that attempts to control and curb otherness, this is not the end 
point to thinking the otherness of the other. Nor is it an end point to thinking ethics, justice 
and hospitality.  
 I have proposed that Derrida inscribes his own signature as a thinker into the 
history of philosophy in a particularly self-conscious way over the question of the animal. 
Reflecting on his method, Derrida asks of the steps of his thought-process:  
Do they not resemble the running of an animal that, finding its way on the basis of 
a scent or a noise, goes back more than once over the same path to pick up the 
traces, either to sniff the trace of another or to cover its own by adding to it, 
precisely as though it were that of another, picking up the scent, therefore, of 
whatever on this track demonstrates to it that the trace is always that of another, 
demonstrating also that in following the consequence or direction of this double 
arrow (it is a matter of the scent, and the scent one smells is anyways the trace of 
another), the animal becomes inevitable, and, before it, the animot.
12
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Derrida thus quite openly characterises his particular style and legacy as a thinker of 
animality.
13
 The final word – “animot” – connects an abiding interest throughout his work 
that is also at the heart of his work on animals, namely, language, words, what a word 
means – mot – but further, for the question of the animal, what a word can do in naming 
something or someone, its power, potency, and performativity. At the same time, Derrida 
maintains a sense of a word’s vulnerability, its changeability and capriciousness from one 
language to another, its elusiveness as a signifier and the connection between the particular 
and the general in language.
14
 “The said question of the said animal in its entirety comes 
down to knowing not whether the animal speaks but whether one can know what respond 
means. And how to distinguish a response from a reaction.”15 This distinction made 
between a response and a reaction captures Derrida’s critique of the Western philosophical 
tradition he examines, it becomes the leading force behind his engagement in this 
distinction as a matter of language, with its relation to responsibility, technology, life, and 
power, or, as Derrida is keener to emphasise, powerlessness in being deprived of the 
possibility of response.  
Speaking from this “island of exception”16 he declares that since he began writing 
“I have dedicated to the question of the living and of the living animal…I have addressed it 
a thousand times, either directly or obliquely, by means of readings of all the philosophers 
I have taken an interest in”.17 Whether this can be said to be correct or not (and who is to 
say what Derrida’s work will have been “about”?), I have argued that his legacy cannot be 
thought without the question of the animal being of utmost importance for his signature as 
a thinker, in his unique contribution, but equally in the attempt he always makes to situate 
his work in context(s), in relation to traditions, and to reflect on what living in the world 
means. Contrary to an island existence of abstract reflection in isolation, Derrida’s thinking 
on animality is always about what living with means, and living after, and these terms 
quickly become about animals – living with animals, living after animals. As Turner puts 
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it, “subjects after Derrida are never alone”.18 This calls for an anti-solipsistic engagement 
with the past and the present – who and what we follow – with the other , a heteronomous 
otherness whose law we stand before, but further, for Derrida, this is directed towards a 
future horizon of a justice to come, and the dream of an indiscriminate hospitality.  
Royle goes on to suggest that in many ways “the reading of his work is still ahead 
of us, scarcely begun”.19 I agree with Royle on this point, due to the complexity and 
challenge that Derrida’s work presents, but almost equally, in light of the 
misunderstandings and obscurantism that orbit his name. Royle’s point is even more 
clearly the case with Derrida’s work on animality. To start to think Derrida’s legacy, it is 
imperative that we begin to follow this later work on animality and thus respond to it, as an 
inheritance that we do not wholly own; that is still to come, and yet that must be received 
and continue to be received and responded to, curiously and responsibly, properly and 
improperly. In what follows I will first summarize the points I made in the four chapters, 
regarding Derrida’s question of the animal and his biblical references, and the biblical texts 
I put forward as responses. Secondly, I pose some potential critical questions as to the 
question of the animal as merely yet another apocalyptic shibboleth that allows armchair-
intellectuals to feel smugly conscientious. In response, I discuss what it means to read and 
engage with Derrida today, in light of his methodology and philosophy, as well as picking 
up on a turn to religion in the Humanities.  
 
The Bible: An Ambiguous Animal Archive 
In this thesis I have drawn attention to the biblical themes of Derrida’s work on animality. 
Explaining how these themes and references relate to his question of the animal more 
broadly, I have also developed them further with reference to other significant texts in the 
biblical archive about animals: Genesis 9, Daniel, Acts 10 and Revelation 17. As I outlined 
in the introduction, this is important for two reasons. The first is that Derrida’s thinking on 
animals is oriented around his biblical examples in crucial but somewhat implicit ways, in 
the shadow of the Western philosophical tradition he pursues and the haunting idea of 
Judeo-Christian blame concerning animal life. I suggest that Derrida’s legacy for animal 
studies as well as his own corpus can only be gauged with an engagement with his biblical 
                                                          
18
 Lynn Turner, “Introduction: The Animal Question in Deconstruction”, in The Animal Question in 
Deconstruction, ed. Lynn Turner (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 3. 
19
 Ibid. 
Conclusion: Living On (With) Derrida, the Bible, and Animals 
 
 
217 
 
references and readings, their function, significance and implications. At the same time, as 
mentioned, these are haunted by the uncritical blame apportioned to the “Judeo-Christian” 
as complicit with Cartesianism and a carnivorous, patriarchal culture. The second reason 
for developing Derrida’s biblical themes and supplementing them with explorations of 
further biblical texts is that this archive cannot be categorized easily as either blame-
worthy or redemptive for thinking about animals today, despite responses in scholarship on 
both sides of this divide. Whether “the Bible” is guilty or emancipatory, it is an important 
cultural archive that lives on in cultural memory as “commencement” and 
“commandment”. Perceived as an origin point and a normative corpus for Western culture 
and civilization, it is a significant locus for tracing relationships between animal, human 
and divine, for culture, religion, philosophy, politics, ethics, law and literature.  
To recap, I suggested that Derrida uses the themes of nakedness and shame in 
relation to Gen. 1-4. Staging his own thinking as a nakedness before “cat or God” becomes 
the foundation for his two tropes of being seen and being after. Being seen by God sets in 
motion his thinking of, and demand for, accountability, responsibility and autobiography as 
confession. Being after the animal is conceived in the gaze of his cat before whom he feels 
ashamed and called into being as a naked human, as well as Adam’s creation after the 
animals in the first creation story. Nakedness and shame in relation to Genesis and its God 
become Derrida’s way to portray the vulnerable exposure of humans to accountability, 
crime and guilt. By orienting the human “I” around shame and consciousness of good and 
evil in his allusions to Genesis, Derrida turns the autobiographical solitude of the human 
subject in the philosophical tradition he traces into a confessional relational stance of living 
with, living accountably before the law of the other as a justice in abeyance, and after the 
animal other as the first-comer. For Derrida, the nakedness of the body connotes the 
vulnerability of exposure to the other and the impossibility of separating the “I think” from 
a physical body and from relations to other bodies in the world. Nakedness is the sign of 
exposed vulnerability. Humans and animals share such an embodied and finite state. 
Derrida’s theme of nakedness is thus intended to draw attention to the vulnerability of the 
body as a mortal thing capable of suffering, humans and animals alike, in their living 
bodies and shared finitude. The self-consciousness delineated in nakedness and shame is 
an “awakening” experience to the other who sees me, which becomes the condition for 
ethics as a relational response and responsibility coming from the other and given to the 
other. In the “or” between cat or God, a justice done to his cat as a singular, particular 
other is synonymous with a justice before the law of God as the one who sees, takes 
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account, but does not intervene. The God who sees is thus the name of a justice to come, 
while the animal other is the particular encounter that demands my response and 
responsibility in the here and now.  
 In relation to Derrida’s scene before the animal who sees him naked and the God in 
whose sight he stands, I provided a reading of Genesis 9 that builds on Derrida’s 
reflections on nakedness and accountability before God and in relation to animals. I 
showed that on the one hand, Genesis 9 is a prime site for locating the sovereignty of 
“Man” given by God to humans, in order to see the power of humans over the animal 
world. On the other hand, however, Genesis 9 stages the tensions in such a power dynamic, 
in light of the emphatic covenant with all life and the “reckoning” or “accounting” for all 
life prescribed as a justice to come by God. Because animals are now in principle killable, 
this justice is a space of decidability: animals become a site in which humans must decide 
how to respond, with “good or evil”. Such a justice cannot be wholly programmed in 
advance or it would not be a justice to come that demands responsibility in the face of such 
a horizon. With the scene between Noah, exposed naked, animal-like, in the gaze of his 
son, and the following curse and demotion of Canaan to servitude, tensions in the 
differentiation between humans and animals are played out further over the exposure of 
nakedness and the performance of sovereign power. Noah’s exposure as naked and 
Canaan’s demotion to a non-brother or even non-human convey the fragile, slippery 
divisions between human life and animal life, showcasing thus the difficulties in 
delineating who or what is in fact killable and edible and who or what is a brother and 
neighbour. In the face of God as a horizon of justice, who will take account of all the living 
and whose covenant is with all life, the differentiations and distinctions between humans 
and animals are thus more problematic and questionable than a simple acceptance of 
carnivorous, sovereign human power would appear at first glance. Rather, in the face of 
such a horizon of justice, a demand for response to, and responsibility for, all life is 
seemingly what is relentlessly required. 
In the second chapter I explored how Derrida’s thinking of a deconstructed subject 
becomes linked to the response “here I am”. Derrida only touches on this in The Animal 
that Therefore I am, but it forms the only response he specifically formulates to his 
emphatic themes of response and responsibility. It is also the response he proffers in 
turning from autobiography to confession and thus an always already responsible relation 
to the other rather than the solipsism of the singular “I”. Building on his reference to “cat 
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or God”, where the cat is identified, but God is rather more ambivalent, the “here I am” 
response features importantly also in his reading of Abraham’s response to God in Genesis 
22 in The Gift of Death. In order to pursue further what it might mean to follow Derrida’s 
God, then, I examined what such a “here I am” response signifies. As an example of 
automaticity and responsibility at the same time, Derrida shows how such a response to 
God is both a sign of radical responsibility in trusting the other as other, who calls and 
demands the incomprehensible and impossible of me, as well as the least responsible 
response in the “blind” faith it asks. I suggested that the Book of Daniel also presents a 
scene before “cats”, or rather lions, and God. Exploring this text further thus provided a 
way of extrapolating on what it might mean to follow God in relation to animality. In 
relation to the Book of Daniel I argued that two visions of following animal and divine are 
presented, one fantasy for a world in which the domesticated animal status of all living 
subjects under divine rule is revealed as empowering and life-giving, and another in which 
the collapse of such a shared animal domesticity takes place in envisioning how such 
subjects are vulnerable to becoming prey to carnivorous and brutal political power-play. 
To respond “here I am” in this context is thus both to follow God in a triumphant levelling 
of human power to an equal status – kings and animals alike – under the only powerful 
ruler, God, who gives life, and to recognise the exposure to risk of such vulnerability under 
other, more ferocious, less domestic (human) animals and to a potentially less domestic 
God. 
The third biblical reference I examined in Derrida’s response to the question of the 
animal was the commandment “Thou shalt not kill”. Derrida indicts the way in which this 
has been understood by the Judeo-Christian tradition as “Thou shalt not murder”, or “Thou 
shalt not kill humans”. In this sense he posits this commandment as a negative biblical 
legacy that still resonates in modern ethics. Referring to the story of Cain and Abel, 
Derrida shows how the sacrificial killing of an animal in a competition for favour and 
show of power leads to the killing of a brother. He suggests that the accepted sacrificial 
killability of animals is a foundation for ethics that prompts the possibility of further 
acceptances of exclusion, violence and killability. Derrida implies that God regrets the 
favouring of sacrificial flesh, as if taking account of its negative consequences. Derrida’s 
point with this is to show how quickly the human other, or the “brother” or “fellow”, 
becomes potentially exclusive, making others ipso facto killable. Animals are one 
significant, but by no means only, example of such an exclusion. Derrida’s dream for an 
unconditional hospitality is linked to the possibility of a regard for all life and for every 
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other. His dream for an unconditional justice is linked to an ethics in which the 
deconstructed subject stands before the other, coming after, offering an “after you” to the 
other as any other, in which each stands in an asymmetrical but nonetheless shared 
dynamic of vulnerability and power.  
Picking up on the biblical legacy of killing, I pointed out that the correlative laws 
about clean/unclean in the Pentateuch is a way of positing categories of the living between 
killability and non-killability. By turning to Acts 10 I was able to explore this further over 
the question of the killability of animals and the hospitality of humans in relation to the 
awkward and thwarted category of the “Judeo-Christian”. Two prominent discussions in 
scholarship on Acts and Acts 10 in particular are its universalism and the extent to which it 
is more “Jewish” or more “Christian”. What is neglected is the way in which its 
presentation of groups of animals along with the categories of clean and unclean could be 
read as foundational for both discussions, of universalism and of the “Judeo-Christian”, its 
divisions, fissions, amalgamations and intermingling. The animals in Acts 10 and their 
significance for both these debates are not taken into account because of the swiftness in 
which animals are perceived in non-literal ways, with purely symbolic functions and with 
anthropologic and anthropocentric meanings. Reading Acts 10 more literally in regard to 
its animals, I showed two possible interpretations: one that presents something akin to 
Derrida’s dream for an unconditional hospitality, and one that leads to indiscriminate 
killability. Both could be read together in light of Derrida’s reflections on life and death. 
The first interpretation would follow on from the line in Acts 10 referring to “the living 
and the dead”, where humans and animals are similarly “sacred” or “clean” lives: all 
equally under the Lord of all. The second interpretation also refers to such a shared state of 
life, only it emphasises the killability of both humans and animals as mortal creatures 
vulnerable to the potential carnivorous violence of every other. While killability would be 
the sanctioned “killableness” of particular living beings, I posited mortability as the shared 
condition of mortal life and in being given over to the hands of others after death. Those 
who come after me will always live on beyond my power. Further, the other can always 
condemn me to a living death, eating and killing me in a close encounter. As such, the 
aporia of Acts 10 showcases Derrida’s dream for unconditional hospitality as well as the 
risk of every hospitable encounter and relation as to the other’s possible violence and my 
vulnerability.  
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In the fourth and final chapter I explored Derrida’s thinking of sovereignty and 
animality as categories of the political. Derrida outlined how conceptions of the political in 
modernity has been grounded both in a human order that has subjugated animals and 
excluded gods, setting the human up as god, and how the political order is represented as 
animal. In this chapter I drew attention to the way Derrida conceptualized the figure of the 
wolf as a model of sovereignty as male, virile, carnivorous power. The lamb became a 
symbol of the weak and innocent animal other, subject to such wolfish power. In his 
discussion of various representations of sovereignty, I showed that Derrida touches on the 
symbol of the Lamb in the New Testament as a figure for the zoological Jesus. In this case, 
Derrida suggested the figure of the Lamb is sovereign, in becoming associated with the 
logos as sovereign powers of reason. While he brings women and sexual difference into his 
discussion of animality and sovereignty on multiple occasions, these allusions remain 
elusive – an aspect of Derrida’s work that I suggested needed developing further. 
Extrapolating on this, I presented a scene in the Book of Revelation, in chapter 17, 
where the zoological Jesus as Lamb features as a triumphant sovereign figure. Analysing 
this influential religio-political fable it is clear that a logic of sympathy for the weak is 
implied in the figure of the Lamb up and against the evil powers of Rome as a many-
headed Beast ridden by a blood-drinking prostitute. But the Lamb is not in fact such a 
weak figure; rather, it becomes a hyper-masculine representation of sovereignty that 
participates in a logic of carnivorous, virile force. Rome is represented as an amalgamation 
of a beast and a prostitute, as if to be associated with wild animals and women denote its 
utter abjection, violence and brutality. As the Lamb becomes beast-like, however, another 
image of Rome emerges. This image is the Rome of suffering animals and women, in the 
captured and killed animals of the Roman arenas and the abused and vulnerable prostitutes 
of its cityscape. I argued that Revelation 17 thus presents a denigrating vision of animals 
and women as associated with evil political power (Rome), but simultaneously overturns 
this by providing the glimpse of a deconstructed sovereignty in the Whore and Beast as 
those who take on the weak positions in the battles for sovereignty and so become the call 
for a compassion to come.  
In conclusion, it is clear from my examination of Derrida’s biblical themes that the 
Bible constitutes an ambiguous archive for the question of the animal; on the one hand, 
nakedness, following God as a justice to come, and the “here I am” response, are motifs 
that emerge from biblical texts and function as a positive resource; on the other, the logos 
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and commandment “Thou shalt not kill” are held up as negative legacies for animality. On 
summing up my own interpretations of the four biblical texts of this thesis, the 
complexities and ambiguities of the biblical archive are merely multiplied. That is not to 
say, however, that the banal conclusion is simply that the status of animals in the Bible 
“depends on how you read the text”, thus offering up a menu card of different options for 
readers to choose as they see fit. Rather, the more challenging conclusion is that the 
biblical archive, in the examples I have presented, abides in an irreducible tension 
regarding animality. On the one hand, there emerges a plateau in which humans and 
animals alike are equally and similarly under God as a justice to come that calls for a 
radical similitude and solidarity as fellow creatures in the world. On the other, animals are 
also portrayed as the subjects that humans appropriate in playing God or in conveying 
God’s power over life. God is a double bind: both the justice to come that demands 
response and responsibility to one’s fellow creatures, showing all creatures alike to live in 
finitude and fellowship, but simultaneously, the idea of a higher divine power provides a 
model for demonstrations of power and subjection of others. 
 
Another Apocalyptic Shibboleth? 
In The Illusion of the End, Jean Baudrillard proposes that the modern world has lost “the 
glory of the event”, and that history has become “cannibalistic and necrophagous”, 
constantly calling for new victims and new events “so as to be done with them a little bit 
more”.20 His contention is that modern history is dominated by an apocalyptic 
presentiment and that we live in age of ressentiment and repentance.
21
 “Rather than 
pressing forward and taking flight into the future, we prefer the retrospective apocalypse, 
and a blanket revisionism”.22 My own starting point, reflecting on Derrida’s last work 
before he died, his legacy as an important intellectual thinker, and his – as well as my own 
– interest in the Bible could perhaps be classed as such a revisionism. The theme being 
animals and emerging out of the acute problem of animal suffering, with two of my 
biblical texts characterized as apocalyptic, merely reinforces Baudrillard’s point as to a 
certain tone of repentance and apocalypticism. I could indeed be accused of “trawling over 
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our own culture”,23 “rifling through its own dustbins and looking for redemption in the 
rubbish”.24 Apparently with some scorn, Baudrillard diagnoses the current intellectual 
context the latest stage of colonialism as a “New Sentimental Order”, with ecological 
concerns for nature as a subject of pity and sympathy.
25
  
In line with my introductory remarks regarding a certain sense of disillusionment 
marking current intellectual attitudes towards the “human” and the place of humanity in 
the world, Fukuyama’s infamous end of history thesis is also brought to mind. He writes:  
We in the West have become thoroughly pessimistic with regard to the possibility 
of overall progress in democratic institutions. This profound pessimism is not 
accidental, but born of the truly terrible political events of the first half of the 
twentieth century – two destructive world wars, the rise of totalitarian ideologies, 
and the turning of science against man in the form of nuclear weapons and 
environmental damage. The life experiences of the victims of this past century’s 
political violence – from the survivors of Hitlerism and Stalinism to the victims of 
Pol Pot – would deny that there has been such a thing as historical progress.26 
Does the question of the animal in fact veer between guilt and a desire for repentance that 
manifests itself in an anxious and desperate revisionism, a deflated disillusionment at 
human “progress” and “civilization” (or the lack of them, thus the necessity of ironizing 
them in inverted commas), and a saccharine sentimentalism as a quick-fix solution to 
salvage the wounds? Atterton and Calarco suggest that the “death of the author”, the 
“death of God”, the “end of philosophy”, the “end of humanism”, the “death of man” are 
apocalyptic shibboleths that have become self-defeating pronouncements in a modern and 
postmodern discourse that has barely said anything about animals.
27
 But what is the 
question of the animal if not another such shibboleth that could equally be termed “the 
death of the animal” and be added to the above list? 28 It could already be said to persist as 
an apocalyptic “death of…” announcement in the ecological anxieties over animal 
extinctions, or, indeed, the urge to proclaim the death of the “human”.   
The animal as a subject of intellectual study in the Humanities is caught up in a 
discourse that flits between the idealistic and the cynical. Animals are appropriated as 
intellectual currency in reams of words that appear to have little to do with actual animal 
lives and deaths. There is something acutely important and disturbingly highfaluting about 
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animals as a subject of study. This is because it offers academic discourse in the 
Humanities generous scope for intellectual pieties and finger-pointing semi-sermons that 
aspire to engage with “real” suppression and suffering outside the ivory towers of 
academic theory. It reveals a glimpse of the hideous reality of the material conditions for 
millions of animals outside what now sounds like the cosy enclose of “animal studies”. 
With the sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit references to slaughter, factory farming, 
the unbearably bleak conditions of so many animals in the world today, a reality of pain, 
suffering, impossible living, and grotesque death haunts this area of study. A gruff inertia 
at the impossibility of doing anything is difficult to resist for those who want to address 
these issues within institutional academic spaces today. And so, the different tones of 
animal studies range from polemical, pious, moralizing, persuasive, self-righteous, 
beseeching, incensed, defeated, hopeless, to hopeful.  
Further, explaining why animals ought to be taken seriously is sometimes met with 
a palpable sigh: oh not another repressed and marginalised group who demand academic 
attention, now animals too! As if ethnic minorities, black people, women, homosexuals, 
and animals are all victim groups queuing to get their due done in intellectual circles and 
be redeemed from the invisible margins. And, as if academics cannot wait to cash in on 
such victim-groups, scoring intellectual advantages from the smug vantage points of 
virtuous abhorrence at how anyone could possibly have failed to face up to such an outrage 
before, thus settling further into the arm-chair-throne of self-righteousness. To emphasise 
the reality of pain and suffering that is the impetus of such studies, ought one to insert 
images of the horrors of factory farms? Ought one add links to youtube clips of suffering 
animals? Or of one’s cute pets at play? Of clever creatures surprising us with their human-
likeness? Ought one to exhort people towards vegetarianism or veganism or asceticism?
29
 
To throw red paint at fur-clad women? Is there not something insufferably superfluous 
about reams of words on animal suffering? Or elements of unbearable sluggishness about 
an academic approach to such current issues? Is such work merely a matter of shuffling 
deck-chairs on the Titanic as the water rushes in below?  
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Thinking with Derrida Today 
But turning to the biblical archive with Derrida provides a prime position for thinking 
today and thinking anew. Derrida’s insistence on tradition, legacy and hauntologies30 is a 
testament to his ceaseless passion for re-examining classics and canons, and thus revealing 
the ongoing vitality of texts and traditions. Elizabeth Weber describes how such a 
hauntological focus is a challenge to not merely apocalyptically proclaim the “death” of 
various concepts but to face up to their powerful and persistent legacies.
31
 They live on. 
Just as Derrida critiques the word “animal” as a performative construction leading to 
practices that frequently condemn living beings to death, so too, intellectual discourse must 
persist in grappling with legacies conceived of as archetypal as well as those conceived of 
as extinct (sometimes the very same legacies). Paul Strohm suggests that “the archive does 
not arrest time, but rather exists as an unstable amalgam of unexhausted past and 
unaccomplished future. Open toward the future – that is, toward activities of future 
interpreters – the archive consists of texts that await meaning”.32 Thus, even “when we try 
to stop time, to freeze a moment for synchronous investigation as a part of a literary cross-
section, that moment nevertheless turns out to bear within itself intimations of past and 
future that amount to a form of implicit diachrony”.33 This is “an unruly diachrony, 
referring in the most surprising and unpredictable ways to what has been and what is not 
yet, to the residual and the emergent”.34 Derrida is a thinker who orients us towards a past 
that can always be rethought – which is always already rethinking itself – and thus is never 
stable or fixed as an immovable inheritance. Nicholas Royle describes deconstruction in 
the following way:  
a logic of destabilization always already on the move in ‘things themselves’: what 
makes every identity at once itself and different from itself: a logic of spectrality: a 
theoretical and practical parasitism or virology: what is happening today in what is 
called society, politics, diplomacy, economics, historical reality, and so on: the 
opening of the future itself.
35
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The Bible is an archive we come after, but that we follow in a way that remains 
with it. It abides in a tension between being thought of as the most popular and widely read 
“book” – found in hotel bed-sides, quoted in films, political speeches and literature, used 
for popular rites and rituals – and by an impression of its “heaviness”, its impenetrability, 
as an obscure, weird, exotic artefact. It is both archetypal and archaic, marked by ubiquity 
and extinction. It is crucial that scholarship intervenes in this tension between “what we all 
know the Bible is about” and what appears to be shrouded from general view in the 
esoteric enclaves of biblical studies. To grapple with popular and generalised perceptions 
of the biblical archive and challenge views that become staid or merely repeated till they 
appear true, is surely a testament to Derrida’s passion for combining erudite, complex 
analyses of etymologies, concepts and texts with their more obvious interpretation, use, 
and colloquial connections and context. Who can measure exactly what impact the biblical 
archive has, will have had, and will continue to have for current attitudes to animals? It 
seems clear, however, that if such canons and textual traditions have any influence 
whatsoever then the Bible would be an obvious and essential archive to explore more 
closely and critically for conceptions of animal, human, divine. 
Lawlor writes that “Derrida is and always has been a thinker of today”.36 Of course, 
“today” is not an easily determinable time or place. How to comprehend what “today” 
signifies, to grasp it and hold it tight, before its spirit dissipates in thin air. Today, as 
Derrida suggests, attitudes towards animals of the past and present need to be challenged. 
Today, it is necessary to do everything possible to limit the violence done to animals.
37
 He 
exhorts that the “relations between humans and animals must change”.38 And this “both in 
the sense of an ‘ontological’ necessity and of an ‘ethical’ duty”.39 These words are in 
quotation marks because both ontology and ethics will have to be rethought with this 
question of the animal. While he asserts his great respect for conceptions of human rights, 
he nonetheless suggests that their foundations, implications and exclusions must be 
“relentlessly analysed, reelaborated, developed, and enriched (historicity and perfectibility 
are in fact essential to it)”.40  Not to “destroy the axiomatics of this (formal and juridical) 
solution, nor to discredit it, but to reconsider the history of law and of the concept of 
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right”.41 Derrida asks, “can one take into account the necessity of the existential analytic 
and what it shatters in the subject and turn toward an ethics, a politics (are these words still 
appropriate?), indeed an ‘other’ democracy (would it still be a democracy?), in any case 
toward another type of responsibility that safeguards against” what he calls the worst kinds 
of violence taking place today? This, he concludes, “can only take place by a way of a long 
and slow trajectory”.42 Derrida also, then, invites “a slow and progressive approach”,43 
akin to the “slow motion” reading I, following Sherwood, suggested in the introduction 
with regard to the biblical archive. There is a sense of urgency in Derrida’s imperative for 
change and his “today” but also for an interminable patience in his call for on-going 
critical thought as to the structures that underpin social, political and ethical relations in the 
world, or indeed, our many worlds, when it comes to the “other” and how this other is 
conceived, welcomed or excluded. 
There are some who might feel irritated and impatient with the above tension 
between urgency for change and the injunction for slow, on-going intellectual thought and 
ceaseless critical analysis. This is perhaps especially the case for animal studies. Where 
does it leave us? The difficulty lies in “that the response cannot be formulated as a ‘yes or 
no’; that would be too simple. It is necessary to give a singular response, within a given 
context, and to take the risk of a decision by enduring the undecidable”.44 As Wolfe points 
out, it is in our “confrontation with an ethical situation that is always precisely not generic 
(hence its demand and, in a sense, its trauma); it obeys instead a double articulation in 
which the difference between law and justice is always confronted in specific situations 
whose details matter a great deal”.45 Writing on the ethical and political stakes of Derrida’s 
work on animals, Calarco asks why Derrida does not go on to provide an ethical platform 
from which moral change and action can take place. But he rightly points out that Derrida 
is attempting to think ethics and animality at another level, of the very conditions for any 
ethics, and what principles must be in place in order to think or do ethics at all.
46
 This 
attempt at something like a disruptive gesture at the very foundations of relations to the 
other, and the engagement with traditions, canons and philosophical inheritance, is why 
Derrida is such a valuable thinker for the question of the animal today. As Calarco puts it: 
“Deconstruction is situated precisely at this level, namely, that of trying to articulate 
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another thought of relation (ethics) and practice (politics) that moves beyond the limits of 
anthropocentric traditions and institutions”.47  
As I outlined in the beginning, what Derrida ultimately calls for in his work on 
animality is: (1) greater vigilance in thought, perhaps especially philosophical thought, 
over the supposedly distinct differences between humans and animals; (2) compassion and 
what he calls an “awakening” to the animal other as a condition for ethics, that forms the 
impetus for his dream of an unconditional hospitality; (3) responsibility in the face of a 
horizon of justice that will always be to some extent excessive, incalculable and 
impossible, but that nonetheless demands our interminable response with respect to the 
other as any other. Ian Balfour conveys how Derrida has been accused of relativism, 
scepticism, irresponsibility. But, he states, “the opposite is far truer: his thinking, writing, 
and speaking is characterized, rather, by a hyperresponsibility, a responsibility to the 
complexities of the moment, of history, and the history to come, and to the discourses in 
which we think and judge, all the while committed to resisting some of the suspect and 
exhausted modes of thinking we have inherited”.48 This is clearly a concern in Derrida’s 
work on animality. Unconditional hospitality is not merely an impossibility or dream, but 
an interpretive and intellectual practice that seeks to question the way the “other” is related 
to in and outside our homes, on the streets, in supermarkets, at our tables and in nature, in 
texts, traditions, canons and legacies, as well as places such as zoos, laboratories, 
enclosures, kennels – without pretending there are simple or straightforward solutions to 
human-animal interactions and obligations.  
Graham Ward criticises what he sees as the “tyrannous demand for infinite 
responsibility” that can only be endured, implied by the impossible responsibility and 
regard for life signified in Derrida’s God, and represented in my reading of Genesis 9.49  
He suggests that such an ethics becomes a Sisyphean task, questioning whether there is 
anything ethical about the “infinite guilt” which, Ward suggests, this thinking of 
responsibility entails.
50
 But as John Caputo’s response to Ward testifies, it is rather a 
matter of “always responding and at the same time always asking what we are responding 
to, always choosing and at the same time asking what we have chosen or has chosen us, 
what we are doing in the midst of the concrete decisions we always and invariably 
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make”.51 The biblical texts I examined showed this aspect too, of the tension in not 
knowing exactly who one follows when one follows the animal or God, most pertinently 
showcased in my interpretation of the Book of Daniel. Deconstruction is “not a philosophy 
of undecidability tout court, but of deciding-in-the-midst-of-undecidability”.52 There are 
two movements in deconstruction, Caputo suggests, historical association and messianic 
dissociation. It situates itself in the contexts, histories and traditions given to us and 
dissociates itself from these names, terms, narratives and dreams for a messianic justice to 
come. “If the first movement, historical dissociation, has to do with the fore-given, the 
second movement has to do with the un-fore-seeable, which is never given”.53 Although in 
a sense, Derrida’s thinking of God and responsibility, as I have outlined, does testify to a 
state of being always already at fault, it is also a radical thinking of hope, of dreaming. But 
this is oriented within the specific, the contextual, the “here I am” in a here-and-now that 
demands my response and responsibility today and every day.  
Derrida flits between this sense of what is dreamt of – an unconditional justice, 
infinite responsibility, a hospitality without limits – and the awakened, urgent, contextual 
and material that must be lived with and lived in-the-midst-of. With the case of the question 
of the animal, there is a very real sense in which the entrenched views that condemn 
animals to a separate sphere as a non-other, a non-neighbour, to killability or utilisation, 
requires the hope and dream of another way of living, another response to the life of others. 
My reading of Acts 10 raised this point, with its rethinking of the relationality to the other, 
and demand for a solidarity amongst the living and the dead, in other words, mortal 
creatures. At the same time, the urgency and reality of animal suffering is a demand for an 
eyes-opened attention now, an awakened state that sees animals and the suffering going on 
in the name of this word “animal” and refuses to look away, that affords compassion, that 
calls for change. As I suggested with regard to Revelation 17, to recognise weakness and 
suffering and side with the victim is to awaken to conditions that subjugate women and 
animals as powerless objects of consumption. This is not merely a historical exercise or act 
of literary criticism, but to critically question how discourses of human and animal allow 
for such conditions to continue, if the category “human” is not destabilized and questioned. 
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Animals and Religion On the Table 
Turning to Religion? 
This thesis might also be seen within the so-called “turn to religion”, with its focus on the 
biblical and Judeo-Christian and Derrida’s own biblical engagement. Hent de Vries, for 
instance, diagnoses this important shift in modern philosophy, particularly exemplified by 
Derrida’s later work.54 Recent scholarship within this turn to religion argues “that citations 
from religious traditions are more fundamental to the structure of language and experience 
than the genealogies, critiques, and transcendental reflections of the modern discourse that 
has deemed such citations obsolete and tended to reduce them to what they are not”.55  It is 
as if religion “dies an ever more secure and serial death, it is increasingly certain to come 
back to life, in its present guise or in another”.56 The biblical archive becomes an urgent 
source of critical study as it appears, on the surface, to be less relevant, known, or read, in 
a modern Western world. If biblical citations and legacies become all the more blurred and 
less overtly discussed it risks becoming a locus no longer critically explored and mapped 
out. It is perhaps noteworthy that Derrida calls both the question of religion and the 
question of the animal “the question of the question” and of response.57 Why religion and 
the animal?
58
 As Sherwood and Moore diagnose a “turn to the Bible” within the “turn to 
religion”, “the Bible is coming to be seen as a key site where foundational, but 
unsustainable, ‘modern’ separations were made”.59 In this case, of course, it is a question 
of the “human” or “man” and the separations between human, animal, divine. In 
renegotiations of “the Bible as symptomatic cultural space”,60 they argue that the Bible has 
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become a site in which “settled identities” and “established concepts” might be disrupted.61 
Any notion of a settled identity or established concept for the “human” in the biblical 
archive, is, as I have shown, impossible to maintain. But that does not mean that we are left 
bereft, stuck with the shards of a broken-down concept, concluding only with W. B. Yeats 
that “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold”. Rather, it shows that the concepts of 
human, animal, divine are both more fluid and particular than can be easily generalised. 
Just as Derrida does retain the word “animal” and “human” and never lets go of them 
entirely, it is not a matter of falling into a homogenous conceptual swamp or of 
iconoclasm. But it is a matter of critically interrogating how such terms are used and 
manipulated, of analysing the tacit exclusions they entail and recognising the constant need 
to re-examine the stakes of our intellectual enterprises. Such enterprises thus become a 
means of gathering ideas that multiply impressions of the staid spaces of “man” or 
“human”, that add, grow and provide places to think with others, with otherness and not 
merely the self-same.  
In the last line of their critical manifesto on biblical scholarship, Moore and 
Sherwood suggest that, paradoxically, what needs to be re-found is precisely religion.
62
 
Perhaps, also then, Derrida’s coupling of religion and animality occurs because in every 
address to the other – and as Derrida emphasises, the animal other too – there must be an 
element of faith; because bearing witness and testifying to another or for another is in part 
always already an act of faith.
63
 Such a faith is perhaps particularly notable for the animal 
other as an other I cannot pretend to wholly know; the animal other marks the limits of 
human knowledge, it marks the ends and limits of the knowledge of any and every other 
and so the incalculability of this other whom I encounter, and in whose encounter a relation 
is established that instantiates the very condition for ethics as response and responsibility. 
The “suffering, fear, or panic, the terror or fright that can seize certain animals and that we 
humans can witness”64 is a capacity, a question, not an automated given, and so involves a 
demand for response or responsibility, to testify to such suffering in a faith or hope. Such a 
faith might always be at fault as not enough, as inadequate, as misplaced, but it is perhaps 
nonetheless all that can be attempted in reaction to a knowledge founded in an 
unquestioned and unquestionable power to subject, exclude, ignore or deem irrelevant, 
rather than a destabilization of such knowledge in the sight of suffering and the recognition 
                                                          
61
 Ibid., 129. 
62
 Ibid., 131. 
63
 FK, 98-99. 
64
 TATTIA, 28. 
Conclusion: Living On (With) Derrida, the Bible, and Animals 
 
 
232 
 
of the “perspective of an animal request, of an audible or silent appeal that calls within us 
outside of us, from the most far away, before us after us, preceding and pursuing us in an 
unavoidable way”.65 
But of course, as de Vries points out, the real reason of the return of the religious is 
because of the “resurfacing of religion as a highly ambiguous force on the contemporary 
geopolitical stage”.66 De Vries suggests that “retracing the religious means also – and, 
perhaps, first of all – tracing it otherwise, not allowing it to take on one particular – that is, 
universal – meaning once and for all”.67 This would tally with Derrida’s call for a 
relentless, interminable attention to, and analysis of, the structures of ethics, rights, law and 
society that underpin, constitute and determine our relationships to others. This is what I 
have attempted with the four chapters of this thesis too, of tracing these texts otherwise 
with Derrida’s question of the animal in mind, in order to foreclose the possibility of the 
“Bible” becoming either a universal pamphlet for animal-welfare or a discarded anti-
animal relic.  
 
On and Around the Table 
While the Bible and its Judeo-Christian legacy are ostensibly, for Derrida, complicit with 
the philosophical tradition he critiques, I have tried to show that on closer examination the 
biblical archive implicitly provides a significant ground for his thinking of animality in 
alternative fashion to this philosophical tradition. In fact, it is some of his biblical examples 
that furnish the ground on which his call for a response and responsibility is founded. 
Namely, the finitude and vulnerability of nakedness that humans and animals share that he 
draws from Genesis, and the response “here I am” to God and animals. Animals and God 
become Derrida’s figures for the nonhuman other: God is thus the demand for 
responsibility in the horizon of a justice to come that arises always from, in relation to, and 
after, the other, and the animal is the figure of the other whom I encounter and respond to 
in the here-and-now as a particular, relational living being. Derrida’s God is not a 
teleological entity which will judge at a particular end-time; this God might rather be 
understood as the interminable hope or aspiration for justice, for response and 
responsibility, in being seen and being held accountable before the law of the other. Such a 
                                                          
65
 Ibid., 113. 
66
 De Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, 6. 
67
 Ibid., 31. 
Conclusion: Living On (With) Derrida, the Bible, and Animals 
 
 
233 
 
justice is the hope for a culture or community of irreducible singularities nonetheless in a 
shared space, a space hospitable to such singularities in which every other remains other 
but nonetheless related to, in relation and response.  
At the same time, as Sherwood puts it, the Bible is not “some solid arche, given 
once and for all (like the image of the Bible epitomised in the 5200 pound granite 
monument of the ten commandments erected outside an Alabama courthouse), nor some 
newly discovered, exotic (dis-Orientating? Hebrew? Jewish?) other, come to seduce a 
Greco-Christian West”.68 The biblical archive is thus a complex compendium fraught with 
tensions and ambivalences that can, with its animals, only be held in abeyance. There can 
be no final “ownership” proclaimed of this archive and its animals, nor can this conclusion 
dis-suspend them from such an ambivalent state. The four biblical texts I have explored 
and interpreted ultimately add a multivocal response to Derrida’s question of the animal. In 
fact, what the biblical archive seemingly “holds” is a contradictory web of relations 
between human, animal and divine, sometimes derogatory towards what we call “animals” 
and at other times radically overturning anthropocentric attitudes. What I contribute with 
this thesis, then, is a close and critical engagement with the theoretical stakes of Derrida’s 
work on the animal, especially in regard to his biblical references, and detailed but wide-
ranging readings of four biblical texts in order to show the ways in which this archive 
might be read as both a denigrating source for anthropocentrism and a resource for 
thinking otherwise.  
Many of the themes emerging in the biblical texts I have presented have revolved 
around the relationship between eating and being eaten. One common theme, then, has 
been the table as a locus of power but also a symbol of hospitality. This theme is also 
important for Derrida, and it is with the question of eating that Derrida’s ambivalence as to 
the animal question fully emerges. It is not enough to avoid eating animals, he states: the 
other is also consumable in more symbolic and unconscious ways.
69
 Predominantly, what 
this highlights is that there can be no simple solution that avoids the suffering of others or 
that abstains from violence. There can be no hospitality of the table that is immune from 
appropriation and consumption of my other. For Derrida a justice to come is not 
teleological, but rather, it remains as a horizon of justice in which his dream of hospitality 
to the other as any other and the first-comer can awaken but is never free from the risks of 
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“evil”. The “opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of justice”, is 
what Derrida calls the messianic.
70
 The “messianic exposes itself to absolute surprise and, 
even if it always takes the phenomenal form of peace or of justice, it ought, exposing itself 
so abstractly, be prepared (waiting without awaiting itself) for the best as for the worst, the 
one never coming without opening the possibility of the other”.71 The table can thus be 
seen as the metaphorical place on which subjects are drawn from the margins and placed 
on for discussion, to do (or give) them justice: putting animals on the table. But the table is 
also that place on which animals are eaten and appropriated – done justice in the sense of a 
sentencing to edibility and killability. The table is the place for fellowship with my 
neighbour, fellow and friend, but it is also a place of exclusion, for those who are not 
invited. The table, like the biblical archive, is an ambivalent site for animals. But following 
Caputo, it is a matter of ceaselessly thinking and offering hospitality while always already 
questioning what kind of hospitality we are offering, and what or who are left outside the 
oikonomia of the table. As Derrida ended his paper entitled “The Ends of Man”, the words 
that must interrupt our thinking are perhaps these three: “But who, we?”72 
The biblical archive is haunted by a sense of the archaic, of an archetypcal archive 
and particular kind of canonical authority that is marked by de Vries’ notion of religion as 
a “highly ambiguous force”.73 Its short-hand name, “Bible”, masks the sense of an archive 
of books that is potently ambiguous in the sense that it is frequently diverted into polarized 
positions of either defunct or potent, conservative or liberal, liberating or oppressive, rather 
than left suspended in ambivalence and abeyance. To leave such a collection of books in 
this ambivalent state would perhaps signal a dangerous move: it could be left in the hands 
of others to name and shame it as determinedly “this” or “that”. In the context of the 
question of the animal, the issue of ambivalence and ambiguity is perhaps also pertinent in 
a somewhat similar way. Animals emerge in this discourse as either in need of liberation or 
pity, as dangerous others better left to themselves or as complex beings humans will never 
comprehend. Of course, what haunts animal studies is the impossibility of determining 
exactly what might be “right” for “animals”.74 But it is not only in the challenge of this 
generality of the word “animal”: even thinking in individual cases of species or particular 
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creatures we are faced with a challenge as to what this being is, signifies, desires, thinks, 
needs, asks of me. This, however, must be lived with as a ceaseless question. Seeing 
Derrida’s work as “an ironic and constantly shifting world without borders and without the 
moral teleology of apocalyptic thought, that is, without final solutions”, as Juliet Flower 
MacCannell puts it,
75
 and thus avoiding such a “world”, would be to accept a cessation of 
thought, of critical attention, and of final, or one might say terminal, appropriations of 
texts, others, topics. 
Perhaps the only way to conclude, then, is with Derrida’s double imperative. On the 
one hand, we must do everything we can now to significantly decrease the suffering and 
systematic exploitation and industrialization of animal bodies. This might involve 
imperfect short-term solutions, even clumsy practical attempts that risk contradiction and 
unsustainability. On the other hand, it is crucial to be and remain critical to the practices, 
institutions, canons and customs that regulate and inform our lives in relation to others, 
human and non-human. Here, a slow, analytical and rigorous approach can be hoped for, to 
ensure that systematic and accepted abuse of animals is stopped or at least limited. “All the 
archaic, anachronistic forms are there ready to re-emerge, intact and timeless, like the 
viruses deep in the body”, Baudrillard writes of history.76 “History has only wrenched 
itself from cyclical time to fall into the order of the recyclable.”77 But it is perhaps in the 
recyclable that an engagement of the past that is allied to the future may be found: an 
engagement that does not naively suppose that the past and its intellectual inheritance can 
be shrugged off, that does not baulk at relocating “the ‘new’ ground on the older one”,78 
and thus reside in a world in which the resources of the past may come in handy to think 
critically today. 
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